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Abstract
Closer Ties: The Dutch Caribbean and the Aftermath of Empire, 1942-2012
by
Chelsea Schields
Advisor: Professor Dagmar Herzog
This dissertation examines the unique trajectory of decolonization in the Netherlands and
its former Caribbean colonies and argues that sexual and reproductive politics have played a
pivotal role in forging a postcolonial commonwealth state. Using sexual politics as a lens,
“Closer Ties” explores how postcolonial ties between the Netherlands and its former Caribbean
dependencies have strengthened rather than severed in the aftermath of colonial rule. This
alternative ending of empire challenges the assumed trajectory of decolonization and locates the
drama of imperial dissolution in debates over sexual and reproductive rights in Europe. Looking
to the circuits of trans-Atlantic exchange across the Kingdom of the Netherlands, a
commonwealth state linking the Netherlands and six Dutch Antillean islands, “Closer Ties”
explores the remarkable investment in knowledge production, development aid and social
welfare that emerged only at empire’s end, and views related debates on sexual politics as sites
where Dutch power is both exercised and contested. As this dissertation demonstrates,
preoccupation with the perceived conjugal norms, gender roles and sexuality of Antillean Dutch
has undergirded drastic changes to the geography of the Dutch state and notions of citizenship,
variously justifying both the expansion and the retrenchment of Dutch boundaries, aid, and social
services. In this process, and however paradoxically, trans-Atlantic exchange has intensified.
By viewing decolonization not as a parting of ways, but rather as a strengthening of ties, this
dissertation will contribute to a reconceptualization of the end of empire and its aftermath.
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Introduction
The Sexual Politics of Decolonization

On 7 December 1942, Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands addressed her subjects in a
radio speech from exile in London. She stressed the common experience of suffering uniting the
metropolitan Dutch with their colonial compatriots, hardships that increased the feeling of accord
across the Kingdom.1 Once the war ended, her majesty promised, the Kingdom’s constituent
pieces in Europe, the Indonesia archipelago, and the Caribbean would jointly reform the
structure of the Kingdom. The Queen—in keeping with the alleged emerging spirit of
camaraderie—offered only a hypothetical model for the postcolonial future: “I visualize, without
anticipating the recommendations of the future conference, that they will be directed towards a
commonwealth in which the Netherlands, Indonesia, Suriname and Curaçao [Netherlands
Antilles] will participate, with complete self-reliance and freedom of conduct for each part
regarding its internal affairs, but with the readiness to render mutual assistance.”2
While the Queen’s predictions proved idealistic with regard to Indonesia and Suriname,
which achieved independence from the Netherlands in 1949 and 1975 respectively, in the
Netherlands Antilles these royal ambitions have been borne out. Indeed, from the formal
colonization of the six Dutch Antillean islands in the mid-seventeenth century to the present day,
ties between the Netherlands and its former Caribbean dependencies have remained
fundamentally unbroken. When Antillean delegates joined other officials from the Kingdom to
reform imperial bonds after the close of the Second World War, they, too, visualized a
1

With the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands, the country was unable to marshal resources in defense of the Dutch
East Indies. The East Indies came under Japanese occupation after 1942, while US and British marines arrived in
the Netherlands Antilles to protect Aruba and Curaçao’s large oil refining industries.
2
Wilhelmina prinses der Nederlanden, The Queen Looks at the Future: Important Statements of H.M. Queen
Wilhelmina on War and Peace Aims (New York: The Netherlands Information Bureau, 1943), 13.
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commonwealth of equal partner states in communion with the Netherlands, a move deemed
insufficiently anti-colonial by Indonesian and later Surinamese nationalists.3 Having learned the
cost of suppressing independence movements through a bloody war with Indonesian nationalists,
the architects of the 1954 Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands—Dutch, Antillean and
Surinamese—ensured in the Charter’s preamble that the document need not serve as “an eternal
edict.”4 While this safeguard intended to usher the Caribbean colonies to eventual independence,
in the islands of the former Netherlands Antilles the flexibility of the Charter has been tested
more often than not by efforts to seek yet closer ties with the Netherlands, in the process
sometimes weakening those amongst the islands themselves. The six Dutch Caribbean islands—
the marginal remnants of a once-sprawling empire—have sought redress for centuries of
colonialism not by calling for national independence, but rather by insisting on increased Dutch
accountability for a colonial past characterized by disinterest and neglect.5
Against the grain of familiar narratives of anti-colonial independence movements and
European nations’ desperate efforts to combat them, this dissertation examines the intensification
of bonds between the Netherlands and the Dutch Antilles from the 1940s until the dissolution of
3

The most complete studies of these negotiations and their historical context are Inge Klinkers, De Weg Naar Het
Statuut: het Nederlandse Dekolonisatiebelied in de Caraïben (1940-54) in Vegelijkende Perspectief (Utrecht:
Utrecht Universiteit, 1999), and the three-part study by Gert Oostindie and Klinkers, Knellende Koninkrijksbanden:
het Nederlandse Dekolonisatiebeleid in de Caraïben, 1940-2000 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2001),
published in shortened format in English as Decolonising the Caribbean: Dutch Policies in a Comparative
Perspective (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2002). Peter Meel explores the issues surrounding
Surinamese independence in Tussen Autonomie en Onafhankelijkheid: Nederlands-Surinaamse Betrekkingen, 19541961 (Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij, 1999). On the disagreements with Indonesian leadership over federalism, see
Jennifer Foray, Visions of Empire in the Nazi-Occupied Netherlands (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2012). John Jansen van Galen examines the decolonization of the Dutch East and West Indies together in, Afscheid
van de Koloniën (Amsterdam: Atlas Contact, 2013).
4
Statuut voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 1954, reprinted in Lexplicatie: De Complete Wetgeving Toegelicht,
Statuut voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, edited by W. Richard Timmers, (Deventer: Wolters Kluwer, 2009),
259. Gert Oostindie has also remarked upon this statement in his numerous essays and books, notably in “Het
Statuut van het Koninkrijk is Geen Eeuwig Edict,” in Openbaar Bestuur, 1991-2005, eds. Peter Oosten de Boer and
Hans van der Heuvel (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer, 2005): 135-146.
5
Historians of the colonial period concur that the West Indies was marginal to the Dutch enterprise. This attitude
was most forcefully summed up by historian Pieter C. Emmer, who argued that “the Dutch were not very important
in that part of the world.” Emmer, The Dutch in the Atlantic Economy, 1500-1850 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 1.
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the Antillean state in 2012. Crucial to understanding this narrative of decolonization, I argue, are
intense debates on gender, sexual and family politics that have galvanized both support for and
opposition to enduring Kingdom ties. At critical points in the Kingdom’s history, debates on
prostitution, family planning, women’s emancipation, and same-sex marriage have played a
decisive role in mobilizing opinions both for and against the Kingdom—shaping its very
boundaries and influencing the allocation of resources and development aid. Thus, “Closer Ties”
argues that sexual politics have served as a critical site for exercising and contesting Dutch
power in a multinational state.
This entanglement between sexual and postcolonial politics runs throughout the broad
sweep of the Kingdom’s postcolonial history. But the impact of these discourses—and their
purported goals—has not remained static. Among the themes this dissertation explores is
continued European Dutch intervention in the intimate lives of Antillean Dutch. This pattern
emerged already at the onset of colonial reform. With the announcement of decolonization plans
in the 1940s, Dutch elites immediately set about reforming the Afro-Antillean household.
Incentivizing marriage and decreasing rates of illegitimacy were to become the primary measures
of decolonization’s success. The Royal Dutch Shell Company on Curaçao, which in the 1940s
was the largest refiner of crude oil in the world, likewise extolled the virtue of “responsibility” to
the nuclear family and work, redeploying stereotypes of black sexual irresponsibility that once
justified slavery.6 Preoccupation with the perceived conjugal norms of Afro-Antilleans would
continue throughout the following decades, as European-funded family planning and social
welfare initiatives sought new strategies for warding off the immigration of cash-poor Antillean
women and their children to the Netherlands and attempted to limit their dependence on social
6

For the authoritative history of the Royal Dutch Shell Company on Curaçao, see Jaap van Soest, Olie als Water,
De Curacaose economie in de eerste helft van de twintigste eeuw (Willemstad: Centraal Historisch Archief, 1977).
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services. “Closer Ties” posits that dominant postcolonial discourses have not managed to escape
the continued pathologization of the “West Indian family” not least because colonialism itself
was so saturated by concerns about the regulation of black women’s sexuality and fertility. In
this way, too, sexual politics has stood at the center of imperial undoing.
Yet, sexual politics have not only served to rationalize Dutch intervention in the intimate
lives of Antilleans. They have also resonated within Antillean demands for emancipation. For
radical socialists on Curaçao who later staged a dramatic anti-colonial revolt on the island in
1969, access to birth control formed a key part of their revolutionary platform. Only through
access to contraceptives, they argued, could the Antilles break free from Dutch control.
Antillean feminists in the 1980s expanded this agenda and pushed not only for women’s
autonomy over their reproductive health. Instead, feminist organizations on Curaçao in the
1980s-1990s rallied the support of Antillean men and women alike by highlighting the lasting
influence of Dutch colonialism on gender discriminatory laws.7 In this way, feminists
profoundly reversed earlier discourses that displaced blame for enduring oppression of Antillean
women onto black men.
Sexual politics, too, have surfaced in arguments for closer trans-Atlantic collaboration.
From the repeated requests for Dutch assistance in family planning efforts made by conservative
Antillean elites in the 1960s to the recent advance of LGBTQ rights in the Caribbean territories,
both European and Antillean Dutch have looked to their Kingdom partner for cooperation in
reforming households and expanding sexual rights. Within the last several years, Antillean
LGBTQ activists have worked with European Dutch legislators and civil rights groups to
advance sexual progressivism in the islands. In 2012, the Dutch Antillean islands of Bonaire, St.
7

On feminist movements in Curaçao, see Sonia Cuales, "In Search of Our Memory: Gender in the Netherlands
Antilles," Feminist Review 59 (1998): 86-100 and Adaly Rodriguez, The Rise of Women’s Rights on Curaçao
(Willemstad: Uitgeverij SWP, 2015).
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Eustatius and Saba became the first in the Caribbean region to legalize marriage equality.
Several years later, colorful floats crowded the canal ways of Amsterdam’s historic center during
city’s 2015 Pride Parade. Sailing under the banner “One Kingdom, One Love,” a float
representing the trans-Atlantic commonwealth—the first in the history of the Pride Parade to
represent the Kingdom—garnered the attention of journalists and filmmakers alike.8 While this
festive float with its celebratory atmosphere scarcely captures the immense struggles that have at
times characterized relations in the Kingdom, it nevertheless aptly illustrates the general impulse
of the Kingdom’s postcolonial history: the negotiation of closer trans-Atlantic ties on the terrain
of sexual politics.

Literature Background
Four distinct bodies of literature provide a foundation for this dissertation. First, political
histories of the Netherlands Antilles from World War II to the present offer thorough
introductions to the major turning points in the decolonization of the Dutch empire. Second, an
interdisciplinary literature on non-sovereign statehood assesses the political and economic
performance of non-independent states in the postcolonial period. Third, as this dissertation
takes up popular debates on sexual politics and their relevance to other affairs in the Kingdom,
scholarship by historians and anthropologists on the colonial regulation of intimacy and the
importance of sexual politics to the legitimacy of postcolonial nation-states also informs this
study. Lastly, an emergent body of scholarship revisiting empire’s end increasingly invokes the

8

The documentary film, “One Kingdom, One Love,” showcases personal stories of LGBTQ-identifying individuals
on the Dutch Caribbean islands and discusses issues around social acceptance of sexual minorities in the Kingdom.
For more on the film, see “One Kingdom, One Love,” http://www.onekingdom.nl/index.php.
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so-called “federal moment,”9 the decade immediately following the Second World War wherein
colonies of the British, French and Dutch empires weighed the possibility of imperial integration
over national territorial sovereignty. In conjoining these frequently divided bodies of literature,
this dissertation seeks to illuminate not only the political processes whereby non-sovereignty was
deliberately achieved in the Antilles, but also how this often-ambiguous situation was popularly
negotiated and experienced.
Political histories dominate the extant literature on the postcolonial Dutch Caribbean.10 A
three-part reference work co-authored by historians Gert Oostindie and Inge Klinkers outlines
the political developments within the Kingdom from 1940-2010 and provides a detailed
understanding of the Charter—its obligations and limitations—as well as a thorough description
of Dutch and Antillean political cultures. The shortened English translation of this work
highlights Dutch policies in comparative perspective and includes an abbreviated assessment of
past and present cultural connections between the Dutch and the Caribbean. Additionally, legal
scholar Steven Hillebrink’s important book analyzes the Charter alongside United Nations policy
on decolonization. Hillebrink concludes that the Charter and the voluntary association of former
colonies with the metropole satisfy UN protocol. While these works serve as an indispensable
introduction to the major turning points throughout the past seventy years of Antillean history,
9

The term “federal moment” appears in Michael Collins, “Decolonisation and the ‘Federal Moment,’” in Diplomacy
and Statecraft 24 (2013): 21-40.
10
Social history has been relatively neglected aside from a burgeoning and often divided literature on the memory of
slavery in Curaçao and Suriname, and amongst postcolonial immigrants residing in the Netherlands. On social
history in the colonial period, see Rose Mary Allen, Di Ki Manera? A Social History of Afro-Curaçaons, 1863-1917
(Amsterdam: SWP, 2007). For an introduction to the academic and popular debate on the Dutch slave past, see Gert
Oostindie, “History Brought Home: Postcolonial Migrations and the Dutch Rediscovery of Slavery,” in ed. Wim
Klooster, Migration, Trade and Slavery in an Expanding World: Essays in Honor of Pieter Emmer (Leiden: Brill
Academic Publishers, 2009), Oostindie, ed., Het Verleden Onder Ogen: Herdenking van de Slavernij (The Hague:
Prins Claus Fonds voor Cultuur en Ontwikkeling, 1999), Oostindie, ed., Facing Up to the Past: Perspectives on the
Commemoration of Slavery from Africa, the Americas and Europe (Kingston: Ian Randle, 2001), Sandew Hira,
“Decolonizing the Mind: The Case of the Netherlands,” Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self
Knowledge 10 (2012): 53-68, and Alex Van Stipriaan, et al., eds., Op Zoek Naar de Stilte (Leiden: KITLV Press,
2007).
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they are more valuable for their exhaustive archival research rather than their conceptual
ingenuity. Oostindie and Klinkers’ conception of the Antilles as a “stagnated model of
decolonization”11 continues to measure the Antilles against the more normative models of
decolonization resulting in national territorial sovereignty. Further, while the authors under
discussion frequently reference the Antillean rejection of independence, they do so without
providing much of a flavor of the surrounding debates, as if the desire to access the benefits of
metropolitan citizenship were as self-evident as the desire, in other parts of the postcolonial
world, for independence and self-sovereignty. As anthropologist Francio Guadeloupe remarks,
one cannot assume that the only plausible explanation for rejecting national independence rests
on economic calculations.12 Only through a deeper reading of Antillean arguments for nonsovereignty—and metropolitan agendas pushing for its antithesis—can we reach a fuller
understanding of how imperial bonds are sustained, revitalized and ultimately transformed.
Multi-disciplinary scholarship on non-sovereign statehood has focused on the political
and economic advantages of non-independence. Godfrey Baldacchino and David Milne’s The
Case for Non-Sovereignty stresses the economic benefits and enhanced stability experienced by
autonomous rather than independent states. Supporting this assessment, Peter Clegg and Emilio
Pantojas-García argue against the tendency to evaluate non-self governing states according to
capacity for eventual self-rule or, alternatively, by the degree to which they continue to resemble
colonies.13 Lammert de Jong echoes this call and, in various works, argues that non-sovereign

11

Best explicated in Oostindie and Klinkers, Decolonising the Caribbean, 86. Their most recent work, Gedeeld
Koninkrijk: De Ontmanteling Van De Nederlandse Antillen en de Vernieuwing Van De Trans-Atlantische Relaties
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012) analyzes the political restructuring of the former Netherlands
Antilles from the initial limited referendum on St Maarten in 2004 to the dissolution of the Netherlands Antilles in
2010.
12
Francio Guadeloupe, “Introducing an Anti-National Pragmatist on Saint Martin & St Maarten,” in ed. Lammert de
Jong and Dirk Kruijt, Extended Statehood in the Caribbean: Paradoxes of Quasi Colonialism, Local Autonomy, and
Extended Statehood in the USA, French, Dutch and British Caribbean (Amsterdam: Rozenburg, 2005), 157-158.
13
Eds. Peter Clegg and Emilio Pantojas-García, introduction to Governance in the Non-Independent
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states should be evaluated on their own terms and according to their own political dynamics, not
as “failed” examples of decolonization stuck in “the halfway house” between colonialism and
independence.14
Following these authors, “Closer Ties” does not address questions of how and to what
extent the Antillean islands remain “colonies” of the Netherlands and does not assess the
viability for eventual sovereignty. However, this dissertation probes further beyond the
bureaucratic processes and economic outcomes spotlighted in these studies to consider other sites
of contestation and popular engagement—including especially those over sexual freedoms. Why
did sexual politics become such an important battleground for sorting out familiar postcolonial
conflicts over citizenship, identity and belonging? Here, I build on previous studies of
colonialism, slavery and the regulation of intimacy that maintained both systems. I argue that
sexual politics have factored significantly into postcolonial relations not least because the
regulation of sexuality was a central component of the colonial and slavery past. Histories of the
colonial regulation of sexuality in the Dutch empire most often center on the Dutch East Indies,
and the work of Ann Laura Stoler has been instructive for students of colonialism writ large,
drawing critical attention to the ways in which the regulation of intimacy helped to create and
maintain racial hierarchies in the colonies.15 Studies of race and slavery in the Americas have

Caribbean: Challenges and Opportunities in the Twenty-First Century (Kingston: Ian Randle, 2009), 1-24.
14
Lammert de Jong, “Extended Statehood in the Caribbean: Definition and Focus,” in eds. Lammert de Jong and
Dirk Kruijt, Extended Statehood in the Caribbean: Paradoxes of Quasi Colonialism, Local Autonomy and Extended
Statehood in the USA, French, Dutch and British Caribbean (Amsterdam: Rozenberg, 2005), 3-24.
15
Within the Dutch empire, the study of intimacy and its colonial regulation is much more extensively documented
for the East Indies. See Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in
Colonial Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s
History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995) and Elsbeth LocherScholten, Women and the Colonial Estate: Essays on Gender and Modernity in the Netherlands Indies, 1900-1942
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2004).
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also reinforced the interdependency of hardening understandings of race, gender and sexuality.16
As Jennifer Morgan has demonstrated, racial slavery was ideologically constituted by connecting
gender and sexual deviance to blackness. Further, enslaved women’s labor and reproductive
capacity determined the value of black female life in the Americas.17 While scholars have
attended to the intersections among race, class and gender in the establishment of colonial
societies and racial hierarchies, fewer studies examine how these intimate entanglements played
out in the era of decolonization.18 The enduring ties of the Kingdom thus offer a useful handle
for considering the afterlife of the colonial regulation of sexuality.
Interdisciplinary studies on Caribbean sexuality also inform this dissertation.19 In
particular, I am indebted to the work of feminist scholar M. Jacqui Alexander, which illustrates
how the sexually conservative nationalisms of 1960s Caribbean nation-states sought to rebut
colonial stereotypes of the hypersexual and untamed West Indian subject that had long

16

The literature on slavery in the Dutch Caribbean has, for the most part, not addressed issues of gender and
sexuality. The notable exception is Gloria Wekker’s important study, The Politics of Passion: Women’s Sexual
Culture in the Afro-Surinamese Diaspora (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006). The historiography on
slavery in the Dutch Atlantic is a highly divided field, with intense disagreements between historians focused on
empirical archival studies and those interdisciplinary scholars who believe the experiences of enslaved people—and
subsequent legacies of trauma—must be explored beyond the official knowledge of the archive. Notable studies of
the former group include, Johannes Menne Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600-1815 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990) and Emmer, The Dutch in the Atlantic Economy, 1500-1850. Works
representative of the latter strain in the literature include, Alex van Stipriaan, et al. Op Zoek Naar de Stilte and
Kwame Nimako and Glenn Willemsen, The Dutch Atlantic: Slavery, Abolition and Emancipation (London: Pluto
Press, 2011).
17
Jennifer Morgan, Laboring Women: Reproduction and Gender in New World Slavery (Philadphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
18
Recent and notable exceptions include Todd Shepard, “‘Something Notably Erotic’: Politics, ‘Arab Men,’ and
Sexual Revolution in Post-decolonization France, 1962-1974,” Journal of Modern History 84 (2012): 80-115,
Amelia Lyons, The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: Algerian Families and the French Welfare State during
Decolonization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), Kristen Stromberg Childers, Seeking Imperialism’s
Embrace: National Identity, Decolonization, and Assimilation in the French Caribbean (Oxford: Oxford University
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legitimized British control.20 Such studies of sexuality in the Caribbean region offer helpful
ways for thinking beyond the dominant framing of the region as both hypersexual and
conservative, and usefully illuminate how concern with sexuality factored into the process of
postcolonial nation building. However, with the exception of sociologist Kamala Kempadoo’s
widely-cited research on sex tourism in the Dutch Caribbean21 and anthropologist Gloria
Wekker’s important study on female same-sex desire in Suriname,22 Caribbean territories in the
Dutch orbit have rarely factored into studies of Caribbean sexuality.23 Although “Closer Ties” is
not centrally concerned with sexual subjectivities of Antillean Dutch, this dissertation does make
a contribution to understandings of the ways in which sexuality and gender influenced the
construction of citizenship in the Dutch Caribbean, a region that scholar Rosamond King has
described as the “most neglected” in Caribbean studies.24 “Closer Ties” fills this gap by placing
the Dutch islands in conversation with broader postcolonial and regional developments.
This dissertation evaluates the intersection of sexual politics and postcoloniality in the
Caribbean alongside contemporaneous debates over sexual freedoms and citizenship in Europe.
As European self-definition increasingly embraced more sexually progressive values25—
particularly in the Netherlands, where this discourse was most often pitted against allegedly
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conservative and homophobic Muslims26 —Dutch perception of its Caribbean counterparts has
shifted from the hypersexual to the hyper-conservative. While much interesting scholarship
exists on the rebranding of European identities and its consequences for notions of citizenship
and belonging, fewer studies examine how this shift in European moral regimes intersected with
ongoing intervention in the former colonial world.27 Nevertheless, literature on the
contemporary debates over European inclusion provides a crucial background for understanding
recent Dutch efforts to expand sexual freedoms in the Caribbean, treading on traditions of
Antillean autonomy.
Finally, this dissertation builds on an exciting new body of scholarship that problematizes
the nation-state as the inevitable end of empire. Scholars of postcolonialism have increasingly
emphasized the embattled state of postcolonial sovereignty. Jean and John L. Comaroff lament
this transformation of the postcolonial state into a “palimpsest of contested sovereignties,” whose
current fragility results from the increased interference of multinational corporations,
paramilitary groups, and the deregulation of the state.28 Similarly, Ann Stoler has insisted that
scholars of postcolonialism shift attention to contemporary “imperial formations,” sets of
relations characterized not least by the “scaled genres of rule that produce and count on different
degrees of sovereignty and gradations of rights.”29 This emphasis on the heightening fragility of
postcolonial sovereignty, however, neglects to take into account how the architects of non-selfgoverning states have deliberately and strategically sought to strike a balance between autonomy
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and cooperation. In this way, the recurrent disavowal of independence in the Antilles must be
evaluated according to how actors made sense of the changed circumstances of the postwar and
postcolonial world and made strategic if also circumscribed decisions about the nature of state
sovereignty.
In his many works on Francophone Africa, Frederick Cooper argues that federalism
prevailed over the nation-state in the brief but important period between 1945-1960.30 Pointing
to Senegalese leader Léopold Sédar Senghor’s stated fear of the “balkanization” of French West
Africa – the breaking up of African territories into small, resource-poor independent states –
Cooper demonstrates how African and French leaders sought to maintain imperial unity while
substantively reforming the bonds between metropole and colony. Between 1946-1960, these
leaders pursued federalism among former colonial and metropolitan territories and in the process
redefined imperial citizenship. Further, Cooper maintains that notions of republican citizenship
and universal rights were not mere French imports intended to seduce African elites into
accepting continued inferiority. Rather, these ideas were given new meaning in French Africa.
Alternatively, Gary Wilder’s Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future
of the World traces the attempts by Senghor and Martinican statesman and poet Aimé Césaire to
envision non-national forms of decolonization, offering an extended meditation on the meaning
of freedom in the postwar opening. Contrary to Cooper, Wilder’s interest is not in resuscitating
federalism as an attractive alternative to the nation-state, but in situating both Césaire and
Senghor’s formulation of “self-determination without state sovereignty” in the complexities of
30

Cooper makes this claim in several works, most forcefully in his recent Citizenship between Empire and Nation:
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the postwar moment, a moment where the solutions for realizing colonial emancipation and
human freedom were neither obvious nor predetermined.31 Although the advent of
decolonization raised new demands for emancipatory political programs, Wilder shows how
Césaire and Senghor looked to both past ideals and future utopias in their effort to not simply
reconstitute postcolonial relations but to envision a new global order more broadly.
Above all, newly emerging studies of decolonization—whether envisioned or realized—
show the many and often competing versions of anti-colonialism that emerged after the Second
World War. This dissertation builds off of Cooper’s work in challenging the nation-state as the
inevitable endpoint of empire at the same time that it offers an alternative history of federalism
that did not expire or fail but, to the contrary, remains powerfully intact to this day.32 The history
of the Dutch Antilles therefore offers a compelling opportunity for exploring and theorizing this
colonial aftermath over the longue durée. Drawing on Wilder’s attention to the promises,
challenges and contradictions of colonial emancipation, this dissertation engages debates on
sexual politics as sites where precisely these struggles have been registered and processed in the
postcolonial Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Chapter Outline and Archival Sources
Exploring the entire sweep of the postcolonial period, chapters move chronologically
from the announcement of imperial reform in 1942 to the aftermath of Antillean dissolution in
2012. These chapters cohere around political, social and economic episodes that have bound the
Antilles and the Netherlands in ever-closer relations, and highlight the discussions on sexual,
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gender and family politics that have punctuated the process of strengthening postcolonial ties. In
its consideration of the political construction and social negotiation of non-sovereignty, “Closer
Ties” makes use of a diverse amalgam of government sources and popular ephemera spanning
repositories in the Netherlands, Curaçao, Aruba and St. Maarten.
Chapter One examines the wartime transformation of Curaçao, then capital of the
Netherlands Antilles, into a crucial location within the world oil economy and the emphasis on
public morality that emerged at the nexus of industrialization and decolonization. Responding to
the rapid transformations of Curaçaoan society in the 1940s and 1950s, elites in the late-colonial
government, Catholic Church, and Royal Dutch Shell Company each sought to enhance
“responsibility” and “discipline” among Afro-Caribbeans entering the industrial workforce and
civic society. Each emphasized the importance of marriage and household organization based on
the nuclear family as requisites for political autonomy and economic modernization. In this way,
the transition from colonialism to autonomous statehood occurred in important measure on the
intimate terrain of the household. The minutes of the Estates General, a nominally elected
colonial council in the Netherlands Antilles, forms a major source base for this chapter. The
Leiden University Library (Universiteitaire Bibliotheken Leiden) houses these documents in the
collection of the Royal Tropical Institute (Koninklijke Instituut voor de Tropen). These sources
underscore the acute concerns about marriage and divorce that arose during World War II. The
late-colonial government, however, shared these anxieties with powerful allies on Curaçao.
While the archives of the Royal Dutch Shell Company are not accessible to scholars, Shell’s
monthly workers publication, De Passaat, documents many of the major changes to the
company’s social welfare programs. Volumes of De Passaat can be accessed at the Public
Library of Curaçao in the National Documents (Dokumento Nashonal) collection. Finally, the
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records of the Dominican order are maintained at the Erfgoed Centrum Kloosterleven in Sint
Agatha, the Netherlands. These archives offer valuable insights into the Catholic mission on
Curaçao and reveal the tensions emerging within the Catholic Church on Curaçao in the 1950s,
as growing industrialization and secularization threatened the historic role of the Church. The
Church, too, would proclaim its continued social relevance by making new suggestions about the
reform of the Afro-Antillean household.
Chapter Two examines how anxieties about the erosion of popular morality spilled over
into public spaces. On the island of Aruba in the 1950s, impassioned protests against a state-run
brothel erupted as the island’s US-owned oil refinery entered a period of terminal decline. This
chapter focuses in particular on the protest movement’s articulation of a distinct Aruban identity
characterized by claims to whiteness and a restrained sexual morality. This insular identity, I
argue, was formed not in reaction to the Netherlands but to neighboring Curaçao—site of the
first state-run brothel and the dominant force within Antillean politics—as well as in response to
the presence of thousands of Afro-Caribbean laborers who immigrated to Aruba in the 1940s and
1950s. Drawing linkages between the protest movement and emerging demands for Aruban
separation from the Netherlands Antilles, I examine how racial and sexual politics underpinned
the successful mobilization of an insular identity on Aruba and argue that antagonisms between
former colonies at times eclipsed even those between metropole and colony. Often-underutilized
sources from the National Library and National Archive of Aruba form the source base for this
chapter. Housed in the National Archive, documents from the island council of Aruba in the
1950s reveal how popular pressure compelled elites to abolish plans for regulating prostitution.
This is remarkable not least because the democratic structures of the Kingdom were largely
untested. Indeed, the protest erupted on the eve of the first-ever island council elections, and
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representatives first clashed with their constituents on the topic of sexual morality. At the
National Library of Aruba in the Aruban/Antillean collection, a scrapbook kept by a priest
affiliated with the protest movement offered a crucial window into the rhetoric and strategies of
the protest movement. The posters, pamphlets, photographs and press clippings maintained there
highlight the movement’s savvy negotiation of various layers of Kingdom authority: from
making demands of the insular government, to petitioning the Dutch Queen.
Chapter Three analyzes how reproductive rights and women’s emancipation factored into
the political imaginaries of the 1960s-1970s. Fears of overpopulation in the Antilles galvanized
some elites to call on the help of Dutch development aid to promote family planning across the
islands. At the same time, actors within the Antillean left, including radical union leaders,
socialist groups, and anti-colonial feminists of color, viewed the extension of reproductive rights
as vital to securing independence from the Netherlands and abolishing economic and racial
inequality. In the aftermath of a violent anti-colonial uprising on Curaçao in 1969, and in an
attempt to distance themselves from their colonial image, the Dutch government abruptly
withdrew development aid for family planning projects. This chapter thus considers discourses
on reproductive rights and women’s sexuality as a venue for overcoming and working through
the legacies of colonialism. Several distinct bodies of sources inform this study. A partial record
of Curaçao’s family planning clinic, Famia Planea, is kept in the archive of the Cabinet of the
Vice Minister President for Surinamese and Netherlands Antillean Affairs (Het Kabinet van de
Vice-Miniser-President voor Surinaamse en Nederlands-Antillaanse Zaken) in the National
Archive of the Netherlands. These files offer surprising insight into the broad coalition of actors
that supported Famia Planea’s rhetoric of “responsible parenting,” and the Dutch government’s
sudden retreat from family planning campaigns in the aftermath of revolution. Journals from
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prominent Antillean leftist groups housed in the International Institute of Social History
(Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis) in Amsterdam show a continuous thread
connecting birth control and sexual emancipation to the struggle for Antillean independence.
Curaçaoan feminists would later join in on this conversation. The records of the most prominent
feminist organization, the Union di Muhé Antiano (UMA), can be found in the National Archive
of Curaçao. UMA’s records show how Curaçaoan feminists brought together the causes of antiimperialism and gender equality in order to form a mass movement involving Antillean men and
women alike.
Chapter Four considers how concerns about reproduction shifted theaters to the European
Netherlands throughout the 1970s-1990s. With unprecedented numbers of Antillean Dutch
immigrating to the Netherlands in that time period, European Dutch policy makers, welfare
providers and social workers focused special attention on the alleged eccentricities of the
Antillean household and called on social scientists to study connections between single
parenthood and welfare reliance. Although Antillean activists insisted robust social welfare
would play a critical role in the emancipation of the Antillean community at home and abroad,
by the 1990s, Dutch politicians reduced the social safety net in part by claiming that Antillean
single mothers were abusing the Dutch welfare state. Above all, this chapter asserts that the
production of knowledge and its corollary application in development schemes—often regarded
as defining characteristics of the colonial project—emerged in new ways at empire’s end in the
Netherlands and Netherlands Antilles. Further, the results of this emerging expertise on
Antillean families powerfully racialized the very concept of welfare and served to solidify
notions of difference between European and Antillean Dutch at a moment when family norms
were themselves radically contested within mainstream Dutch society. Looking to municipal
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sources from the city of Amsterdam housed at the Gemeente Amsterdam Stadsarchief offers
insight into the major concerns that rocked welfare providers and social services departments in
the era of mass migration. The studies that these and other civil servants commissioned, which
focus excessively on the female-headed household, are located in the collections of the Royal
Netherlands Institute for Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies (Koninklijke Instuut voor Taal-,
Land-, en Volkenkunde) at the Leiden University Library, which likewise offers access to the
journals and newsletters of Antillean social welfare organizations based in the Netherlands.
Reading across these sources reveals how Antillean single mothers took on a symbolic role in
arguments for the expansion and retrenchment of the Dutch welfare state.
Finally, Chapter Five analyzes how debates on LGBTQ rights have factored into the
restructuring of the Kingdom in in the 2000s, which resulted most dramatically in the absorption
of three Antillean islands into the Dutch state. The legalization of same-sex marriage in the new
Dutch municipalities of Bonaire, Saba and St. Eustatius in 2012 mobilized a homegrown
Antillean LGBTQ-rights movement at the same time that it galvanized extreme opposition to
Dutch “re-colonization.” Similarly, European Dutch politicians incorporated these new
municipalities in uneven ways: on the one hand insisting on full legal harmony in areas
concerning sexual and reproductive freedoms, and on the other hand supporting unequal social
welfare spending in the Caribbean territories. Parliamentary and press sources available online
form the bulk of source material for this chapter, enabling me to connect conversations spanning
the Dutch parliament, insular governments, and LGBT civil rights groups on both sides of the
Atlantic.
Debates over LGBTQ rights after 2010 are in many ways emblematic of the larger
history of the Kingdom: as new bonds of cooperation are forged in this multi-national Kingdom,
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sexual politics have time and again highlighted both the promises and the challenges of creating
equitable bonds of citizenship, and have proved to be one powerful venue in which to negotiate
belonging, sovereignty, and the memory of the colonial past. As the title of this dissertation
suggests, “closer ties” at once speaks to the political realities of the Dutch-Antillean connection
and evokes the often messy and intimate human relations that the political bears upon.

Contribution of Findings
Over the past fifteen years, activists and scholars—many of them Antillean and
Surinamese Dutch—have attempted to direct public attention in the Netherlands to that country’s
colonial and slavery past. Growing public attention to the atrocities of the colonial past,
however, has divided the Dutch public over whether or not the state remains accountable for the
crimes of past centuries. Politicians of the ascendant right have channeled Dutch frustration over
the demands for apologies, reparations and concessions in the Antilles and Suriname into popular
party platforms—insisting, despite Antilleans’ full Dutch citizenship, on the restriction of
movement within the Kingdom, the imposition of integration measures for Antillean immigrants
and, most controversially, the total severance of ties with their Caribbean compatriots.33 My
dissertation aims to contradict these revisionist histories of an increasingly marginal Dutch
entanglement in the Antilles by illustrating instead the growth in substance and meaning of
transatlantic ties throughout the postcolonial period.34

33

The right populist and anti-immigrant Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV) supports the
“independence” of the Netherlands and the dissolution of the Kingdom. More centrist parties such as the People’s
Party for Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD) supported the controversial
“Bosman law” when it was proposed in 2010, which aimed to restrict immigration of Antillean-born Dutch citizens
to the mainland Netherlands.
34
Lammert de Jong notes that many Dutch, especially the generation coming into political consciousness within the
past decade, do not understand the historic responsibility of the Dutch to the Antilles. De Jong, “The Implosion of
the Netherlands Antilles,” in eds. Clegg and Pantojas-García, Governance in the Non-Independent Caribbean, 33.

19

That the post-World War II period has witnessed, above all, the intensification of bonds
between the Dutch and the Caribbean provides an alternative way of imagining and living the
trajectory of postcolonial history. In view not least of the evident fragility of many postcolonial
nationalisms, scholars have sought to recover different ways of understanding the diverse forms
of colonial overcoming. David Scott, among others, has encouraged scholars to dispense with
triumphalist narratives of revolutionary anti-colonialism, suggesting that historians must instead
incite new questions of the past that inspire the, as he puts it, “possibility of thinking critically
through our postcolonial political present.”35 The Dutch Caribbean offers a compelling historical
example. In the absence of a revolutionary nationalist tradition, anti-colonial discourses in the
Antilles have sought to strike a balance—often quite precarious—between insisting on greater
Dutch responsibility to its imperial remnants and broadened autonomy. Though this negotiation
has not been without its complications, the complexities of the Antillean past correct widely held
assumptions about the dénouement of empire and its ostensible conclusion.
In ways both predictable and obvious, the colonial past looms large in the non-sovereign
world, with countless places often only ambiguously integrated into former metropolitan states.
Yet my interest is not to claim that empire lives on at the margins of the former official Dutch
imperium. Rather, it is to ask how our understandings of empire and its aftermath shift when we
view decolonization not as a parting of ways, but a strengthening of ties.
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Chapter One
Responsibility and Reform: Domestic Anxieties in the Age of Decolonization, 1940s-1950s

In 1943, mere months after Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands promised to
democratize the Dutch empire, the Estates of Curaçao1 embarked on an ambitious plan of moral
reform. “Abnormal circumstances,” the Estates reasoned, “loosen the brakes of morality…and
undoubtedly expand certain forms of evil, thereby threatening the community to a much greater
extent.”2 Circumstances were, indeed, “abnormal” on Curaçao in the 1940s. The Nazi
occupation of the metropolitan Netherlands sent the Dutch Queen and government in exile to
London, affording colonial officers and newly-empowered elites more governing autonomy than
ever before. Meanwhile, the island’s oil refining industry gained profound strategic importance
in the struggle to liberate Europe from fascism. With increased wartime demand for oil in the
1940s, Curaçao’s Royal Dutch Shell-owned Isla refinery became the largest refiner of crude oil
in the world, drawing thousands of migrant laborers and US and British marines to the island’s
bustling port to staff and protect its most vital industry. Demands for governing autonomy and
aspirations to reform the bonds of empire emerged alongside economic and demographic
expansion on the Antillean islands. The combined momentum of World War II and global

1

In 1936, the Estates of Curaçao replaced the Colonial Council. This occurred simultaneously with an extension of
the franchise. Property-owning men above the age of 21—roughly 5-6% of the total population—were then eligible
to elect ten of the fifteen members of the Estates. This slight democratization of colonial governance brought elite
“children of the land” (“landskinderen”) into power, the majority of them descendants of European Dutch. The
Governor of Curaçao, appointed by the Dutch monarch, continued to hold sway in the Estates, choosing the
remaining five of its members. The Governor retained the power to suggest legislation to the Estates.
2
Universitaire Bibliotheken Leiden (UBL), Koninklijk Instituut Tropen (KIT) Collection, Staten van Curacao,
Zittingsjaar 1942-1943-12: Landsverordening tot wijziging en aanvulling van de Verorderning van den 9den Juni
1921, houdende bepalingen ter bestrijding van besmettelijke ziekten (P.B. 1921 no. 66) zooals deze is gewijzigd en
aangevuld bij de Verordening van den 7den November 1931 P.B. 1931 No. 76. Memorie van Toelichting No. 3.

21

decolonization swept the small Antillean islands, once derided as the “poor stepdaughters of
Holland,”3 back into the spotlight of world history.
As the actions of the Estates of Curaçao suggest, however, the urgency of the moment
called forth unparalleled attention to issues of public morality. For major power brokers on
Curaçao—including the late-colonial government, the oil industry, and the Catholic Church—the
project to turn Curaçaoan subjects into disciplined and productive citizens would commence first
and most importantly in the realm of the household. As this chapter explores, development
initiatives and modernization schemes repeatedly targeted the intimate behaviors and desires of
the island’s majority Afro-Curaçaoan population. Governing officials, management at the Isla
refinery, and modernizing leaders in the Catholic Church each viewed the reform of AfroCuracaoan household organization, child rearing practices, and sexual norms as both the
guarantor and measure of decolonization’s success.
Why did concern with sexual morality emerge so acutely at empire’s end? Over the last
three decades, scholars of colonialism have insisted that the regulation of sexuality served as a
key site for exercising colonial control.4 If empire was so saturated by anxieties about sexuality,
and if regulating sexuality was so critical to its maintenance, then the reformulation of imperial
relationships by the mid-twentieth century would also necessarily turn up questions of its most
potent ideological premise: the subjugation or enslavement of subject populations based in part
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on their alleged sexual profligacy.5 The system of racial hereditary slavery that prevailed in
Curaçao and the broader Dutch Caribbean until abolition in 1863 hinged in more specific ways
on the strict and violent control of black men and women’s sexuality in order to reproduce an
enslaved population. What is more, as scholars of both colonialism and slavery have aptly
shown, racial hierarchies did not function apart from gendered and sexualized stereotypes.6 It
was precisely through the language of sexual danger and gendered deviance that race became
imbued with devastating social significance. Race and sexuality were not to be uncoupled with
the advent of abolition, however. As scholars of postemancipation societies have shown,
abolition brought forth renewed concerns with the sexual morality of formerly enslaved people,
and elites throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century looked to the non-white embrace of
Euro-American “respectability” to evidence abolition’s success or, conversely, its failure.7
Similar concerns, I argue, surfaced anew at empire’s end. In this way, then, the history of
Curaçao in the age of decolonization is not only the story of a former colony in transition. It is
also a story about the lengthy, tangled afterlife of race after slavery.
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Reading across the literature on empire and slavery, this chapter argues that the end of
empire in the Dutch Caribbean reanimated racist assumptions that underpinned justifications for
slavery on Curaçao. With the impending demands of democratization and industrialization,
elites in the state, church and oil industry now sought to address the alleged sexual
permissiveness of Afro-Curaçaoans with unprecedented reformist zeal. As M. Jacqui Alexander
has argued of 1940s Trinidad and Tobago and the Bahamas, the conservative nationalisms that
emerged across former Caribbean colonies strategically rebutted the very stereotypes that
underpinned the unfreedom of black men and women.8 Indeed, on Curaçao, political elites
similarly rallied around the promotion of “traditional” European family values in the transition to
autonomy, pointing to their “moral” accomplishments as evidence of their ability to govern
themselves. Yet, as this chapter argues, the late colonial regime was not the only actor
concerned with intervening in the intimate lives of Afro-Curaçaoans. As such, this chapter
broadens the scholarly view of the late colonial period by showing how other forces, including in
particular the Royal Dutch Shell Company and the Catholic Church, also redoubled their efforts
to promote the Western nuclear family among Curaçao’s subjects. In this time of crisis and
opportunity, elites on Curaçao attempted to make “modern” precisely the space in which this
colony, like so many other former slave societies in the Caribbean, had been constructed as
“backward.”
Examining this initiative from three perspectives, this chapter considers moral reform and
social welfare programs undertaken by the late colonial government, the Royal Dutch Shell
Company, and the Catholic Church from the onset of World War II until the transition to
autonomy by 1954. First, I explore the colonial state’s preoccupation with reforming conjugal
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norms among Curaçao’s population. Immediately following the announcement of imperial
reform in 1942, officers of the late colonial regime and a cadre of local leaders enacted a range
of laws and initiatives designed to increase parental responsibility, including encouraging marital
monogamy and incentivizing the recognition of children born out of wedlock, and decreasing the
prevalence of divorce. Secondly, I analyze how the Royal Dutch Shell Company invoked similar
racialized discourses around familial “responsibility” as the oil refining industry employed
increasing numbers of Afro-Curaçaoan men in the 1940s. In their effort to harness and discipline
local labor, Shell offered significant incentives for workers to marry—from free medical care to
subsidized housing—which corresponded with a significant increase in marital rates on the
island. Third and finally, I consider debates within the Catholic Church on Curaçao in the 1950s.
In this time, a new generation of Catholic priests arrived on the island and pointed to the alleged
profligacy of Afro-Curaçaoans as evidence of a lackadaisical and superficial religious climate on
Curaçao. Significantly, this newer generation of Christian leadership insisted that broadening
access to sexual education and empowering women would help to resolve what these actors
identified as a decidedly masculine problem of marital infidelity and sexual irresponsibility.
Taken together, this preoccupation with the conjugal and sexual norms of Afro-Curaçaoans
undergirded schemes to transform the political, economic and social life of the island in the era
of decolonization.

The Dangers of Divorce: Marriage Reform and the Late-Colonial Government
As the Dutch government sat in exile in London, governing elites on Curaçao rushed to
prove their legitimacy and preparedness to govern with greater autonomy. For the Estates of
Curaçao, the task of transitioning the island to a democratic post-colony commenced with the

25

initiation of wide-ranging moral reforms designed to address perceived threats to public morality
that percolated during the war years. Venereal disease, the menacing presence of thousands of
itinerant single men on the island, and the scrambling of traditional gender roles with the
potential conscription of women into the wartime workforce all emerged as points of debate and
reform.9 According to elites, each of these issues threatened not only public health and virtue,
they also destabilized marriage and resulted in an ever-increasing number of divorces. The
unifying concern with reforming the conjugal norms of the Curaçaoan population and
incentivizing marriage throughout the next decade thus justified unique and unprecedented
interventions into the romantic lives of colonial subjects.
Months after US and British forces arrived on Curaçao in 1942, the leading local paper
on Curaçao, Amigoe di Curaçao, anxiously reported, “The increase in the number of divorces
manifests in history in periods of growth and is an infallible harbinger of decadence and collapse.
If we consider the Territory of Curaçao, then it will be apparent that decadence is also ravaging
there. Not only does the number of officially dissolved marriages steadily increase, but it is all
the more startling when one compares the number of marriages with the number of divorces.”10
The anxieties reflected here—the rising prevalence of divorce and the decreasing appearance of
marriage—inflected the early course of action undertaken by the Estates and emerged as a
defining program of reform aimed to distinguish Curaçao as a bastion of morality in contrast to
the allegedly lax Netherlands. These initiatives by the late-colonial government have not merited
attention by historians. Rather, political historians of the 1940s in the Dutch Antilles have

9

These issues are debated in UBL, KIT, Zittingsjaar 1943-44 Staten van Curaçao - Landsverordening houdende
bepalingen om Ontaarding der Goede zeden der jeugd te gaan. Memorie van Antwoord No. 5; Staten van Curacao,
Zittingsjaar 1942-1943-12: Landsverordening tot wijziging en aanvulling van de Verorderning van den 9den Juni
1921, houdende bepalingen ter bestrijding van besmettelijke ziekten (P.B. 1921 no. 66) zooals deze is gewijsigd en
aangevld bij de Verordening van den 7den November 1931 P.B. 1931 No. 76. Memorie van Toelichting No. 3.
10
“Echtscheiding een toenemende ramp voor Curaçao,” Amigoe di Curaçao, 31 July 1942.

26

focused overwhelmingly on the exchanges between the Netherlands and the Antillean islands
during the so-called Round Table Discussions that eventually resulted in the creation of a
commonwealth Kingdom and autonomous governance in the Netherlands Antilles.11 Yet, my
contention in this section is that these moral reform initiatives are symptomatic of precisely this
process. Modernizing the state was not simply a process of transferring duties of governance.
Indeed, when one explores the issues undertaken by the Estates during the war years, one sees
frequent and interconnected allusions to public morality and political and social modernization.
The Estates attempt to tackle the perceived problem of divorce and the waning importance of
marriage was one such issue that emerged in connection with the changes to Curaçaoan politics
and industry during World War II.
At the first meeting of the Estates in April 1944, chairman John Sprockel addressed his
colleagues with a message of hope and foreboding. “The population must realize that their
cooperation is absolutely necessary in ensuring the success of hygienic measures and in
obtaining satisfactory living conditions …Laws that do not become habits seldom develop deep
roots.” Sprockel continued:
Both nature and the law demand that parents care for their children, but the impact of
habits is evidenced in the thorny question of illegitimate children. To name just one
island, on Curaçao in 1943 664 illegitimate children were born, about one fourth of the
total…Of course, this reveals an absence of a feeling of responsibility
(verantwoordelijkheidsgevoel), but also slackness (laksheid) and ignorance of the
advantages attached to marriage…[such as] child financial support (alimentatie) and
inheritance. I am considering measures…and call on all possible cooperation to put an
end to this situation, which may be historically explainable but today unnecessarily
tarnishes our community and is highly socially undesirable.12
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How should this “situation” be remedied? What were its causes and who was primarily
responsible for perpetuating non-marital and reproductive relationships? Sprockel likely felt
little urgency to clarify such questions, as his use of the terms “slackness” and “absence of
responsibility” would have already implied enough to his audience. As scholars of race have
noted, such language is profoundly racialized, conjuring stereotypes of immaturity,
irresponsibility and sexual danger that permeated justifications for slavery and that continued to
hold critical sway after its end.13 But this is not the historical explanation that Sprockel referred
to in his address to the Estates in 1944. Rather, the chairman likely had in mind the proscription
on Curaçao that, until abolition in 1863, forbade enslaved men and women from marrying. In
Sprockel’s logic, where once slavery was to blame for the absence of Western-style nuclear
families among black households on Curaçao, now it was these families themselves who were
responsible for their own failure. In its new democratizing and modernizing form, the colonial
state would now help these subjects-turned-citizens to conform to Western ideals of
respectability that were deemed vital to the transition to autonomy.
Although discourse on sexual irresponsibility has long served as a proxy discussion for
race outside of postemancipation Curaçao, and indeed continues to structure contemporary
discussions on race in many societies,14 what merits attention here is the urgency with which the
alleged “abnormalities” of the Antillean household were pursued at the moment of
decolonization and in a period of dramatic economic growth on the island. As another member
of the Estates reasoned in the summer of 1943, “What do we get if year after year we direct
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money from the budget to the building of dams and…this or that building and yet we do not look
at the moral situation of Curaçao? These are also priorities that we must protect. We must work
together…to lift up the morality of Curaçao.”15
One of the ways that some members of the Estates sought to address these charges to
raise the moral climate on the island was tied explicitly to building and development. In their
analyses of the declining relevance of marriage, members of the Estates pleaded for a more
interventionist development program on Curaçao, particularly in the realm of the island’s
housing stock. As one member of the Estates opined, “The housing question is, in the first place,
an ethical question. The young people must be able to marry…but there are no homes available
and the people are all thrown together in one house, and crazy things also come from this.”16
The idea that couples refrained from getting married owing to lack of housing options emerged
repeatedly in the meetings of the Estates. Also emphasized were the unhygienic and poor moral
conditions stemming from overcrowded dwellings. In 1942, one member of the Estates argued,
“We ask for subsidized housing (volkswoningen) to provide our less prosperous people with
better provisions…There was and is an extreme shortage of subsidized housing, which tests
hygienic and moral demands.”17 The next year, another member of the Estates claimed that
young married couples who did not secure housing ended up divorcing after a mere five months,
while others were obliged to forego marriage entirely due to lack of access to adequate housing.18
These concerns were so pervasively shared that by the end of the 1943 budget year, the Estates
annual report included a lengthy discussion on the moral dimensions of the housing shortage.
Their explanations highlight how centrally anxieties about marriage—or, rather, its absence—
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factored into development schemes on Curaçao. Whether strategic or sincere, it nevertheless
shows the purchase of marriage discourse in advancing seemingly unrelated programs of social
housing.
In their pursuit of intensified development, elites of Curaçao’s late colonial government
followed a trajectory quite similar to their better-known counterparts in Britain and France. As
Frederick Cooper has argued, the postwar effort to hold together French and British empires
witnessed colonialism at its most reformist.19 In the Dutch Caribbean, too, the 1940s brought
unparalleled efforts to expand industry and employ local labor on arguably more humane terms.20
At least in parts of the British and French empire, however, expanding development would also
prove to be imperialism’s undoing as metropolitan populations proved unwilling to satisfy the
cost of building infrastructure in the colonies. On Curaçao, development and its costs, however
unevenly and sporadically pursued, did not break the bonds between the metropolitan
Netherlands and Curaçao. To the contrary, Curaçao and its five island partners elected to remain
in Dutch orbit in the 1940s, insisting instead on strengthening the bonds of cooperation between
Europe and the Caribbean.
Bringing the Curaçaoan family into the fold of modern society also became a concern of
the law. In their effort to incentivize marriage and highlight Curaçao’s moral and cultural
affinities with the modern world, the Estates broke with the traditional pattern of harmonizing
Antillean and Dutch law to found a separate and far stricter divorce code on the island. The
debate commenced in 1943 and hinged on the question of providing evidence of marital
infidelity, one of the few reasons why a couple might be granted a divorce. Because Antillean
law forbade divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences, unhappy couples often strategically
19
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claimed that a partner had cheated in order to be granted a divorce.21 “This state of affairs,” the
Estates lamented, “has corrupted the essence of divorce to a condition that must be regarded as
unsustainable.”22 This state of affairs was unsustainable not least because the circumstances of
the war would only further diminish the climate of morality on the island at a time when it
urgently sought to prove its preparedness for autonomy. As one member of the Estates argued,
“We are on a slippery slope…Especially in this time of war, when savagery of manners and evil
have adopted new forms, it is my opinion that government intervention is necessary.”
Intervention, however, would require that Members of the Estates break with legal tradition and
instead forge wholly new colonial divorce laws separate from those of the metropolitan
Netherlands. The statesman continued, “I am therefore surprised by the Dutch legal scholars
who find this legal prohibition to be positively immoral.”23
Although some members of the Estates spoke out in opposition to the law and claimed
that the Antillean divorce law was already sufficiently strict,24 no member of the Estates
challenged the notion that the government should intervene to uphold “Christian principles” of
marriage in Curaçaoan society. When the Estates voted on the revised divorce law in 1944, only
one member of the Estates—the populist Aruban leader Henny Eman—abstained from voting,
while all who questioned aspects of the law ultimately voted to enact it despite their
misgivings.25 The day after the law was approved on 18 August 1944, Amigoe di Curaçao
celebrated the accomplishment: “Here it appears that Curaçao is once again paving the path for
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good morals.” With a great deal of public interest, the article continued, it would remain to be
seen whether the new law would “diminish the evil of divorce” but nonetheless trusted that
“London,” or the Dutch government in exile, “will value this important work.”26
Striking in the discussion around divorce law in the 1940s is the extent to which the
reformulated Antillean divorce code became a testing ground for distinguishing Curaçao from its
metropolitan overseer and for reassuring metropolitan leaders of Curaçao’s preparedness to
govern its subjects autonomously.27 Without any prompting from the government in exile, the
colonial Governor on Curaçao redoubled his efforts to incentivize marriage and the recognition
of children born out of wedlock. Governor Kasteel opened the meeting of the Estates of Curaçao
on 4 April 1944 with his ambitious plan to reverse Curaçao’s rising rate of illegitimate births,
which accounted the previous year for roughly 30% of live births.28 Just before the passage of
the divorce law in August 1944, the Governor collaborated with an official from the Civil
Registry on Curaçao to promote marriage among cohabitating couples with children, inviting
them to wed easily before the law and claim parental responsibility over their children. After
outreach in the community, a total of 177 children were legally recognized by a parent during the
first two weeks of August—the great majority of them by their mother. Similarly, couples living
in so-called “concubinage”—living together but unwed—were encouraged to marry in order to
“raise the moral level of the population and…cultivate the feeling of responsibility.”29
The Estates’ tripartite plan—to prevent divorce, encourage marriage, and reduce the
number of illegitimate births—intersected with justifications for building new and affordable
26
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housing projects on Curaçao and with the government’s more abstract ambition to modernize the
social and sexual mores of Curaçaoan society on the eve of autonomy. Taking issues of
morality, marriage and divorce into their own hands, the Estates independently spearheaded a
program of moral reform as a way to both appease and outshine the metropolitan Netherlands.
The fact that it was precisely on the terrain of the household that a defiant and enterprising
colonial government began its program of reform is significant. It suggests that late-colonial
officers sought to address the justifications for the island’s subjugation at the source. The
alleged abnormalities of the Antillean household would no longer explain the island’s unfreedom
or its exclusion from the modern world.

Love in the Time of Oil
The colonial government was not the only party interested in encouraging
“responsibility” among the population, or, more specifically, poor and working-class AfroCuraçaoans. The Royal Dutch Shell Company likewise embarked on an ambitious program of
social reform to encourage discipline among local workers. Shell did this not least by
incentivizing marriage through a range of economic benefits for workers and their families.
Combining economic power with social reach, Shell’s social programs ultimately did correspond
to an increase in marital rates and a decrease in illegitimate births on the island. In this way, then,
it was not simply the intervention of the state but also the power of capital that would serve to
shape matters of love, intimacy and domesticity on Curaçao in the 1940s-1950s.
In the pages of its monthly workers publication, De Passaat (The Trade Wind), various
commentators extolled the virtues of marriage and celebrated masculine duty to wives, children
and work. One 1947 issue featuring a cover story on “Responsibility” opined, “In life, people
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must carry responsibility in all kinds of ways. There is no person on earth that does not have
some form of responsibility. Sensible parents teach their children this at a young age…A feeling
of responsibility means the fulfilling of one’s duty. The greater the sense of responsibility is, the
higher one climbs the social ladder.”30 As the island’s largest employer, Shell was conscious of
its outsized role on Curaçao. When the refinery opened on Curaçao in 1919, Shell abstained
from hiring local Afro-Curaçaoan men, believing their command of the Dutch language,
familiarity with the demands of the industrialized work force, and work ethic all to be lacking.31
Instead, Shell routinely employed thousands of contract laborers from Europe, the United States,
and predominantly British Caribbean islands. When World War II erupted, however, demand for
local labor increased and Shell began to experiment with providing requisite transportation
between outlying towns to the refinery in Willemstad’s harbor. With near full male employment
on Curaçao in the 1940s, Shell grew to its peak operating capacity and life changed precipitously
for a predominantly rural Afro-Curaçaoan population.
The discourse of “responsibility” again attended to the integration of Afro-Curaçaoans
into Shell’s workforce. In quotidian but no less significant ways, De Passaat celebrated all
worker marriages and legitimate births in its monthly issues. Short blurbs and images celebrated
the marriages of male as well as female workers, often congratulating women employed by Shell
on their ability to retire from the workforce once married.32 This exaltation of domesticity, of
course, clashed with the longstanding reality of the company, which relied in large measure on
the labor of single men traveling from foreign countries without their wives or children. It was
in no small part because of this contingent of single male laborers that the colonial government,
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in concert with the Catholic Church, opened up a state-sanctioned brothel near the island’s main
airport in 1949.33 A committee established to study the problem of prostitution in 1942
recommended that laborers and sailors orbiting the island’s oil industry must be given access to
light-skinned foreign women so that the local women would not be harassed.34 While Curaçao’s
white women would be spared unwanted attention from sailors, marines and Shell laborers,
domestic sex workers—the vast majority of whom were women of color, owing to their
longstanding exclusion from the formal labor market and social marginalization writ large—
were denied entry into the brothel, which was in turn rationalized as both a defense of local
womanhood and a catering to demand for light-skinned sex workers from the Dominican
Republic and Colombia. According to the committee charged with studying prostitution,
regulating sex work would be economically advantageous for Shell and the government,
allowing them to avoid the costs associated with the migration of families: “Next to the capital
investment for housing, this carries the consequence of needing to pay higher wages, including
an increase in the cost of travel for families, and, in the event of economic recession, the problem
of foreign labor will grow even larger than if guest workers come without their families, because
they can easily be sent back.”35
Domestic labor, however, required separate provisions. As Shell began to rely
increasingly on Afro-Curaçaon laborers in the 1940s, separate schemes emerged to accommodate
the formation of stable married households and the modernization of the island more broadly. De
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Passaat enthusiastically reported on the ways in which Shell was contributing to the social
modernization of its island headquarters:
The oil industry exercises great influence on the social territory where she is established.
Apart from the material advantages, she offers among other things the raising of income
for the treasury, the increase in buildings, education, relaxation, sport, and hygiene. Her
influence on social-economic terrain is of indescribably great importance. Also of
undeniable value is the influence she exercises on her staff, making the latter more
methodical and disciplined in their work.36
This was not empty rhetoric. In the absence of a robust welfare state, Shell did indeed do much
to expand affordable housing for workers. But perhaps its most radical program came in the
form of expansive social services for Shell employees and their legal wives and children. After
some workers began agitating for higher wages to meet the rising cost of living, Shell formed an
“Advice Committee” in lieu of allowing its workers to unionize.37 In 1947, following several
meetings of the Advice Committee, Shell extended free medical care to workers’ wives and
children, agreed to expand appropriate housing for families, and in 1950 created widower
pensions.38 Shell linked their expansion of these social services to the emerging zeitgeist of
modernization and development in the Caribbean, claiming:
The realization of the need for sound social welfare projects is resulting in several
changes and introductions all over the world, and particularly in the West Indies. ...Every
new introduction should form part of a predetermined pattern, not merely an issolated
[sic] innovation. And bearing in mind the fact that our own area has got past the stage of
a bachelor community and is fast assuming the form of the balanced community with
peoples of both sexes and of all ages, social welfare now has to be expanded to include in
its advantages all the sections in the community.39

36

Curaçao Public Library, Dokumneto Nashonal, De Passaat, February 1947 vol. 4. No. 2.
“Sociale Toestand op Curaçao: Hoe is het nu op Curaçao?” Amigoe di Curaçao, 5 March 1947.
38
Eva Abraham-Van der Mark, Yu’i Mama: Enkele facetten van gezinsstructuur op Curaçao (Assen: Van Gorcum
& Co., 1972), 17.
39
Curaçao Public Library, Dokumento Nashional, De Passaat, "BWI Section," October 1947, p. 23.
37

36

Pointing to the rising incidence of marriage, this commentator used marital rates to measure the
success of Shell’s social welfare initiatives. Much as in the late colonial government’s scheme to
incentivize marriage, Shell also saw the imperative to expand social welfare and the urgency to
reform conjugal norms among workers as inextricably linked. Unlike elite nationalist leaders on
Jamaica, for example, who exclusively displaced blame for underdevelopment onto the sexual
culture of working-class black Jamaicans in the 1930s-40s,40 on Curaçao both the late-colonial
government and the Royal Dutch Shell Company paired their attack on Afro-Curaçaoan conjugal
norms with plans to address underlying structural issues such as lack of housing, education, and
social services.
In the 1960s, Dutch sociologist Eva Abraham van der Mark began her research on the socalled “matrifocal” family allegedly prevalent among Afro-Curaçaoans. With generous funding
from new scholarships and institutions designed to strengthen cultural and intellectual exchange
between the Netherlands and the Caribbean, van der Mark investigated among other things the
impact of Shell’s social welfare programs on marital rates.41 Looking to marital statistics and
rates of legitimate births on Curaçao, van der Mark argued that marriage rates increased and
illegitimate births decreased during the years that Shell maintained these social welfare
provisions between 1947-1960, and that within two years, rates of illegitimate births reached
their pre-1947 levels.42 Such evidence is compelling, as van der Mark herself argued, and
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suggests that the power of capital did more than the power of state or church combined to
“reform” household organization among Afro-Curaçaoan workers. While many laborers and
their families undoubtedly benefited from access to housing and medical care, and certainly
mourned the dissolution of these programs after mechanization at the refinery in 1959 resulted in
mass layoffs and the scaling back of social services, my interest here is less in identifying
whether or not such measures were coercive, of if they were indeed effective in changing
romantic norms on Curaçao. Rather, my interest lies in documenting the way Shell, like the
colonial government, deployed a similar racialized rhetoric of respectability and responsibility
and linked the goal of its social welfare programs to the successful “reform” of the AfroCuraçaoan household in the 1940s-50s.

Catholicism and Conjugality
In contrast to Shell’s sudden concern with the moral lives of its Afro-Curaçaoan workers,
the Catholic Church on Curaçao had long endeavored to influence the intimate behaviors of its
Afro-Curaçaoan adherents. By the early 1950s, however, a new generation of European Dutch
priests on the island had begun to doubt the efficacy of past approaches and sought new methods
for addressing what elites perceived as unresolved and abiding issues of sexual irresponsibility.
For this reformist group, enduring immorality represented an indictment of the Catholic
Church’s role on Curaçao and evidence of its superficial penetration into the spiritual lives of its
followers. These reformers arrived on the island with a sense of historical urgency. As the
power of state and capital ascended in the postcolonial period, the Church would likewise need
to prove its claims to social relevance on the terrain of the household.
20% in 1960, so, too, did rates of illegitimacy. Illegitimate births were lowest in 1952 (23.9%) but rose steadily
after mass layoffs resulting from mechanization at Isla in 1960 (27.9%), 1967 (34.9%) and 1970 (33.4%). Figures
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With the arrival of Dominican missionaries on Curaçao in the nineteenth century,
encouraging the stable formation of Western-style nuclear households emerged as the premiere
task of the post-emancipation period.43 The efforts of Catholic missionaries helped to produce
religious and racial hierarchies on Curaçao. Elites guarded Protestantism and Judaism as the
preserve of white elites but in the nineteenth century permitted Catholic missionaries to convert
and “civilize” the majority Afro-Curaçaoan population. In 1935, approximately 74% of
Curaçao’s total population was cash-poor and Catholic.44
As a major powerbroker on the island, Catholic leaders were involved in state-led efforts
to reform sexual behavior in the 1940s when wartime demands raised concerns across church
and state about the island’s moral climate. Perhaps most remarkably, established Catholic elites
on Curaçao participated in efforts to create a system of regulated prostitution in the 1940s and
served on the 1942 committee tasked with studying the prevalence of prostitution and possible
solutions for eradicating public immorality and venereal disease. Two Catholic priests served on
this 1942 committee and helped to articulate its ultimate recommendations, including inviting
foreign prostitutes to work in government-sanctioned brothels and requiring compulsory medical
check-ups for sex workers.45 Pointing to the “very large number of male people on this island,”
the committee warned, “the cleanliness and chastity of many of our girls are in great danger of
being lost.”46 In this way, then, turning to foreign prostitution would help to protect the virtue of
local womanhood during wartime. As a result of this committee’s finding, Campo Alegre
opened its doors in 1949. The presence and continued operation of Campo Alegre, however,
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troubled a younger generation of Catholic priests on Curaçao by the 1950s. For these reformminded priests, local patronage of Campo Alegre and stagnating marital rates evidenced an
insufficient Catholic mission on Curaçao.
This critique of the Catholic Church on Curaçao by the turn of the decade coincided with
broader changes in Curaçaoan society. The long-held Church monopoly over healthcare and
schooling dissolved throughout the 1950s, owing to growing secularization and the rise of
private and state-run services resulting from the growth of the oil industry.47 Subtle social
controls intended to enforce right belief and behavior thus fell away over the following decades.
Until 1951, illegitimate children were prohibited from being baptized during the day and were
only allowed to arrive at the church for their baptism under cover of darkness.48 Only in 1963
were these children allowed to have godfathers serve as witnesses to their baptism. Other
regulations discriminating against unwed parents and their children persisted into the 1960s. It
was only in that decade that illegitimate children would be allowed to attend the same schools as
their peers born within wedlock, and that single mothers were allowed to deliver their children in
the same maternity ward as their married counterparts.49
These draconian forms of social control came under attack by younger priests who
advocated for a new approach to reforming relations between Afro-Curaçaoan men and women
in light of the perceived durability of immoral practices. New approaches to tackling sexual
morality, they argued, would be at the heart of attempts to reform Catholicism writ large—a
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practice of “theological renewal” already underway in the metropolitan Netherlands.50 The
young Dominican priest Wim van der Marck best embodied this emerging spiritual trend on
Curaçao, and his controversial 1959 study of the situation in the Antilles would mobilize both
supporters and detractors on the island.
Although it is unclear what precisely motivated the Catholic Church to commission a
study of the spiritual situation in the Antilles, it is likely that the Church, too, experienced the
1940s-50s as a time of anxiety and uncertainty. In 1958-59, van der Marck spent nine months
studying the situation on Curaçao. He considered the organization of the Catholic Church and
the religious lives of its followers on Curaçao not only through the lens of theology, but also
anthropology. Trained in both fields, van der Marck made a series of observations about the
“traditional” methods of Catholic instruction on the island and looked for social and historical
explanations for the inadequate absorption of Catholic values in Curaçaoan society. While the
overarching goal remained the same—that is, to encourage marital harmony—van der Marck
shifted the debate on responsibility and conjugal norms in some surprising ways.
First, van der Marck did not simply attack Catholics for relinquishing familial
responsibility. Rather, he exhorted the very leaders of the Catholic Church on Curaçao for their
backwards attitudes on family matters. He claimed that priests and other religious figures on the
island were excessively focused on the administering of the sacraments without being attentive
to the substance and depth of adherent’s faith. The young priest indicted entrenched Catholic
elites for their “very traditional” approaches that bordered on dogmatic lectures and
proscriptions—a feature of Curaçaoan Catholicism, he argued, that did more to isolate rather
than incorporate believers. Isolation, however, was not only for the Church’s believers. It
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influenced the mentality of Church leadership, too. “Isolation,” van der Marck opined, “is a
point of enormous importance and it is difficult to overstate its influence….Theologically and
scientifically, spiritually and practically, the Antilles are isolated.”51 As a newcomer to the
island, van der Marck observed that “when one arrives on Curaçao one gets the impression that
one has stepped back in time—a mentality prevails that existed many years ago in Europe.”
Evidence of this backwardness could be found in the Church’s lackadaisical attitude toward the
“‘remarkable’ conjugal and family situation” and in the Church’s superficial “grip on the male
population.”52 Administering the sacraments, van der Marck argued, would not be enough to
meaningfully bring Curaçaons into the spiritual life of the church. In painting Curaçao as an
isolated backwater, van der Marck hoped above all to implement a project of theological
modernization on the island—a project that would foster a culture of religious and scientific
learning53 and that would transform the conjugal lives of parishioners.
In a series of exchanges with the Provincial Father in the Netherlands in 1959, van der
Marck defended his views on the Church’s limited reach into the lives of Curaçaons and, again,
pointed to conjugal and sexual norms as evidence of the Church’s failure. Thus, van der Marck
shifted the terms of debate to place accountability for moral deviance on the shoulders of
inadequate church instruction, rather than on the individual neglect of Afro-Curaçaons. Pointing
again to the “dangerous superficiality” of Catholicism among many Afro-Curaçaoan men, van
der Marck painted a bleak picture of moral attitudes on the island:
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After school age, most boys and a large number of girls no longer go to the church unless
it is on Christmas, Good Friday, or on the occasion of a funeral or when they serve as
godmother or godfather.... A large number of men and women marry in the church, but
for the most part after a long period when they lived together (potentially with another or
with others) and had children; especially for the men, marital fidelity is hardly
mentionable. In broad segments of the population, sexual activity before marriage
increases the social prestige of boys and men. While there is naturally no accurate figure,
it appears that homosexuality appears in abnormally high measure, although one would
not expect this given the presence of 'Campo Alegre' (with an average occupation of 110
women and an average visit of 250-300 men and boys per evening).54

What could explain the continued prevalence of such immorality despite the longstanding
presence of the Church on Curaçao? In addition to the misguided and dogmatic approach of
Church leaders on the island, who were perhaps more concerned with fulfilling duties rather than
transforming lives, van der Marck proffered another historical explanation. “The earlier
situation, which was determined by a number of historical factors, including slavery and the
behavior of the elite of society, has already changed favorably in many individual cases and
these changes continue…in the direction of Western European and North American patterns.”55
In this way, van der Marck conceded that slavery—which forcibly dissolved family ties and
which regulated the intimate lives of enslaved people—exerted a profound social influence on
the descendants of the enslaved. The practice of concubinage, or cohabitation without marriage,
he attributed to historical precedents under colonialism, when wealthy white elites fathered
children with women of color whom they did not marry, and only seldom recognized or
legitimated their children.56 Van der Marck’s historical sensitivity, while diverging substantially
54
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from the rhetoric of the late-colonial regime and Shell, nevertheless upheld the nuclear family
and marital monogamy as the ideal endpoint. Despite signs of a transition toward the nuclear
family, van der Marck cautioned that individual successes alone would not sustain a broad
cultural shift. Rather, he argued, “the problem can only be addressed…by a strongly enforced
social pattern.”57
In order to impose this new “social pattern,” van der Marck implored priests on Curaçao
to embrace new methods in dealing with parishioners. His recommendations were twofold.
First, he emphasized that priests seek to instill “a personal bond with the person of Christ” as the
foundation for dealing with matters related to sexuality. Second, van der Marck advocated
“extensive care for the development of women and girls, who in the current situation scarcely
know a function apart from bearing children, and, what is more: to be a physical-sexual partner
for the man.” This would require better instruction on and preparation for marriage alongside a
broader program of social empowerment so that women and girls “can take their place in society
next to men.”58 Van der Marck cautiously added that these issues highlighted the urgency of
offering instruction on family planning to the growing population of Curaçao. Such beliefs no
doubt placed van der Marck among a progressive minority of Catholic priests.59
Yet, when established Church leaders on Curaçao reviewed van der Marck’s report, it
was not his apparent progressivism that most offended them. Rather, established Catholic priests
on the island rebuked van der Marck’s naiveté, drawing attention to the Church’s repeated efforts
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to address the “male problem, which makes many of us hopeless and melancholic.” One priest
mocked, “If [van der Marck] knows novel methods for dealing with this problem, do not let him
hesitate—we are waiting on him and still know no solution.” Elites, then, quickly reverted to a
narrative of essentialized black sexuality characterized by male promiscuity and irresponsibility.
Rather than waste their efforts on a lost cause, Church officials concluded, “We currently see no
possibility for repairing contact with this group.”60
Van der Marck’s nine-month visit to Curaçao touched off a lengthy correspondence—
much of it critical to the young priest—between established clerical elites on Curaçao and their
counterparts in the Netherlands. Van der Marck himself had not anticipated such critical
attention to his report. It seemed, then, that the author’s focus on sexual backwardness as
evidence of Catholic failure touched a nerve. Throughout the 1960s, similar tensions persisted
between progressive and conservative factions within the Catholic Church on Curaçao. The
timing of the initial eruption of these tensions in the 1950s, however, suggests that the Church
was itself conscious of its own fragility in an age of democratization and decolonization. They,
too, looked to the realm of the household as evidence of the Church’s continued relevance. For
van der Marck, the prevalence of non-marital sex demanded the Church make new kinds of
interventions, portraying itself as more human and less dogmatic, and placing individuals and
their sexual habits in a broader social context. For van der Marck’s detractors, it was precisely
the fact that some individual’s behaviors could not be reformed that the Church should maintain
a privileged role in society, guarding a social boundary between the civilized and sexually
responsible and those deemed irreparably irresponsible. Despite their differing positions, both
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converged in their belief that the household would be the terrain on which the Church justified its
continued role on a rapidly changing island.

Conclusion
The domestic anxieties that coursed throughout elite discussions in the 1940s-1950s
attended a broader process of political change and social uncertainty. After over a decade of
debate and deliberation, the proclamation of the Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in
1954 enshrined a new constitutional relationship between the Netherlands and its Caribbean
territories. The Netherlands Antilles shed its dependent status and became an equal member and
partner country of the Kingdom. The Netherlands Antilles and Suriname would govern their
internal affairs autonomously, while The Hague would continue to oversee citizenship, defense
and diplomacy. This new relationship maintained imperial geographies while reforming the
substance and meaning of trans-Atlantic ties. Central to this process of political and social
renewal, as I have argued, was a shared preoccupation with the Afro-Curaçaoan household as
both a guarantor and a hindrance to the process of decolonization.
The modernizing aspirations of elites in the late colonial regime, oil industry, and
Catholic Church were both coercive and condescending toward Afro-Curaçaoans. Redeploying
longstanding stereotypes of black sexual irresponsibility, elites in the 1940s-50s justified a
redoubled civilizing mission precisely at the moment when the political relationships between
the Netherlands and the Caribbean were to be drastically transformed. Indeed, elites viewed the
domicile as the first site of decolonization. Without reform in the household, subsequent
political and economic changes would falter, and the Antilles would remain isolated island
nations unready for belonging in the modern world.
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The zeitgeist of development and reform at empire’s twilight resonated not only in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands. As Frederick Cooper has observed, British and French colonial
administrators, too, enacted a last-ditch effort of imperial reform and modernization in the 1940s.
Paradoxically, Cooper argued, “it is…only in the last phase of colonial rule that something like
the project of a reformist imperialism was implemented with any degree of seriousness.” And it
was likewise “colonialism at its most reformist” that was the first to collapse in the British and
French imperial world.61 In this way, then, colonial elites on Curaçao belonged to a wider
generation of imperial reformers. Yet, in significant ways, their actions diverged from more
familiar colonial powers, not least because their interventions set off an enduring pattern of
increased and intensified exchange between Europe and the Caribbean. Indeed, reformist
colonialism did not collapse in the Antilles. Instead, it was this version of colonialism that
survived and set the tone for postcolonial Kingdom relations: a history characterized not by the
severance but the strengthening of ties.
However, it is not simply the divergent trajectory of decolonization that merits scholarly
attention to the Kingdom. The centrality of sexual and conjugal norms to late-colonial
development schemes is also a striking feature of the Kingdom’s democratic transition. Elites
across the late-colonial government, oil industry and the Catholic Church all converged in their
effort to modernize the Afro-Curaçaoan household as a precursor to political and social
modernity. If it was in the realm of the household that the Caribbean was constructed as an
unmodern space under slavery, then it was likewise in the realm of the household that elites in
the 1940s-50s endeavored to prepare the way for political, economic and social modernity. In
this time of rapid change and uncertainty, however, it was not only elites who voiced anxiety
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about the moral state of the islands. As the following chapter explores, decolonization and
industrialization touched off moral panic on the neighboring island of Aruba, where newly
enfranchised Dutch citizens leveraged an emerging democratic culture to uphold racial
hierarchies, male chastity and feminine virtue.
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Chapter Two
Sexual Morality and Separatism: The 1951 Campo Alegre Protest and Insular Identity on
Aruba1

In an exceptional visit to Aruba in May 1951, a reporter from TIME magazine observed
an epic struggle that had recently beset this “arid, rust-colored Caribbean islet” and “colonial
outpost of the Netherlands.” The struggle erupted on May 30, 1951 when “Virtue, cheered on by
3,000 righteous housewives, grappled with Vice, symbolized by 134 resentful prostitutes.”2 This
confrontation marked the climax in a series of protests against a proposed brothel near the
Aruban port city of San Nicolas, galvanizing religious leaders, women’s organizations, and an
unprecedented number of island residents in opposition against the so-called Campo Alegre, or
the Happy Camp. The protest movement of 1951—measured in the strength of its numbers and
its wide and consistent coverage in the Antillean press—tested fragile democratic institutions
intended to transition Aruba from a Dutch “colonial outpost” into a modern democracy. At the
same time, in both content and in form, the protest movement unfolded within the framework of
Antillean decolonization. Specifically, the relationship between Aruba and Curaçao, its island
neighbor and seat of the government of the Netherlands Antilles,3 became a subject of urgent
concern for the protest movement – not least because it was on Curaçao that the region’s first
state-sanctioned brothel appeared two years earlier. In the protest movement of 1951, concerns
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over the arrival of a Curaçaoan-style Happy Camp thus became deeply entwined with the issue
of national belonging on Aruba.
The extent of emotional energy invested in the protest movement raises the question of
whether the longing for a “separate” Aruba had been channeled into a moral and social project
rather than an expressly political one. By 1951, Aruban aspirations to separate from the
Antillean constellation were thwarted by the enactment of decolonization measures that
broadened democratic self-governance in the Netherlands Antilles but united the six Dutch
Antillean islands under the seat of government in Willemstad, Curaçao. This outcome was a
significant setback for hardline separatists like the Aruban People’s Party (Arubaanse
Volkspartij, hereafter AVP), who sought independence not from the metropolitan Netherlands
but from Curaçao. Yet, as the protests over the proposed Aruban Campo illustrate, deepening
inter-island tensions soon appeared in new theaters of public dialogue, in turn shifting the
debates out of the halls of government and into church pews and city streets. As this chapter
demonstrates, the mass protest against Campo Alegre on Aruba was enabled by decolonization
policies at the same time that it gave vent to ambivalent feelings of opportunity and anxiety
evoked by these very measures.
In important ways, Aruba’s postcolonial history mirrors that of other former colonies.
Across the former Dutch, British and French empires, some former colonies sought not only to
reform bonds with former metropolitan states, but likewise with former dependencies.4 Yet,
strengthening ties between former colonies often gave way to intensified inter-colonial rivalry.
4
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Federations comprised of former colonies such as the short-lived West Indies Federation, a
conglomeration of British Caribbean islands, or further afield in former French West Africa, the
Mali Federation, ultimately dissolved into territorially-defined national states.5 By the midtwentieth century, popular forms of Aruban nationalism similarly called into question the
lingering relationship to neighboring Curaçao. Unlike in other former colonial federations,
however, Arubans rejected national sovereignty as a means for gaining autonomy from Curaçao
and instead aspired to forge bilateral ties with the Netherlands. As such, this chapter seeks to
illuminate how antagonism within and amongst former colonies could eclipse even the demand
to reform bonds between metropole and colony.
Central to understanding these inter-island struggles are closely related debates on sexual
morality, debates that dramatically came to a head in the Campo Alegre protest of 1951. As
other scholars of sexuality and gender in the Caribbean have demonstrated, the postcolonial
nationalisms of the twentieth century conscripted men and women differently according to their
gender, race, and class.6 Similarly, I view the intense discussions around sexual politics on
Aruba in the 1950s within a constellation of equally passionate debates on the island’s enduring
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relationship to Curaçao and the metropolitan Netherlands. As this chapter will demonstrate,
protesters against Campo Alegre on Aruba embraced and redefined notions of a unique Aruban
identity. In the process, participants in the Campo debate combined previously popularized ideas
of the island’s allegedly distinct racial heritage with new mandates for restrained sexual morality,
reframing the boundaries of belonging on Aruba along the axes of race and sexual morality.
This chapter’s dual focus on inter-island antagonism and the gendered and racialized logics of
insular identity sheds light on the complexities of anticolonial nationalism and throws into sharp
relief the ways in which ordinary citizens made sense of the dizzying changes of the
decolonizing state.
This chapter thus highlights the protest movement’s complex interactions with and
contributions to prevailing ideas about decolonization. After surveying initial attempts to
regulate prostitution during World War II and its immediate aftermath, I then analyze protest
ephemera, press sources, and official documents produced at the height of the Campo protest in
the spring and summer of 1951. First, I examine the protest movement’s recurrent appeal to a
distinctly Aruban identity and complementary assertions of moral and racial superiority to
Curaçao. Second, I survey the ways in which the protest movement made strategic use of the
emerging democratic channels of the postcolonial state, including, above all, the opportunities
offered by the Kingdom’s multitiered structure. Finally, I examine how the protest movement
presented itself to and mobilized its supporters around the threat Campo ostensibly posed to
marital bliss and domestic harmony. These messages, and the protest movement’s attendant
promise of moral integrity, resonated in a time of widespread change and uncertainty as the
island’s political future hung in the balance and the economy—centered on the once powerful oil
refining industry—entered a phase of decline. As such, the extraordinary success of the protest

52

movement was owed not to how the Campo question displaced attention from the island’s
political and economic future. Rather, the protest movement evoked incredible emotional energy
precisely for the ways in which the Campo debate dynamically intersected with aspirations for
increased autonomy, and the uncertainty and optimism born of this important moment in
Antillean history.

Regulating Prostitution, 1942-1949
World War II drew the largest Dutch Antillean islands into roles of world-historical
importance. The presence of oil refining industries on Curaçao and Aruba helped to fuel the
Allied war effort, and the wartime boom in production brought both economic and demographic
expansion to the islands. As Gert Oostindie and Inge Klinkers have argued, these developments
contributed to a sense of optimism and self-confidence among Caribbean elites, who, at the war’s
end, pushed to reform ties with the metropolitan Netherlands.7 Yet, the very conditions of
growth and expansion that galvanized some Antillean leaders to seek greater autonomy from the
Netherlands by the war’s end also produced innumerable anxieties about the unmooring of
traditional values and public morality. The growth of port industries in Willemstad in Curaçao
and San Nicolas in Aruba drew thousands of largely single male contract laborers, sailors on
cargo ships and oil tankers, and Dutch and U.S. marines to Antillean shores in the years during
and immediately following the war.8 Officials connected this traffic – significant for the small
islands of Curaçao and Aruba, whose populations totaled 105,000 and 55,000 in 1951
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respectively – to the alarming rise in venereal disease and the alleged appearance of open and
flourishing hedonism in the port environs.9
These developments troubled colonial and religious leadership alike. On both Curaçao
and Aruba in the first half of the twentieth century, the Catholic Church occupied a central role
in civic life. Although Protestantism, the religion of early Dutch colonists, remained the primary
religion of governing elites into the twentieth century, Catholicism had long been the majority
religion of residents on Curaçao and Aruba. With the arrival of missionaries from the Dominican
order in the nineteenth century, key institutions such as education and health care came under the
auspices of the Catholic Church and remained under Catholic control until the 1950s.10 When
colonial policy-makers on Curaçao attempted to address the perceived sexual needs of the
island’s population of single males, they solicited the opinion and involvement of the Catholic
Church in finding a solution. As discussed in the previous chapter, in 1942, a five-man
committee, including members of the colonial government and two Catholic priests, convened to
study the island’s prostitution problem and advise colonial administrators based on its findings.11
This committee called on the police and health departments of both Curaçao and Aruba to
supervise prostitution and sequester commercial sex within tolerated zones and hotels.12
Upholding a statute introduced by the Dutch governor in 1936, the committee also endorsed the
continued licensing of foreign sex workers hailing largely from Colombia, Venezuela, and the
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Dominican Republic.13 Together with other regulationist measures, this imperative aimed to
protect the chastity of local womanhood and public virtue.14
This loose system of regulation was ultimately introduced on both Curaçao and Aruba in
1944 as an amendment to the earlier regulation of contagious diseases.15 Within a year, however,
local officials on Curaçao complained that the measures had done little to improve flagrant
displays of public immorality and decrease the prevalence of venereal disease. New proposals
issued in 1945 advocated for the centralization of prostitution in a single destination away from
Willemstad’s commercial and residential centers. In 1949, these plans became a reality when the
first Campo Alegre opened its doors on the site of a former military encampment near Curaçao’s
Hato airport. Only foreign women were permitted to enter and work in this sprawling compound
—to this day the largest open-air brothel in the world—after registering with the police and
obtaining a certificate of good health from medical authorities.16 Although this more
interventionist system promised to sanitize downtown Willemstad, Campo Alegre directly
contravened Articles 259 and 260 of the Antillean criminal code. These statutes prohibited the
facilitation of prostitution by a third party and banned brothels—a peculiar situation for colonial
officials, as Mariëlle Kleijn and Marlou Schrover have argued, who subsequently assumed the
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role of pimp in a government-run brothel.17 Neither articles in the Antillean penal code nor their
Dutch antecedents, however, outlawed prostitution or criminalized the prostitute.18
On Aruba, meanwhile, the regulations of 1944 and contradictory injunctions in the
Antillean criminal code had created a peculiar situation in San Nicolas, site of the prosperous
U.S.-owned Lago Oil and Transport Company. Although authorities permitted foreign
prostitutes to establish temporary residence in the hotels Hija del Dia and Hollywood, the ban on
third-party facilitation and brothel-keeping prohibited sex workers from entertaining clients in
hotel chambers.19 As a result, commercial sex had become a public spectacle. By 1950,
authorities complained of the scandalous situation on the island’s eastern shores, where hired
taxis shuttled public women and their customers from the center of the city to the outlying
beaches of Smal and Juana Morto.20 Mounting concerns over public prostitution on Aruba and
the recent opening of Curaçao’s Campo empowered some officials on Aruba to attempt to
remove immoral acts from public view.
On June 4, 1949, José María Debrot, owner of the hotel Hija del Dia requested a permit
to build a “hotel” intended exclusively for a “certain category of women.”21 Debrot’s proposed
establishment would house sixty rooms and a restaurant serving residents and their guests.
Unlike Debrot’s Hija del Dia, this new establishment—dubbed Campo Alegre by its supporters
and eventual detractors—would openly facilitate paid sexual encounters on the complex’s
17
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grounds. In his proposal to Aruban authorities, Debrot strategically emphasized his desire to
“move the guests from the heart of San Nicolas beyond the city limit, contributing to the social
welfare of the island.”22
Ironically, it was Debrot’s intent to shield the Aruban public from immoral acts that
triggered significant popular outcry. In March 1951, as Aruban officials and civil servants
repeatedly failed to find a suitable location for Debrot’s Campo, a number of housewives in San
Nicolas caught wind of the looming plans. Under the leadership of president Clarita Villaba and
secretary Marianita Chong of the Roman Catholic Women’s League (R.K. Vrouwenbond) of San
Nicolas, a self-styled protest committee began to draw attention to the troubling specter of a
brothel planned just “a short distance from a residential area, very close by the houses of good
Aruban families with many children and who deserve to provide those children with a good
upbringing.”23 Throughout the spring and summer of 1951, religious women’s organizations
allied with leaders of Christian churches on Aruba to mobilize thousands of island residents—the
majority of them women—in protest against the island government and Campo Alegre. Their
aim was not only to prevent a Campo Alegre from arriving on Aruba, but also to abolish
prevailing systems of regulation. Such measures, they insisted, flouted Christian principles and
both Antillean and Dutch law. Moreover, the presence of a brothel on Aruba, they asserted, ran
contrary to the Aruban people’s principles and mores.

Curaçao’s “Worthless Example”
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In their confrontations with Antillean authorities in the spring and summer of 1951,
leaders of the protest movement sought to defend Aruban families and public morality from
government-sanctioned sin. While other scholars have commented upon the religiosity of the
protest movement, none have remarked upon how the movement’s professed Catholicism and
restrained sexual morality became deeply imbricated within notions of a discrete insular
identity.24 Protest leadership and various sympathizers identified Curaçao as the antithesis to
Aruba’s emerging island identity—not least because it was on Curaçao that the region’s first
Campo Alegre came to exist. In this way, the Campo debate on Aruba became a powerful means
for repudiating Curaçao and, in the process, advancing notions of a distinctly Aruban identity.
The Aruban identity popularized by commentators within the Campo debate was marked
not only by the island’s supposed moral superiority, but also by the alleged racial superiority of
Arubans to Curaçaoans. As I will later discuss, nationalist politicians on Aruba insisted that the
island’s unique ethnic heritage set it apart from other Antillean islands.25 These actors called on
the island’s large mestizo population—the descendants of early European colonists and
Amerindians from South America—as the “real” Arubans. Until the arrival of the oil refining
industry in the early twentieth century, Aruba’s population remained relatively homogenous
owing to the absence of plantation slavery and the island’s isolation.26 By contrast, on Curaçao
the Dutch West India Company established the bustling port city of Willemstad as a center of the
Atlantic slave trade in the seventeenth century. Over two centuries of reliance on the enslaved
labor of people of African descent on Curaçao thus differed substantially from the historical
trajectory of Aruba, where the number of enslaved never totaled higher than 600.27 By the
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twentieth century, Afro-Caribbeans formed the majority population group on Curaçao and a
growing minority on Aruba, as thousands of primarily Afro-Caribbean laborers came to work in
the oil refining industry.28 Although the image of Aruba as a mestizo society and of Curaçao as
an Afro-Caribbean society is a simplistic one that belies the diversity of both islands by the midtwentieth century,29 some politicians on Aruba nevertheless succeeded in popularizing this
reductive understanding of Aruban belonging, and which, as I will later demonstrate, inflected
the tenor of the protest against Campo Alegre.
For some among the protest movement, the mere fact of the movement’s existence
separated Aruba from Curaçao. One Catholic priest on Aruba, whose fastidious collection of
press clippings, pamphlets, posters, and correspondence forms an important source base for this
study, reflected in the opening pages of his scrapbook: “What is incredible is that Aruban women
… have continued to protest, because this does not fit within the history of the Antilles. While
on Curaçao no one raised their voice in protest when a brothel was built with the approval of the
administration … on Aruba the government has now been forced to search for another location
for the second time.”30 Similarly, an article in the consistently sympathetic Catholic newspaper,
Amigoe di Curaçao, observed:
Aruba lies somewhere on the earth off the coast of Venezuela, a small pile of
rocks tossed from God’s creating hand. What can we do? ... Not much. We lie
between lands that can trample us. Economically speaking, the question of our
survival depends on Lago. We are practically dependent on others for everything.
But it is a fact that this small, precious and eternally loved little island has its own
mentality and character. We will not discuss Curaçao, which accepted a Campo
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and foreign prostitutes without protest. Curaçao must figure that out on its own.
Our ideas are different: we do not want a Campo!31
For this commentator, Aruba’s homegrown moral tradition was all the more remarkable
precisely because of the island’s political and economic dependence. In view of Aruba’s
reliance on foreign industry and its marginal role on the international stage, the island’s
autonomous moral character emerged as its most distinctive and celebrated trait.
While these authors indicted the complicity of the Curaçaoan public in the Campo
question, other opponents of the brothel explicitly placed blame for Aruba’s emerging troubles
on Curaçao. The Antillean press became an important tool for bringing this message to the
public, and in newspapers such as Amigoe di Curaçao, numerous sympathizers railed against
their island neighbor. The paper’s opinion pages commonly accused Curaçao’s leaders, who had
flouted the law with impunity, for encouraging a haughty sense of disregard among Aruban
officials. One author opined, “what is yet more unbelievable is that fact that the government of
Aruba stood very strongly because it was supported by Curaçao, which has illegally had a
Campo Alegre since 1949.”32 Repeatedly, opponents of Campo Alegre questioned why Aruba
must follow Curaçao “when it has offered such a worthless example.”33
Curaçao loomed large in the protest movement’s rhetoric not only because the island
housed the first Campo Alegre. The opening of the brothel in 1949 and its exclusive admittance
of foreign sex workers from Latin America and the Hispanic Caribbean had evidently forced
some local prostitutes to search for new clientele on Aruba.34 Police reports from the late 1940s
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and early 1950s cited the troubling increase in the number of Antillean prostitutes on Aruba,
among whom the “Curaçaoan element predominated.”35 Indeed, forty-four of the island’s
seventy-five registered prostitutes in 1951 originated from Curaçao. Meanwhile, police reported
that until August 1951 there were “as good as no Aruban prostitutes” on Aruba.36 Thus, both
officials and protesters perceived prostitution to be a largely “foreign” affair. What made the
perceived threat of Curaçao so acute, however, was that Curaçao was a domestic Other in a
position of political authority, bonded unevenly to Aruba through common citizenship,
government, and the freedom of movement among the Dutch Antillean islands.
Commentators on all sides of the Campo debate routinely racialized Curaçaoan sex
workers and claimed that the alleged undesirability of African-Curaçaoan prostitutes served as
the primary justification for continued reliance on “white foreign women.”37 After the mass
demonstrations in San Nicolas and the capital city of Oranjestad at the end of May, a subject to
which I later return, Antillean authorities called for the formation of a committee to study
prostitution on Aruba. The Antillean Attorney General and the committee’s chairman, J.J.A.
Ellis, dismissed an unusual proposition to “import” exclusively Curaçaoan sex workers,
claiming, “these Curaçaoan women would not satisfy the demand, and would therefore cause
problems for the white women of Aruba. The local [Curaçaoan] prostitutes are black.”38 Ellis
35
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thus made a cautious argument for the continued tolerance of foreign prostitutes by insisting that
male sexual needs would threaten Aruba’s “white” females should clients be denied access to
light-skinned sex workers.
Members of the protest movement, however, retorted that the sexual availability of white
foreign women only made prostitution more appealing. In a letter to the editor of Amigoe di
Curaçao, one author opined:
One whispers that the foreign prostitutes must come as the indigenous are not
sufficient because of their color. If there are no foreigners then the indigenous
will be sufficient; they will only become busier. Men will take what they can
even if they prefer the white foreigners. The traffic in foreign prostitutes makes a
choice possible and the sin more attractive.39
While sex workers were routinely racialized, a move that simultaneously served to “whiten” the
Aruban population and equate this whiteness with chastity, the race of male clientele received
little attention. Although many police and medical experts on Aruba contended that itinerant
sailors and local men patronized prostitutes in equal numbers, the diversity among both of these
groups renders the racial identification of clients—as in most instances—highly problematic.40
What is salient in this exchange between governing officials and the protest movement, however,
is the extent to which the protest movement succeeded in setting the terms of the debate. In a
new atmosphere of representative politics, officials scrambled to defend their actions in the
language of the protest movement itself, invoking the danger of prostitution to public morality
and, more troublingly, racial purity.
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A minority voice on Aruba also deployed the threat of racial danger—this time as a way
to indict the shortsightedness of the protest movement. Nearly one year after the mass
demonstrations of May 1951, the San Nicolas circular Chuchubi ran the headline, “Curaçao vs.
Aruba: Barbuletas [butterflies] vs. Chinchurias [whores].”41 The article denounced the protest
movement and the island government’s subsequent decision in August 1951 to deport foreign
prostitutes:
Did you all anticipate as you marched through the streets in opposition to the
“butterflies” (barbuletas) that this situation would cause a migration of prostitutes
from Curaçao to Aruba? Did the administration consider … that a national
migration would occur on Aruba? Did the island council consider when they
protested against the “butterflies” that Curaçao would remain and give their
whores permission to plant themselves on Aruba?42
Evidently it was not enough for certain critics of the protest movement to attack the
implausibility or naïve idealism of a strictly abolitionist approach. Instead, these critics invoked
racialized stereotypes of Curaçaon sex workers to argue that the abolition of foreign prostitution
on Aruba had done more to threaten rather than protect the island.
These comments highlight a central and problematic feature of the Aruban identity
popularized in the 1940s, and one that some leaders integrated into their pleas to separate from
Curaçao: Aruba’s whitened racial identity in contrast to that of Curaçao. As Luc Alofs has
argued, the formation of the AVP in 1942 did much to popularize notions of a unique ethnic
Aruban identity and located the nation’s founding myth in the marriage between European
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colonists and indigenous Amerindians.43 The popular maxim of the AVP, “Aruba for Arubans,”
was as much anti-Curaçaoan and as it was anti-immigrant—a fearful expression of the island’s
inferior status to Curaçao and a defensive backlash against the economic marginalization of local
workers. By 1948, roughly 40 percent of Lago’s 8,262 employees hailed from the Anglophone
Caribbean, and thus thousands of predominantly African–Caribbean laborers formed the
backbone of the island’s most important industry.44 While the AVP’s nativist and xenophobic
rhetoric rallied electoral majorities in the days of limited franchise, the broadening of the
franchise and the organization of immigrants in associational clubs and political parties
ultimately created increased competition for the AVP by 1951.45 Although the protest movement
did not explicitly align itself with any political party, its equation of outsiders with moral
degradation, and the concomitant defense of a unique Aruban character, in many ways reflect the
AVP’s rhetorical strategies. Adding to and drawing upon prevailing discourses of Aruban
separateness, the protest movement combined a restrained sexual morality with racially coded
understandings of Aruban belonging.
This pattern of racialization on Aruba stands in contrast to emerging categories of racial
difference on Curaçao in the 1950s. As Kamala Kempadoo has noted, Campo’s practice of
inviting light-skinned Latin sex workers to Curaçao to the exclusion of local women of largely
African descent has resulted in the production of “categories of womanhood … that
distinguished between decent, domesticated local women and loose, exotic disruptive
hypersexual Others.”46 The stereotyped image of the “SanDom” on Curaçao – typically
understood as an unruly Latin sex worker – thus serves as a contrast to appropriate African-
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Curaçaoan femininity. On Aruba in the early 1950s, however, and despite the number of foreign
prostitutes from Latin America, commentators on the Campo question repeatedly connected
African–Curaçaoan women with sexual chaos and moral disorder, a discourse that
simultaneously served to “whiten” Aruban women. As Ann Stoler has argued, such racial,
sexual and class discourses powerfully map “the moral parameters of the nation.”47 Through
discussion of prostitution and sexual politics, a range of actors became engaged in these efforts.
Despite sometimes diverging opinion on the Campo question, these actors ultimately converged
in their belief in Aruban separateness. While scholars have long noted the imbrication of gender,
race, and class within understandings of nationalism, what bears stating in the Aruban example is
that none among the chorus of voices expressed support for territorial sovereignty based on the
familiar nation-state model. The articulation of a distinct and separate Aruban identity—
saturated though it was by familiar markers of race, gender, and class—thus became an urgent
project not in spite of its enduring connections to Curaçao, the broader Dutch Antilles, and the
former colonial metropole, but precisely because of these revitalized multinational ties. It is to
this subject that I now turn.

Leveraging the Kingdom
The protest movement owed its extraordinary efficacy in part to fortuitous timing.
Sweeping decolonization policy enacted in 1951 democratized the bodies of Antillean
governance and made space for the participation of citizens in civic life. While other scholars
claim that participants of the Campo protest were motivated primarily by their religious
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idealism,48 the emphasis on the protest movement’s religious orientation overlooks the ways in
which the movement and its supporters engaged with and navigated the politics of local,
national, and Kingdom-wide governance. The protest movement availed itself in particular of
constitutional changes that asserted the authority of Kingdom and national governments over
local island administrations in the Antilles. Indeed, somewhat paradoxically, even as the protest
movement advanced notions of a separate Aruban identity, they simultaneously leveraged
Aruba’s non-sovereign political status to solicit intervention from authorities in Willemstad and
The Hague.
As other scholars have recently pointed out, this kind of “layered sovereignty” emerged
in the 1940s-50s as an attractive alternative to revolutionary anticolonial nationalism and
territorial sovereignty premised on the national state.49 While recent scholarship is right to
highlight the ingenuity of these multinational states, what has received comparatively less
attention is the rather unglamorous and quotidian ways in which political elites and popular
classes negotiated and made sense of the often opaque linkages between local, national, and
Kingdom-wide governance.50 As such, these early years of reform were pregnant with both
problems and possibilities, on the one hand producing innumerable frictions between various
governing organs and personnel unsure of the scope of their authority, and on the other hand
offering tremendous latitude for political improvisation while also making accessible multiple
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channels for airing grievances and seeking redress. It was into this maelstrom of optimism and
uncertainty that the debate over the Campo Alegre brothel emerged.
The protest movement’s strategy of leveraging the governing bodies of the Kingdom was
enabled by the introduction of the Interim Regulation (Interimregeling) of February 1951 and the
proclamation of the Island Regulations of the Netherlands Antilles (Eilandenregeling
Nederlandse Antillen, hereafter ERNA) in March 1951. While earlier regulations in 1939 and
1948 introduced the basic principles of democratic self-governance to the Netherlands Antilles,
including freedom of the press, the creation of a national parliament and, crucially, the
introduction of universal franchise, the Interim Regulation and ERNA strengthened the
democratic structures of the state and clarified the relationship between the national government
and the Dutch crown, and between local island administrations and the national government.
Specifically, the Interim Regulation of 1951 strengthened the position of the Antillean
Parliament, known as the Estates (Staten), which assumed primary responsibility for formulating
the laws and regulations governing internal affairs in the Netherlands Antilles.51 The increased
authority of the national parliament stripped the governor of the Netherlands Antilles –
previously appointed by the Dutch crown—of many of the executive’s duties and made the
position responsible to an Antillean council of ministers.52 However, several important functions
remained with the governor. In the governor’s capacity as symbolic head of the national
government, the governor retained the power to dissolve and hold new elections in parliament,
and, in his role as representative of the Kingdom government in the Netherlands Antilles, the
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governor could reject any ordinance deemed contrary to the mutual interests of the Kingdom.53
In this way, though the national government exercised autonomy in internal affairs, its status
within the Kingdom of the Netherlands ensured the ongoing intervention of the Netherlands in
issues of mutual interest to the Kingdom countries.54
Quickly following the enactment of the Interim Regulation, the royal proclamation of the
ERNA on March 14, 1951 expanded the autonomy of each of the island territories and placed a
range of administrative responsibilities under the control of a local island administration. Daily
management over the affairs of each island territory rested in the Administrative College formed
by a lt. governor, who served as the college’s chairman, and several deputies selected by the
Island Council (eilandsraad), whose members were popularly elected and served four-year
terms.55 Yet, while the autonomy of each island territory certainly expanded through the ERNA,
the regulations of national and Kingdom governments remained superior. According to the
terms of the ERNA, each island territory was obliged to cooperate in the implementation of
national regulations or decrees and the lt. governor, whose primary task was to determine
whether island regulations came into conflict with national or Kingdom-wide agreements, would
be appointed by the Dutch crown.56 As such, island administrators answered to the bodies of
national and Kingdom governance.
53
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The protest movement displayed a sophisticated knowledge of these emerging governing
structures. Nearly all major petitions and declarations by the two primary arms of the protest
movement—one led by religious women’s organizations and the other by religious leaders—
were sent simultaneously to local authorities, national officials in the Antillean capital, and
governing organs in the Netherlands. Initially, protesters addressed their petitions to the lt.
governor of Aruba, who responded to the nascent protest movement by simultaneously
attempting to relocate the proposed brothel further away from residential areas and quietly
accelerating plans to finalize the building of the brothel. On May 16, 1951, acting Governor of
the Netherlands Antilles F.A. Jas—an unelected official appointed by the Dutch monarch—
signed a national decree approving the lease of 17,000 square meters of government land to N.V.
Pereira and J.M. Debrot.57 Although Debrot and his allies in government agreed not to discuss
the lease, within ten days word had leaked to the public. In the week following this revelation,
the protest movement publicized their cause in the Netherlands and on Curaçao.58 In a series of
telegrams dispatched on the day of mass demonstrations in Oranjestad, protest leaders Villaba
and Chong jettisoned moral arguments and instead drew attention to Campo’s infraction of two
Antillean and metropolitan laws: those prohibiting the facilitation of prostitution by a third party
and the ban on brothels. In two telegrams addressed to the governor of the Netherlands Antilles
in his dual capacity as head of the national government and representative of the Kingdom in
Curaçao, Villaba and Chong called for the “restoration and enforcement of Curaçaoan law
regarding prostitution,” while also urgently requesting that the governor notify “higher
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authorities in the Netherlands.”59 Villaba and Chong then took matters into their own hands,
issuing a telegram directly to Queen Juliana of the Netherlands requesting the enforcement of
Dutch law to ensure “no tolerance for foreign prostitutes, no tolerance for public lechery.”60
While it is unclear whether protesters expected much from these appeals, the protest movement
nevertheless availed itself of the hierarchical nature of the Kingdom.
The mass demonstrations against Campo Alegre at the end of May significantly altered
the previously dismissive attitude of local administrators and compelled a range of elected
parliamentarians to involve themselves in the Campo debate. On May 30, 1951, thousands of
people—the vast majority of them women—marched to government offices in Oranjestad
demanding the reversal of the national decree. Sympathetic onlookers described this event as an
unparalleled historic occasion and celebrated the protest’s democratic spirit of inclusion. While
the leadership of the protest movement included largely middle-class women, the nearly 3,000
people who protested in the streets of Oranjestad and San Nicolas at the end of May drew a
wider cross-section of society into the Campo debate.61 One author observed, “old and young,
mother, partner, betrothed, from all walks of life, gathered … to defend husbands, young men,
and fiancés against the attack of money-minded people who make a vile profit by taking away
the most precious of what God gave to women in his unending overflowing love.”62 For some,
the protest was not simply an outpouring of faith but a deeply spiritual experience. One
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commentator pointed to the contrast between the protest movement’s modest tactics—a hodgepodge of homemade signs attached to broomsticks and riddled with Dutch spelling errors, a
testament to the humble social status of the protesters—and its striking moral uprightness: “this
was the instinctive response of 500 years of Christendom … you looked and you felt a strange
lump in your throat: this was the soul of Aruba speaking.”63
Officials scrambled to respond to the protest. Members of parties who had been elected to
represent Aruba in the Antillean government, and whose parties had much to lose if they did not
neutralize the conflict before Aruba’s first-ever Island Council election in June, seized the
opportunity to placate protesters and redeem their own tarnished reputations. Yet, as politicians
competed amongst each other to claim the moral high ground for themselves and their respective
parties, confusion emerged about the scope of local authority to initiate or reverse the policy on
prostitution and the accountability between island and national branches of government. On
June 1, 1951 the Antillean Parliament declared the national decree a “political mistake” and
approved the formation of a committee to study prostitution in San Nicolas.64 Aruban
parliamentarians in particular rushed to revise their position on Campo in view of the fastapproaching Island Council election. AVP leader Henny Eman circulated pamphlets claiming
that he never supported the brothel. Instead, Eman maintained he had only approved of the
building of a cabaret.65 The Minister of Justice of the Netherlands Antilles and fellow AVP
member W.F.M. Lampe came under especially heavy criticism because of rumors that Debrot
funded his political campaign.66 Lampe swiftly proposed new regulations to the Antillean
parliament that prohibited both the licensing of foreign prostitutes and the registration of
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domestic sex workers.67 It was acting Dutch Governor Jas, however, whose dramatic change of
heart secured the victory of the protest movement. In a theatrical speech on June 19, 1951, Jas
declared the Campo question a matter of the past, vowing that no Campo would be built on the
island. Additionally, Jas ordered the repeal of licenses for foreign prostitutes and prohibited
further “importation” of foreign women. Embracing the protest movement’s nationalist rhetoric,
he concluded his speech stating, “I call on the Aruban people to continue with me, and soon,
with the chosen island administration, to fight against prostitution.”68
While the protest movement welcomed Jas’s measures with gratitude, some of his
colleagues in the Antillean government felt that he had overstepped his authority and violated the
government’s democratic principles. In particular, Prime Minister of the Netherlands Antilles
Dr. M.F.da Costa Gomez claimed that Jas’s actions showed a “disregard for parliamentary
tradition” and faulted Jas’s controversial interpretation of the Interim Regulation.69 Lampe
likewise challenged Jas’s authority and insisted his own regulations should take precedence over
the acting governor’s. Indeed, Lampe’s measures dated two days earlier than those of Jas but
had not reached Oranjestad in time to redeem the minister of Justice.70
Undoubtedly, the political changes of 1951 increased the accountability of officials to
their constituents and opened a range of venues in which protesters could seek redress at the
same time that they offered politicians a new degree of latitude. Though some protesters adeptly
navigated state structures to press for the restoration of law and morality, the nature of these
reformed political bonds—especially those between Curaçao and Aruba—also provoked feelings
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of anxiety and uncertainty. Taken together, the anti-Curaçaoan sentiment of the protest
movement and the strategic leveraging of the Kingdom’s multitiered structure are remarkable not
least for how they conform to prevailing aspirations for decolonization. This is perhaps most
evident in the seemingly ubiquitous assertion—shared by some of Campo’s elite supporters in
the AVP and its most virulent detractors in the protest movement—that Aruban identity was
distinct from and under threat by Curaçao and thus deserved special protection from the
Netherlands. Yet, the protest movement often appealed to the legislative authority of Curaçao
over Aruba in an attempt to halt the development of a Campo Alegre, thus exploiting federal
connections even as they denounced the problematic precedent of Curaçao’s Campo. More still,
the pursuit of external intervention by governing authorities in Curaçao and the Netherlands
misrecognized (perhaps strategically) the locus of the Campo question. Dutch colonial
authorities who had been instrumental in advocating for regulated prostitution on Curaçao and in
establishing that island’s government-run brothel did not become the target of the protest
movement’s censure. Instead, the protest movement’s assumptions about blame and
accountability in the Campo affair reflected in many ways local political ambition to sever ties
with Curaçao and the remaining Dutch Antillean islands and in its place strengthen bonds with
the Netherlands.

The Promise of Morality
The protests against Campo Alegre on Aruba drew thousands of island residents into
public demonstration. While neighborhood, familial, and religious networks undoubtedly did
much to rally upwards of three thousand island residents against state-regulated prostitution, the
protest movement’s repeated emphasis on the vulnerability of domestic stability galvanized some
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supporters around Campo’s threat to household harmony and reflected broader ambivalence and
uncertainty about the sweeping political and economic changes of the 1940s-50s.
The posters and pamphlets of the protest movement offer insight into how the movement
addressed itself to and mobilized its supporters. Written predominantly in Papiamento, posters
circulated in San Nicolas contained messages such as “Women of Aruba! Protest against the
danger that awaits your husband or boyfriend!” and “Women of Aruba! Come forth for your
family. A Campo Alegre is destructive to your domestic peace.”71 When protesters descended on
the streets of Oranjestad at the end of May, makeshift posters warned female onlookers that “the
government is looking for a new home for your husbands.”72 The Antillean press likewise
predicted the impending dissolution of household harmony. One fictionalized story printed in
Amigoe di Curaçao envisioned the nightmarish impact of a Campo Alegre on Aruban
households, telling the story of two adolescent males who, until the opening of the brothel, had
contentedly passed their evenings playing card games on the porch. On the first night the brothel
opened its doors, the sons abandoned the porch and did not return home until midnight. On the
second night, they did not return at all.73 Echoing this perceived threat to Aruban manhood and
familial stability, the conservative Arubaanse Courant cautioned in an open letter to the “women
of Aruba” that Campo would deliver “great danger to the moral and physical welfare of our
homes. A danger to our husbands, sons, fathers, brothers and boyfriends.”74
These repeated articulations of Campo’s threat to Aruban families—and women’s alleged
responsibility for male chastity—distinguish this abolitionist campaign from countless others.
Unlike some struggles against prostitution throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth
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centuries, where middle-class feminist groups purportedly came to the rescue of “fallen women,”
Aruba’s protest movement rallied around a xenophobic rejection of sex workers. 75 In this way,
the protest against regulated prostitution on Aruba echoed the anti-blackness of nineteenthcentury Puerto Rican feminists who, as Eileen Findlay argues, rejected Afro-Puerto Rican
women and sex workers from understandings of “common sisterhood”—a discourse motivated
by racial hatred and the threat of sexual competition alike.76
The vulnerability of Aruban manhood likewise emerges in official response to the
protest. In questions posed to numerous medical professionals, police personnel, Lago managers
and other island leaders, the committee formed to study prostitution on Aruba in May 1951
repeatedly asked how prostitution might imperil male youth. The idea that looser systems of
regulation induced youthful male curiosity and offered “public lessons in seduction”77 guided the
official defense of Aruba’s Campo Alegre in the government’s initial interactions with the
protest movement. Again, the defense of male youth by some governing officials presented a
dramatic change in emphasis from the 1942 committee formed to study prostitution on Curaçao,
which authorized the regulation of prostitution on the grounds “that the cleanliness and virginity
of many of our girls are in great danger of being lost.”78
Whether such anxieties about male vulnerability and threats to domestic harmony were
strategic or sincere is difficult to determine. What is clear, however, is that the protest
movement was not the only party to express anxiety about the resilience of Aruban manhood.
Island leadership, too, worried about rising male unemployment and overdependence on Lago,
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the island’s largest industry and employer. During the war, the Allied demand for oil drew an
unprecedented number of Aruban males into employ at Lago—a practice that reversed the
refinery’s earlier reliance on English-speaking foreign contract laborers. However, the end of
the war and the eventual recovery of the European economy scaled back the wartime boom in
Lago’s productivity as well as the demand for local labor.79 By 1951, many officials cited rising
unemployment, worsening economic conditions, and labor relations—especially pronounced
during a massive strike at Lago in the summer of 195180—as the primary cause of slackening
public morality. In meticulously plotted graphs, officials charted rising unemployment alongside
increased reports of divorce, sexual violence, public drunkenness, theft, and pregnancy out of
wedlock.81 In this way, too, official anxieties over public morality dovetailed with the protest
movement’s concerns, even as these groups at times differed in their thinking on how best to
address the crises afflicting Aruban manhood.
The boom and subsequent bust years of the war and its immediate aftermath were
disorienting if also ultimately transformative years for Aruba. If the war brought a dizzying
sense of optimism to the island, the end of the war provoked broad uncertainties over how to best
sustain these gains. The brief flurry of international attention that Aruba garnered in its
important wartime role soon failed to captivate even metropolitan Dutch officials, who by the
war’s end focused their attention on the explosive conflicts unfolding in Indonesia’s struggle for
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independence.82 Changes in the economic landscape paired with disappointments on the political
stage, including the failure of the Aruban separatist movement and the defeat of more moderate
proposals to establish equivalence among Aruban and Curaçaoan seats in parliament,
compounded for some the sense of Aruba’s marginality and dependence. Undoubtedly these
changes reached into Antillean households in vexing and personal ways. Such rationale might
go a long way toward explaining how several thousand people came to be so convinced of the
threat of Campo Alegre to members of their family and not, as it were, the thousands of
anonymous sailors and foreign refinery workers whom the brothel was allegedly intended to
serve. The protest movement’s implicit promise of moral uprightness and its attendant aspiration
of domestic harmony perhaps offered an empowering if idealistic message in an atmosphere of
uncertainty and change. What’s more, by late summer of 1951, the protest movement had
succeeded where politicians failed: although Aruba would not become politically or
economically autonomous that year, the protest movement had helped to forge an image of
Aruban moral autonomy.

Aftermath and Conclusion
The 1951 protest against Campo Alegre on Aruba profoundly inflected the tenor of the
island’s sexual politics and the spirit of Aruban separatism. Testing the nascent mechanisms of
the decolonizing state, the protest movement compelled public officials to halt plans to develop
Campo Alegre and, by August 1951, to send away the island’s foreign prostitutes. This victory
for the protest movement came as a blow to those who profited from commercial sex on the
island while also presenting a dilemma for local officials who lacked both the resources and the
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gumption to address the precipitous increase in domestic prostitution.83 The conflicting interests
of these various groups, and the ways in which each came into stunning conflict in the spring and
summer 1951, has exerted a lasting influence on Aruba’s treatment of commercial sex work.
Specifically, the legacy of the protest movement of 1951 is most evident in the continued
reticence of the island leadership to confront the “prostitution question” with a coherent policy of
tolerance and regulation. Instead, in the years following the protest, officials responded
ambiguously to aggrieved café owners in San Nicolas who, citing destitution and bankruptcy,
demanded the return of foreign prostitutes.84 By 1954, a significant number of foreign women
had entered Aruba on two-week transit permits designated for “saleswomen”
(koopvrouwtoeristen). Much like in the days before the Campo question emerged, these women
headed for the streets of San Nicolas and clandestinely practiced their trade in the backrooms of
bars and clubs.85
The threat of protest lay behind any subtle move to invite foreign prostitutes back to
Aruba. With the increased presence of saleswomen after 1954, familiar players in the protest
movement, including Catholic women’s associations and clergy, sent angry letters in defense of
the “good name of Aruba.”86 This time, however, they were joined by a chorus of voices in
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newly established social welfare initiatives such as the Foundation for the Promotion of Mental
Health on Aruba (Stichting ter Bevordering van de Geestelijke Volksgezondheid op Aruba) and
the Aruban Foundation to Combat Alcohol Abuse (Stichting Bestrijding Alcoholmisbruik
Aruba).87 As Margo Groenewoud has also argued of the postwar period on Curaçao, economic
modernization and the initiation of decolonization policy empowered actors to organize beyond
the traditional framework of the Catholic Church, thus increasing the participation of secular
associations in education, social work and health care.88 And so it was within this diverse
landscape of social actors in 1957 that the island government of Aruba quietly permitted a
number of registered cafés to hire “adult entertainers” (animeermeisjes) from abroad. Though
careful to never label these foreign entertainers as prostitutes in public, in private correspondence
governing officials bluntly conceded that such semantic deceptions were necessary for resolving
this hot-button and “centuries-old social question”89 on Aruba. Aruban officials defended the
provisional return of such foreign entertainers, claiming that without these animeermeisjes the
number of Curaçaoan prostitutes on Aruba would only increase.90
Although Aruba did return to a minimally regulated system of prostitution after 1957, the
protest movement can nevertheless be regarded as impactful on several counts. First, the
absence of a Campo Alegre on Aruba testifies to the efficacy of the movement. Barring a
centralized, regulated brothel from existing on Aruba was, after all, the original goal of the
protest movement and its primary reason for being. Second, the protest movement succeeded in
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establishing the terms of debate in 1951 and in the decades that followed, and compelled the
local government to respond to the protest’s demands using the very rhetoric of the protest
movement itself. This was most evident in the local government’s insistence after the protests of
1951 that any changes related to prostitution policy would benefit and protect the spirit of the
Aruban nation. Lastly, the continued reticence to legally recognize foreign prostitutes on Aruba
remains another striking legacy of the Campo Alegre protest. Though the system of regulation
forged in 1957 has since undergone several significant changes—namely, the cordoning off of a
red-light district in San Nicolas and the strict enforcement of weekly medical checkups with
government doctors—sex workers are still recognized by the law as adult
entertainers/animeermeisjes rather than as prostitutes. Some experts claim that the patchy
system of regulation in the now small and deindustrialized town of San Nicolas, and the dubious
terms under which foreign sex workers enter the island, have significantly raised prospects for
human trafficking.91 While an analysis of contemporary concerns over prostitution on Aruba
falls beyond the scope of this chapter, it is nevertheless remarkable that the decisions resulting
from the protest movement of 1951 and its aftermath have continued to hold sway on Aruba.
Two insights follow from this analysis of the Campo Alegre debate. First, by including
actors often marginalized in traditional political histories of decolonization in the Antilles, the
imbrication of sexual politics within other kinds of politics comes into stark relief. Locating the
points of connection between the politics of decolonization, Aruban separatism and concerns
over appropriate morality, gender roles, and ethnic and racial propriety helps to revise our
understandings of decolonization and the subjects it traditionally involves. In the Campo protest
of 1951, a legion of largely middle-class women powerfully channeled their hopes, fears, and
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anxieties through democratic processes. While theirs does not at first seem to be a struggle
concerned with decolonization, the Campo debate tested the democratic reflexes of the
postcolonial Dutch Antillean state at the same time that it gave vent to the anxieties produced by
reformed political bonds.
Second, and not least, in powerfully marshaling a notion of a distinct Aruban identity, the
protest movement fits not only within the tangled history of sexual politics on the island but
perhaps most strikingly within the history of the island’s struggle to extricate itself from the
Antillean constellation. In their repeated appeals to a separate Aruban identity, participants in
the 1951 protest movement—much like leading Aruban politicians—located the drama of
colonialism not within the relationship between metropole and colony, but among the islands
themselves. In this way, the fight against Campo Alegre might also be regarded as a critical
stage in the transformation of Aruban separatism from a political goal into a social project.
While the Campo Alegre protest may not fit easily alongside episodes of radical and
revolutionary anticolonialism happening elsewhere in the colonial world, it merits attention
precisely for the ways in which it departs from the received wisdom of empire’s end. The
Campo protest was not a displacement of attention away from the substantive issues of
decolonization and colonial hierarchies, but, as I have hoped to demonstrate, an engagement
within and against those very dynamics. Leveraging the evolving structures of the decolonizing
state, the protest movement exploited the island’s non-sovereign status to plead for intervention
against an array of perceived enemies, whether foreign prostitutes, Curaçaoan sex workers, or
leadership on both Aruba and Curaçao. At times, the movement’s strategies stood at odds with
its goals. Most notably, the protest movement railed against Aruban leadership even as it adopted
and popularized notions of a distinct and precious Aruban identity shared by those very leaders.
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Indeed, what the Campo protest illustrates is not only the remarkable urgency of intercolonial
conflict at empire’s end, but also the incredible diversity of political possibilities emerging from
imperial collapse. For the protest movement of 1951 as for the eventual leaders of Aruban
autonomy, leveraging the multilayered structures of a commonwealth state seemed the most
expedient way to protect “the soul of Aruba.” While increased scholarly attention to these clever
models of statehood has proven that independence was neither obvious nor preferred at empire’s
end, it is by reading across the fault lines of the political and the personal that we can broaden
our view not only of the trajectory of decolonization, but also its social resonances.
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Chapter Three
"Sexuality, Yes! Slavery, No!": Reproductive Politics in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
1960s-1980s

Numerous global developments reverberated across the European and Caribbean shores
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in the 1960s-1980s. Decolonization, radical anti-colonial
revolt and the Black Power movement, as well as sexual revolution and the mainstreaming of
women’s rights intersected with demands for enhanced autonomy and greater collaboration in
the islands of the Dutch Antilles. Starting with the founding of the first family planning
campaign in the Antilles in 1965, these demands became intertwined with discussion of
overpopulation and the unfinished project of postcolonial modernization in the Kingdom’s
Caribbean territories. In this way, debate on reproductive politics drew a remarkably diverse
body of actors into conversation. The family planning campaigns of the 1960s brought together
Catholic clergy, Protestant leadership, Jewish rabbis, Antillean governing officials and doctors,
Curaçaoan union leaders, radical Antillean activists, and representatives of the local Rotary Club
and Credit Union. European Dutch actors, too, weighed in on the dangers of overpopulation and
economic duress that threatened the forward momentum of modernization in the Dutch Antilles.
European Dutch scholars, public health experts, and policy makers overseeing development
programs in the Antilles also converged on the discursive field of reproductive politics. The
surprising alliances among these groups, and the varying ways in which their views on women’s
reproduction coincided with aspirations for political and economic modernization, is the subject
of this chapter.
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This chapter explores this history in three phases. First, it surveys the first family
planning campaign founded on Curaçao in 1965 and the unexpected coalition of doctors, priests,
rabbis, ministers and union leaders who collaborated to stem the perceived threat of
overpopulation. These campaigns simultaneously deployed conservative assumptions about the
nuclear household with its separate spheres for men and women along with new and arguably
progressive incitements to form mutually pleasurable and respectful relationships. In addition,
the campaign’s emphasis on “responsible parenthood” drew on the same profoundly racialized
concept of “responsibility” discussed in chapter one, highlighting the long undoing of slavery
and colonial racism, and the ways in which these legacies resonated in the intimate realms of the
household. In their effort to restrict the fertility of cash-poor black women on Curaçao, family
planning campaigners looked to the Netherlands for material and intellectual support, leveraging
Kingdom ties to push Antillean society in the direction of the former metropole, where the
increased availability of birth control and liberalizing attitudes on sexual mores corresponded
with declining birthrates in the postwar period.
Secondly, I turn to the radicalization of discourses on reproductive politics in the 1960s1980s. Actors on the far left on Curaçao shared with the conservative founders of the family
planning campaign the belief that overpopulation threatened the future development of the
Netherlands Antilles. Yet, unlike family planning campaigners, socialists in the oil refinery
workers union and radical Antillean student groups in the Netherlands supported the full
independence of the Netherlands Antilles as the best path forward. In the decades of
unprecedented political mobilization in the 1960s-1970s, these actors argued that it was the
revolutionary duty of Curaçaoan women to restrict their fertility in order to advance political and
economic modernization on the island. By the mid 1970s, however, and with the entry of
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Curaçaoan feminists into radical politics, the tone and tenor of reproductive politics shifted
markedly. Curaçaoan feminists and other allied women’s groups insisted on the expansion of
reproductive freedoms as part of a broader project to dismantle discriminatory laws against
women—many of them leftover from Dutch colonial rule. Like the radical union leaders and
student groups who inspired them, these feminists also supported the independence of the
Netherlands Antilles and viewed this goal as integral to the struggle for and achievement of
women’s emancipation.
Finally, this chapter considers European Dutch responses to Antillean pleas for
collaboration in family planning schemes and the radical disavowal of Kingdom ties. Initially
supportive of family planning campaigns in the Antilles, Dutch policy makers abruptly withdrew
development aid for family planning projects in the aftermath of anti-colonial revolt on Curaçao
in 1969. Tying together these varied conversations on reproductive rights, this chapter argues
above all that reproductive politics became a critical site of imperial undoing in the 1960s-1980s.
Despite the convergence of actors on the field of reproductive politics, not all of them agreed on
how the Antilles should become a modern postcolonial society, with the founders of family
planning campaigns looking to strengthen bonds across the Atlantic and radical leftists and
feminists seeking to abolish them. European Dutch actors, too, were keenly aware of the
importance of their ongoing meddling in intimate affairs and, with the prospect of Antillean
independence looming, distanced themselves from efforts to regulate the sexuality and
reproductive health of Antillean Dutch.
While scholars have productively explored the regulation of women’s fertility under
European colonial rule, fewer studies have examined how discussion of women’s fertility
factored into anti-colonial movements or within projects to strengthen bonds of cooperation
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between former metropole and colony.1 Attention to these issues highlights not only how
reproductive politics helped to mobilize support and opposition for closer collaboration on
reproductive issues in the Kingdom. It also brings to the fore the extent to which intimacy is
imbricated within the unmaking of colonial rule.2 In the 1960s-1980s, reproductive politics
emerged as a potent channel for reformulating postcolonial relationships.

“Plan Your Family In Advance!”
As discussed in chapter two, the transition to autonomy in the Antilles coincided with a
short-lived period of economic prosperity, particularly on Curaçao—the capital of the
Netherlands Antilles and the most populous islands—where the presence of a Shell oil refinery
provided near full employment for the island’s male population. By the end of the 1950s,
however, the national climate shifted from one of optimism to fear. In 1953, the last Dutch
colonial governor Struycken predicted, “with the decline in the oil industry, the whole matter of
overpopulation will be completely let loose.”3 By the end of that decade, mechanization at the
Isla refinery resulted in mass unemployment and the scaling back of Shell’s social welfare
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program.4 By 1960, unemployment soared to over twenty percent.5 The consequences resonated
in the most intimate of atmospheres. In the years after mass layoffs, the birthrate rose and,
particularly troubling for public officials and religious elites was the fact that by 1962, thirty
percent of children were born out of wedlock.6 Fears of terminal economic decline went hand-in
hand with anxieties that the island’s poorest residents were reproducing without any jobs or
social services to absorb them. The onset of what would turn out to be protracted economic
downturn paired with a rising birthrate revived anxieties about overpopulation on this tiny island.
And it was this fear especially—the fear of overpopulation—that led to the creation of the first
family planning initiative in the Netherlands Antilles.
The Foundation for the Promotion of Responsible Parenthood (Stichting tot Bevordering
van Verantwoord Ouderschap), locally known as Famia Planea, was established on Curaçao on
October 1, 1965. The initiative was largely the brainchild of Dr. Sergio Leon, the first on
Curaçao to professionalize the field of obstetrics and gynecology. When Leon returned to his
native island in 1962 after completing his medical training in the US, he was appalled not only
by the deplorable state of healthcare on the islands but also by what he perceived as the
uninformed attitudes among the island’s population. For Leon, this was evidenced in the high
rates of illegitimacy, and the large number of children born to impoverished, single mothers.
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The doctor thus rallied the support of leading religious institutions on the island in order to
undertake a massive educational campaign “to promote the idea of responsible parenthood
among the people in the broadest sense of the term, and taking into account the official
standpoints of the churches and the cultural and religious convictions in our society.”7 The
education of “responsible parenthood” became the central goal of Famia Planea and a guiding
ideology that shaped all of the foundation’s outreach and activism, which took the form of
lectures, advertisements, TV and radio programs, private client consultations and public
demonstrations. In the several clinics established by Famia Planea across Curaçao, nurses
offered basic education on reproductive health and anatomy, instruction on methods of birth
control, and affordable medical services.8 Moreover, Famia Planea’s emphasis on responsible
parenthood rallied the cooperation of all of the major religious institutions on the island. The
foundation’s administration consisted of representatives from the Diocese of Willemstad, the
council of Protestant Churches, Mikvé Israel, a Jewish synagogue, the Association of Physicians
on the Netherlands Antilles, the Rotary Club and local Credit Union.
What communal crisis did the Foundation respond to, and who was responsible for it? In
Famia Planea’s educational materials and in their numerous public broadcasts on the radio,
campaigners warned against the threat of unfettered population growth on Curaçao. In an early
radio broadcast in 1968, a spokesperson for Famia Planea asserted, “The Foundation not only
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wants to help bring a more harmonious marital life in the family, but moreover, its purpose is to
decrease the rapid growth of our population, in other words: to lend a hand to improve our socioeconomical situation.” Though Famia Planea made clear that all were welcome at their clinics,
the foundation emphasized in no uncertain terms that it was poor, unwed people who most
urgently needed to embrace family planning methods in order to prevent the collapse of the
Antillean state. The broadcast continued, “About 35 percent of the children born do not bear
their father's name. This human irresponsibility goes hand in glove with a lack of knowledge of
the possibilities to prevent pregnancy. As a consequence of the irresponsibility of many men and
women, many of the children born out of wedlock become a burden on the whole community.”9
In this way, Famia Planea seized on overpopulation as a teachable moment. While the Catholic
Church on Curaçao had long sought to promote marital monogamy,10 Famia Planea would
appropriate this discourse in some disturbingly familiar and shockingly new ways.
Among the more familiar themes of Famia Planea’s outreach was its emphasis on the
nuclear family and marital monogamy, with its separate spheres for men and women. In one
program that aired both on TV and radio entitled “Mommy, Who is My Daddy?” dramatic
images of crying, neglected babies flashed across the screen. The voice of a young boy
interrupted the infants crying, wistfully asking about his father’s identity. The show’s host
paused for dramatic effect before adding, “Yes, who might his father be?” The message was
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clear: single-parent households bred miserable and tortured children. Not only did the
foundation emphasize the psychological harm done to children born out of wedlock, they also
appealed to the desire for class mobility, promising that a “planned family was a happy family,”
not least because planned families could afford luxury items and maintain proper division of
duties between husband and wife. One expert on a TV panel commented:
many times a child without a father cannot receive a good education. His mother has to
go out to work in order to support it…Sometimes the mother finds herself forced to start
an affair with another man, just to improve her financial situation....but the result is, that
she finds herself with more children.....and more misery!! When mother and father are
married and live together more often this family can count on a fixed sum of money for
the maintenance of the family. And there is no need for the mother to go out to work.11
It is very clear from these and other examples that notions of parental responsibility were indeed
inseparable from notions of the nuclear family with its separate spheres for men and women.
Reflective of their abiding paternalism, the founders of Famia Planea reserved special
vitriol for negligent fathers. In the foundation’s annual report for 1967-68, founder Leon opined:
The most irresponsibly proliferating group of the weakly intelligent, who do not employ
any form of birth control, appear to be so indolent that they no longer experience their
misery as misery…They do not wish to exchange the laziness and carelessness with
which they lead their sex lives for the responsibility one automatically acquires as the
result of gaining greater knowledge on certain methods of birth control. This aversion to
accepting responsibility seems to manifest more frequently in men than in women.12
Notions of appropriate gender roles and class behavior thus critically underlay this concept of
responsible parenthood. In subtle though no less profound ways, the concept of responsible
parenthood also mobilized racist stereotypes. This discourse on “responsibility” did not
11
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originate with Famia Planea. Colonial officials, Shell, and the Catholic Church, among others,
had long assumed the Western-style nuclear family as the ideal norm. As discussed in chapter
one, the late-colonial emphasis on fostering “responsibility” was deeply racially encoded.
Though Famia Planea did not invent this language, they did re-deploy it. In the process, Famia
Planea implied that those families who deviated from marital monogamy were irresponsible, or,
in the words of Dr. Leon, “indolent,” and “weakly intelligent.” Famia Planea mobilized
stereotypes that equated blackness with sexual irresponsibility in order to rally concern about the
dangers of overpopulation. Indeed, overpopulation gained its foreboding meaning only by
raising the specter of a growing black lower class. Families who had the financial means to
support a large number of children were not admonished to be “sexually responsible,” suggestive
as well of the class dynamics of Famia Planea’s message. On Curaçao in the 1960s, however,
race and class were differences without distinction.
There is vague anecdotal evidence to suggest that both the discourse on and the provision
of family planning services was eugenic in nature. One doctor’s assistant at Famia Planea’s
clinic in downtown Willemstad recalled that some physicians would simply remove a woman’s
uterus if she had acute problems with fibroids—a condition that overwhelmingly affected black
women on Curaçao.13 Colonial-era laws criminalizing abortion remained on the books after the
transition to autonomy—indeed they are still there today—but by 1970 the outbreak of a rubella
epidemic, which carried significant risk of birth defects, prompted the creation of a council to
approve abortion on medical and later social indication. Although Famia Planea’s official
standpoint emphasized, “The Foundation for Responsible Parenthood is there to help people plan
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their family, not to help them get rid of their pregnancy,”14 the reality was somewhat different.
Some doctors who cooperated with Famia Planea interpreted the social indication quite broadly.
As the doctor’s assistant recalled, “Look, there were lots of single-parent families. A mother
with a child could only survive if she had a man in the house, and would then get pregnant
again….That’s why we were rather liberal with abortions.”15 This assistant also recalled that
many women who underwent the procedure on grounds of social indication were also
simultaneously sterilized. Dr. Leon remembers this differently, claiming that many women
preferred sterilization to other contraceptives like condoms or the pill so that they would not
raise the suspicions of male partners who hoped to prove their virility. Scholars must be careful
with this evidence. Elsewhere in the Caribbean, research has shown that sterilization was not
always a coercive act. As Laura Briggs demonstrated for Puerto Rico, many women voluntarily
elected sterilization when there was not adequate recourse to other contraceptive methods.16 We
should also be cautious not to assume the victimization of women on Curaçao, where abortion
was illegal and where the state health insurance for low-income individuals did not provide
coverage for other forms of birth control.17 In this context, it is reasonable to assume that some
women viewed sterilization as the most effective way to plan their families. While it is not
always clear how consent was determined in these moments, it is certain that at various points
exceptions were made to restrict the fertility of impoverished black women on Curaçao.
Such eugenic concerns were not unique to Famia Planea, or even to the postcolonial
Caribbean. As Dagmar Herzog has argued, eugenic argumentation has had an uncomfortably
14
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close relationship with battles for contraception and abortion. From the beginning of the
twentieth century on, efforts to broaden contraception for women have, from their inception,
sought to restrict the reproduction or “outbreeding” of the European lower classes, people of
color, and the disabled. 18 Eugenic attitudes entered forced sterilization campaigns as in the
United States and Germany, as they did in the voluntary family planning campaigns in Sweden,
India and Jamaica.19 For Famia Planea as no doubt for other family planning initiatives, the
success of this foundation rested rather in the ambivalent ways that the Foundation marshaled
both frankly racist and conservative viewpoints with progressive injunctions to broaden access to
contraception and promote sex education. Without this doubleness, this holding fast to
“traditional” family norms through broadening access to new contraceptive methods, Famia
Planea would not have rallied the support that proved critical to its success: especially in gaining
backers in the conservative Antillean government and the support of the churches.
It bears stating that Famia Planea very skillfully navigated a climate of religious
conservatism and a legacy of legal repression dating back to the Dutch colonial government. As
this chapter later explores, the emphasis on responsible parenthood—with all the trappings of
Western norms of household organization—rallied the support of all major religious institutions
on the island. In addition, however, the emphasis on responsibility in the foundation’s
educational materials might also have been a strategic way to avoid breaking the law. In 1918,
the Dutch colonial government introduced anti-vice legislation in the Caribbean territories.
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These laws directly mirrored those introduced in the Netherlands after moral panic gripped that
country in the early twentieth century. One such law enacted in the Netherlands Antilles banned
the advertisement of contraceptive methods, while another prohibited abortions and strengthened
penalties for doctors who performed them.20 In the Netherlands, too, it took decades to reverse
anti-vice legislation. Only in 1970 did the Netherlands repeal the ban on advertising
contraception—precisely at the same time that this ban was lifted in the Netherlands Antilles.21
At least in the initial years of its activities, Famia Planea’s focus on parental responsibility rather
than simple advertisement of contraception did not run them afoul of the law.
This fusion of the traditional and the progressive is perhaps most evident when
considering the role of the Catholic Church in Famia Planea. All of the island’s major religious
institutions participated in Famia Planea, even if only in an advisory capacity. With the
exception of a 1965 donation of 300 Antillean guilder to cover the foundation’s registry cost
with the local notary, the Catholic Church did not provide monetary assistance to Famia Planea.
Yet, perhaps more significantly, some Catholic leaders enthusiastically endorsed the foundation
and publicly supported its efforts.22 Clarification on the Church’s standpoint on family planning
proved to be very urgent on Curaçao—and not simply because Catholicism was the majority
religion on the island. In the wake of Vatican II (1962-65) and Pope Paul VI’s 1968 encyclical
letter, “Humanae Vitae,” renewed confusion emerged about the church’s standpoint on birth
control.
20
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Especially after the encyclical letter, which was widely understood to ban all forms of
“artificial” contraceptive methods, representatives from the Catholic Church in Famia Planea
were called on to render the Church’s standpoint explicit. Father Cees Streefkerk, a Dutch priest
on Curaçao and member of Famia Planea’s advisory board, took to the airwaves in 1968.
Streefkerk maintained that those who took the encyclical letter as an “absolute NO” on the topic
of birth control had not read it carefully enough. He continued, “The Pope is not against Family
Planning, for we bear responsibility. He acknowledges that it is not responsible to have children,
if one cannot maintain them. He takes the problems and ideas of our modern time into
consideration: population explosion, emancipation of women, the idea that procreation is not the
only purpose of marriage.” When the program’s host pushed Streefkerk to address whether
observant Catholics could use “artificial” methods of birth control in the name of responsibility,
Streefkerk responded, “Those Catholics who can keep to the words of the Pope, let them do so.
Of course! Those who, for serious reasons, cannot, let them look for another way!… For serious
reasons people can use them, if the rhythm method is not good for them. And such persons must
not think themselves less Catholic or outside of the Church.”23
In 1972, all of the religious organizations on the island would help Famia Planea to
coordinate “Family Week,” dedicating a week of religious services to the theme of parental
responsibility. The highlight of the week—a conference entitled “Procreation and
Responsibility”—brought together Catholic priests, Anglican, Methodist and Reformed
reverends, and a rabbi from the Hebrew Community before an audience of over 1,500 people.
Famia Planea advertised the schedule on the radio with a short jingle set to the beat of local
music that called on the community to “tackle the problem at its root for the salvation of our
23
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country. Our family is OUR responsibility and must not be a burden for our society."24 With this
curious jumble of associations – from religious salvation to national welfare and parental
responsibility – major religious institutions on the island made family planning safe for
consumption, and found ways to address thorny topics with surprising forthrightness.
In markedly progressive ways, secular members of Famia Planea addressed shifting
norms on erotic love. In one radio broadcast in 1968, a nurse from Famia Planea discussed
whether non-marital sex itself constituted “a lack of responsibility.” The nurse contended:
This is a question, which, in my opinion, cannot be answered just with a simple yes or no:
A large group of people…are of the opinion that sexual intercourse is only permitted in
marriage…And there is also a group of people who want more liberty in this field. In my
opinion, every person as a human being has to bear responsibility for his actions. Both
married and unmarried persons do not really behave like human beings if they do not take
full account of their partner and the interest of the child who might get born.25
Although the all-male board of Famia Planea upheld notions of the male breadwinner household,
they did try to re-formulate and restrict norms surrounding male sexual license. One TV
broadcast admonished its male viewership, “Times have changed. There is no need anymore for
a man to be boasting about the amount of children he has, like in the old days! Nowadays only
shame is left for such men.”26 Indeed, Dr. Leon would later reflect that it was this aspect of
Famia Planea’s campaign—the challenge to male sexual license—that explained why the local
island government never offered financial support for the foundation. Although the national
Antillean government did subsidize the foundation’s operating costs, governing officials were
24

NA, KabSNA, 2.10.41 inv. nr. 553, Report on the Activities of the Foundation during the Year 1 April 1972-1
April 1973.
25
NA, KabSNA, 2.10.41 inv. nr. 553, Radio Program "Who is MY FATHER?????” Scripts of Five Consecutive
Radio Programmes of the Foundation for the Promotion of Responsible Parenthood, Curacao, Neth. Antilles,
Broadcast in the Last Quarter of the Year 1968 [in English].
26
NA, KabSNA, 2.10.41, inv. nr. 553, Program One, 14 August 1968, Scripts of Seven Consecutive Television
Programs of the Foundation for the Promotion of Responsible Parenthood, Curacao, Neth. Antilles, Broadcast in the
Last Quarter of the Year 1968.

96

not always supportive of augmenting laws in the service of promoting responsible parenthood.
In Leon’s recently published biography, Leon recalled that the Antillean Governor laughed at his
suggestion to introduce a paternity law that would make the biological father financially
responsible for his child, claiming that members of Antillean parliament—many of whom
allegedly fathered children out of wedlock—would never support such a measure.27
By framing the issue of responsible parenthood as one of fundamental importance to
curbing the threat of overpopulation, Famia Planea and its supporters in the Antillean
government sought to attract significant Dutch development aid for family planning efforts.
They also leveraged Kingdom ties to send doctors from Curaçao for more advanced training in
the Netherlands. Indeed, it was also with significant Dutch development aid that a new
outpatient unit was established in Willemstad, and which would serve as a base for broadening
family planning efforts and professionalizing nurses and doctors working in obstetrics care.28 In
addition, Famia Planea doctors forged more informal ties with like-minded institutions in the
Netherlands, calling on the Dutch Association for Sexual Reform (Nederlandse Vereniging voor
Seksuele Hervorming, NSVH) to provide sex educational materials for use in schools, the
content of which Famia Planea translated into English and Papiamentu.29 While historians of the
modern Dutch Antilles have done excellent work on the political fiber of Kingdom ties,
interesting in this case is the comparatively small scale but no less impactful and intimate ways
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Kingdom ties inflected matters at once as quotidian and intimate as the content of sex
education.30
Famia Planea’s founders and its supporters in the federal government believed in some
measure that support from and contact with the Dutch government and Dutch institutions would
be critical not only to the program’s survival, but also in reducing the threat of overpopulation
that imperiled the country’s future. In a protracted correspondence with the Dutch Vice Minister
President, the Antillean Governor requested the speedy approval of Dutch development aid
considering “the fact that rapid population growth forms one of the foremost causes of our
structural problems.”31 This particular exchange, dating back to 1968, would not be resolved for
over a year. Thus, in the realm of reproductive politics, some leaders in the Antilles sought
closer bonds with the Netherlands and understood these ties to be a matter of vital importance for
the reproductive questions in the islands and, subsequently, to welfare in the Kingdom.
Throughout the 1960s, effective population control and reproductive health became
important indicators of development across much of the globe.32 Within the Kingdom, the
Netherlands emerged as the indisputable center of development and reproductive health. But the
Antillean six-island state was riddled by its own internal frontiers, and family planning initiatives
also played an important role in internal development schemes. Although Famia Planea
expanded with success to neighboring Aruba in the 1960s, the Leeward Islands of St. Maarten,
Saba and St. Eustatius were harder to reach both literally and figuratively.33 In the internal
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development plan for the Antillean state, known as D2, officials and researchers maintained that
the island of St. Eustatius—the poorest of any in the Antillean state—could not hope to see any
improvements without the widespread use of birth control. Dr. Eva Abraham-van der Mark, best
known as one of the first sociologists on the Afro-Curaçaoan household, carried out a report on
St. Eustatius for the Antillean government in 1975. In it, she stated, “Family planning must be
encouraged. Contraceptive mediums must be made available to Statians free of charge. Because
people begin having sex on Statia at such a young age, teenagers especially must be educated in
the most effective methods to prevent unwanted pregnancy.”34 One European Dutch social
scientist who conducted an ethnography on Statia confirmed the dire situation there, claiming
that the most important purveyor of contraceptives on the island was a man who traveled to the
nearby island of St. Kitts to buy condoms in order to re-sell them at a mark-up to fellow Statians.
Yet, the author concluded, “because…he clarified that he had not sold more than 40 condoms in
two months, the use of condoms must be regarded as ‘incidental.’”35
Although early annual reports from Famia Planea in the 1960s routinely emphasized
plans to establish family planning across the Dutch Antilles, these plans fizzled throughout the
1970s, in no small part because practical oversight proved challenging in a six-island state.
More still, a dearth of experts combined with overburdened and underfunded medical centers on

surrounding the different circumstances on Aruba and Curaçao, can be found in NA, KabSNA, 2.10.41, inv. nr. 415,
Documents Concerning the Construction Plan for a Health Center at San Nicolas on Aruba, 1974-1975; NA,
KabSNA, 2.10.41, inv. nr. 553, Report of a Visit to the Netherlands Antilles and Suriname, 4-12 September 1970,
by Prof. dr. A. A. Hapsels (Amsterdam: KIT, 1970); and Letter to the Dutch Representative of Development Aid
from Famia Planea, 17 December 1974.
34
NA, KabSNA, 2.10.41, inv. nr. 1009, "Statia in Cijfers. Dr. Eva Abraham: Statianen geven heel, veel uit aan med.
kosten, veel aan voeding," Amigoe, 22 September 1975.
35
Wout van Den Bor, Not too bad...Sociale organisatie; gezins- en familieverband op St. Eustatius: een orienterend
vooronderzoek (Wageningen: Landbouwhogeschool, 1973), 73.

99

the smaller Leeward Islands hampered the progress of family planning initiatives there.36 In this
way, reproductive politics helped to carve out the centers and peripheries of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, both across the Atlantic and within the Caribbean region itself.
Despite the uneven reach of Famia Planea across the islands, its efforts can be measured
as a “success.” In 1970, the island’s birthrate declined from 35 to 23 per one thousand residents.
However, looking to the continued prevalence of single parenthood on Curaçao, Leon feared that
it was middle- and upper-class families who were restricting the number of children born, rather
than the working-poor single mothers whom Leon most hoped to reach. While fears of
overpopulation became less pronounced throughout the 1970s, new concerns about the
prevalence of single motherhood quickly took their place in both the Antilles and the
Netherlands—the subject of chapter four.
The successful mobilization of old discourses around decency and responsibility—
concepts inseparable from those of race, gender, class and sexuality—together with new and
progressive discussions on the importance of access to birth control helped to ensure the survival
of Famia Planea. The latter would not have succeeded without the former, at least not in gaining
the backing of the Antillean government and the major religious institutions of Curaçao. In
framing the issue of reproductive politics as a matter of national need rather than an issue of
rights, Famia Planea also succeeded, at least initially, in gaining the support of the Dutch
government within the context of long-term development aid. In their appeals to both local and
overseas institutions for funding and cooperation, Famia Planea tied reproductive issues to social
and economic concerns in the Antilles, to the very survival of this fledging postcolonial state.
While the 1960s are often heralded as a radical breaking point with former colonial regimes, in
36
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the Antilles, the members of Famia Planea hoped to address the social and economic challenges
of the decade together with the Netherlands. Yet, the very conditions that had galvanized more
conservative opinions around an ideology of responsible parenthood also shaped more radical
imaginaries among the very segment of the population that Famia Planea hoped to target and
discipline.

Sex, Sovereignty and Socialism
On the 30 May 1969, Willemstad, Curaçao became the scene of a dramatic uprising.
After a march through the city demanding fair pay for local laborers at the Shell oil refinery,
local police, unable to control the crowd, called on the assistance of the Dutch marines. A labor
strike quickly evolved into widespread revolt in downtown Willemstad. While working
conditions might have been the problem sparking revolt, the protest revealed a plethora of
discontents among the city’s working class and urban poor. The protesters contested the
entrenched racial hierarchies on the island that seemed to go hand-in-hand with the ravages of
capitalism and foreign ownership of big business. On Curaçao, Trinta di mei (Thirtieth of May)
is remembered as a moment of awakening—the radical entry of Afro-Curaçaoans into politics,
and the dawn of a new public consciousness among Curaçaoans of all walks of life who sought
to celebrate rather than suppress the traditions that distinguished the island from the former
Dutch metropole.
Historians Gert Oostindie, Luc Alofs and others have examined the paradoxical
reverberation of this event across the Kingdom.37 On Aruba, insular leadership that postured as
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the “real” Arubans—descendants of indigenous Indians and European colonists—mobilized fears
of a radical, Afro-Curaçaoan takeover of the federal government to revitalize demands for
Aruba’s separation from the Antillean constellation.38 In the Netherlands, too, the decision to
send in the marines revived memories of the bloody decolonization wars in Indonesia. Fearful of
looking like a neo-colonial overlord on the world stage, the progressive cabinet that came to
power in 1973 under Joop den Uyl prioritized the full decolonization of the Antilles and
Suriname as a cornerstone of its emancipatory agenda.39 On Curaçao, meanwhile, radical
political imaginaries went mainstream—and while the guard did change in 1969, the political
machinery did not. Nor, too, did the Caribbean country’s economic plight.
This version of the cause and effect of Trinta di mei is well known to historians of the
Antilles. But a neglected part of this history is how reproductive rights and women’s
emancipation factored into the run-up to and aftermath of the revolutionary events of 1969. This
oversight is striking for two reasons. First, social scientists and statesman on Curaçao tasked
with diagnosing and ameliorating the causes of Trinta di mei in its immediate aftermath focused
on the revolt’s alleged causes in family structures and “overpopulation.”40 In the concluding
recommendations of the report 30 Mei 1969, the government-formed committee prioritized
mention of the need for greater access to birth control and family planning before addressing the
seemingly more urgent issue of increased representation of Afro-Curaçaoans in Antillean
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government.41 While this can no doubt be read as a displacement of blame away from severe
structural causes of inequality and onto familiar themes of black sexual irresponsibility,
government reports on Trinta di mei nevertheless prompt us to consider the centrality of
reproductive and family politics to contemporary understandings of the uprising. Second and
related, the omission of reproductive politics in studies of Trinta di mei is surprising not least
because the revolt’s very leaders devoted sustained attention to topics such as birth control,
population policy, and women’s rights in their major publication, Vitó. In this way, reproductive
politics formed a critical part of the leftist, anti-imperial imaginary throughout the 1960s-1980s,
when leftist activism moved out of the sphere of labor politics and under the umbrella of radical
feminist activism. Perhaps most interesting is that later feminist groups viewed access to birth
control, and the expansion of women’s rights—issues that were sometimes, though not always,
linked—as imperative to the struggle to secure full and complete independence from the
Netherlands.
The first utterances surrounding family planning and birth control in the leading leftist
periodicals of Vitó, Kontakto Antiano and Kambio were similarly linked to fears over a certain
kind of overpopulation.42 Authors of these newspapers, however, did not admonish poor families
as Famia Planea did. Rather, leftist authors regarded large and cash-poor families as the dupes of
a Catholic and colonial government who did not look out for their best interests. It was a
paternalism perhaps of a different kind, and one that served distinct political goals: to break free
from the colonial government and to reduce the influence of the Catholic Church. Leftists
writing for Vitó, Kontakto Antiano and Kambio shared these views, views that were no doubt
inflected by the authors’ common educational backgrounds and political ideologies. Run largely
41
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by the generation of young adults whose parents had benefited from the oil boom of the 1940s50s, the authors of leftist periodicals were almost uniformly educated in the Netherlands. Both
Kontatko Antiano and Kambio were started by Antillean university students in the Netherlands.
Their experiences in the metropolitan state of the 1960s-1970s inspired fierce critiques of the
lingering Dutch presence in the Caribbean and a strong reproach of colonial racism and
capitalism. These journals circulated among other leftist student groups in the Netherlands and
across the Atlantic. Alternatively, oil refinery workers on Curaçao began to publish Vitó in
1966. This publication—and, in particular, its editor-in-chief Stanley Brown—would go on to
play a leading role in the uprising of 1969.
Much attention has been devoted to the ways in which citizens from the former colonies
became radicalized during their student period in the metropolitan state.43 For individuals in the
Antillean diaspora in the Netherlands as well, the experience of immigration invigorated feelings
of Antillean unity that were often fragile, if not altogether inconceivable, in the Antilles
themselves. In the Antillean state-of-six, insular distances and cultural divides between the six
islands could prove insurmountable. Publications like Kambio, Kontakto Antiano and Vitó
unequivocally supported the future independence of the Antilles-of-six. Not only did the spatial
proximity among Antilleans in the Netherlands enable Leeward Islanders and Curaçaoaners, for
example, to interact more frequently than they would have in the Antilles. Additionally, their
common status as “outsiders” in the Netherlands—this despite their common Dutch
citizenship—likewise mobilized greater feelings of unity. As Antillean scholars Willem Koot
and Anco Ringeling observed, migration to the Netherlands also mitigated the intense racial
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divides that plagued Antillean societies.44 While Antilleans of lighter complexion might be
regarded as “white” in the Caribbean, in the Netherlands European Dutch viewed these
individuals as people of color. Although certain dividing lines remained acute for Antilleans in
the diaspora—including, above all, distinctions between upper-class and cash-poor Antillean
Dutch—the common experiences of racism and cultural and linguistic isolation blunted the
social distance between Antilleans in the diaspora. Thus, the maxim that “the Netherlands
Antilles exists only in the Netherlands”45 holds true not only for the Dutch colonists who
invented this colonial polity, but also for many Antilleans active within immigrant organizations.
Indeed, it was in the Netherlands rather than in the Antilles that many activists came to support a
radical politics of Antillean unity and independence.
Antillean student groups in the Netherlands were also likely to have come into contact
with radical anti-colonial activists from other parts of the Dutch empire. The founders of
Kontakto Antiano, for example, attended the very university where, in the 1960s, a group of
young Surinamese students re-discovered Wij Slaven van Suriname (We Slaves of Suriname) by
the anti-colonial critic Anton de Kom.46 While little scholarship has explored in depth the period
of Antillean immigration to the Netherlands in the 1960s, this was undoubtedly a time of
radicalization among the Antillean community both in the Netherlands and in the Antilles. The
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emergence of several radical leftist periodicals in the 1960s such as Kambio, Kontakto Antiano
and Vitó attest to this trend.
Yet, an analysis of these publications also reveals the extent to which their authors were
deeply concerned with and influenced by other struggles for anti-colonial liberation, socialist
revolt, and the Black Power movement. The pages of Kambio and Kontakto Antiano were more
often filled with regional news from the Americas, paying special attention to the success of the
revolution in Cuba and the Black Power movement in the United States. More still, the
migration of other groups to Curaçao—primarily of Afro-Caribbeans from the former British
empire—might also have been a source of intellectual exchange and ferment. Notably, the first
prime minister of Grenada, Eric Gairy, worked at Curaçao’s oil refinery before entering radical
politics in his home country.47 It is therefore wise to conceive of circuits of exchange within the
Kingdom rather than simply a unidirectional leftward shift emanating from the Netherlands.
After all, the Atlantic world has long been defined by high mobility and cultural exchange. As
Paul Gilroy argues, dispersal, journey, and migration—movements central to the lives of many in
the Caribbean—have endowed thinkers of the Black Atlantic with a unique standpoint from
which to critique and experience modernity.48 For this reason, I view Kambio, Kontakto Antiano
and Vitó together in a common frame despite the different locations in which their authors lived.
Not only did authors of these periodicals express solidarity with each other, they also shared a
similar critique of the Kingdom and worked to ensure the independence of the Antillean state
through anti-colonial and anti-capitalist mobilization.
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Another similarity running across these periodicals is their persistent attention to
intersecting issues of overpopulation, reproductive freedoms and women’s rights. Kambio, the
earliest leftist-oriented publication started by Antillean students in Leiden, Netherlands in 1965,
focused on Curaçao’s overpopulation problem in its two inaugural issues. Its authors claimed:
The overpopulation with which the Antilles must now cope is the direct consequence of
the conservative, bigoted politics of the Catholic Church in general and her
representatives on the Antilles in particular; but the Antillean government is also not
absolved in this as they proved themselves completely…blind when it came time to
formulate new insights towards a progressive approach to the overpopulation problem.
The results of this shortsightedness did not take long to manifest: the consequences of the
lack of every form of birth control have not only resulted in fatal unemployment, but also
in the appearance of so-called illegitimate births, which have unfortunately remained too
high thanks to this conservative stance of church and state (overheid).49
Thus, prior to the emergence of Famia Planea—which was in part supported by the very
institutions this author attacked—leftist authors fit their pleas for progressive population policy
into their attacks on Catholicism and local governance, both regarded as the unfortunate
holdovers of the colonial past.
When the weekly Vitó first appeared on Curaçao in 1966, the newspaper filled an
important gap in the regional news scene. Vitó was self-published by its editor-in-chief, Stanley
Brown, and therefore operated outside of the narrow monopoly on Curaçao that controlled the
Antillean press. Brown and other contributors leveraged this freedom to critique entrenched
hierarchies of church, state and capital on Curaçao and, to a lesser extent, the other Antillean
islands. In one early issue in 1966, the newspaper’s cover displayed various forms of birth
control and even included an interview with Dr. Sergio Leon. Vitó publicly supported the
foundation, but replaced rhetoric on “responsible parenthood” with a critique of lingering
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colonial conservatism. Vitó reminded its readers, “Did you know that according to article 240bis
of the Criminal Code it is illegal to provide sexual education or contraceptives to persons below
the age of 18? Something to ‘add’ to the long list of legal measures waiting to be changed.”50
Overpopulation received sustained attention in the run-up to 1969, the year Vitó’s editors
joined in the Trinta di mei uprising. For Vitó as for Famia Planea, the issue of overpopulation
likewise carried grave social and economic consequences. Lack of job opportunities, the
absence of a strong welfare system and the dismal state of insular education were all complaints
that stood at the heart of leftist discontent in 1969. In the pages of Vitó both before and after
Trinta di mei, these issues became deeply imbricated within concerns about the island’s rising
population and fertility rates. In this way, Vitó contended that overpopulation could only in part
be addressed by enhancing family planning services. Stemming the threat of overpopulation
would, in addition, demand a strong, interventionist government and enlightened social attitudes.
The combination of these two would, effectively, prepare the Antillean state and the Antillean
population for independence. Thus, an effective approach to overpopulation was in many ways
symbolic of the maturation of the Antillean state and people that these leftists thought crucial to
securing independence.
In the pursuit of this struggle, contributors to Vitó and Kontakto Antiano insisted that
traditional gender roles must change. Women should no longer be relegated to the home or
suffer the status of second-class citizens. These leftists, along with later feminist activists in the
1970s-1980s, criticized especially colonial-era laws that forbade married women, or women
living in concubine relationships from keeping their jobs in the public sector, and laws that
ascribed minor status to married women, prohibiting them from administering or making
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decisions on household goods and property without the consent of the husband.51 Moreover,
demands for women’s emancipation were made often in explicit connection to reproductive
issues. In a 1970 edition of the regularly recurring column entitled, “Open Letter to Women,”
Vitó authors insisted that women deserved full legal and economic equality with men, social
welfare that offered financial security and educational opportunities to all families, and a “large
project to control fertility.” To this end, all young women at the age of 14 should receive sexual
education in order to decrease the high birthrate, cited at 3,000 live births annually. The author
continued in increasingly forceful tone:
The majority of the 3,000 children born on Curaçao will not be able to be cared for. IT IS
IN OUR HANDS TO DRAMATICALLY CHANGE THIS SITUATION. YOU, ME,
WE ALL MUST COOPERATE. Vitó will work all week to loudly proclaim our
revolution, which will give us back our rights to be human, which will give us back
our LIBERTY.52
Tying together issues of fundamental human rights and liberty with demands for an
interventionist population policy, these activists located reproductive politics at the center of
revolutionary imaginaries.
In the aftermath of 1969, the language of revolutionary action increasingly inflected
discussion on reproductive politics and gender relations. An article appearing in Vitó in 1970
looked forward to "the day when women do not accept the abuse any more,” and called on
women to “REMEMBER EVERY TIME YOU HAVE SEXUAL RELATIONS TO USE
CONTRACEPTIVES...REMEMBER NOT TO HAVE SEXUAL RELATIONS WITH A MAN
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WHO TREATS YOU LIKE A SLAVE.”53 Both the language and subject matter that these
leftists took up far surpassed Famia Planea in its radical demands and progressivism.
Surprisingly, both Vitó and Kontakto Antiano touched on a range of issues related to non-marital,
non-reproductive sex, including better protection for domestic prostitutes and a precocious
defense of gay-identifying Antillean men both in the Netherlands and on Curaçao. In 1969, Vitó
featured a lengthy interview with a closeted gay man who discussed in great detail his encounters
with discrimination and his feelings of shame and marginalization on Curaçao.54 Kontakto
Antiano, alternatively, reported on a meeting of a small Antillean gay rights group in the
Netherlands, who hoped to enhance visibility and tolerance for the gay community there.55
Whereas Famia Planea sought to avoid public discussion of abortion, Vitó loudly proclaimed its
support for decriminalization.56
Yet, within this revolutionary language, conservative assumptions about traditional
gender roles surfaced. By and large, the overwhelmingly male contributors to Vitó assumed that
it was women rather than men who should maintain responsibility for acquiring education on
birth control methods and avoiding sexual contact that was either exploitative or reckless. One
rare editorial written by a 26-year old single mother of three entitled, “Which one of us is the
whore?” attacked male privilege but laid the blame for the unchallenged superiority of men at the
feet of Curaçaon women. The author continued, "Little by little I came to realize that on
Curaçao, women accept the foolishness of men,” and called on other women to reject "living like
slaves.”57 Statements like this no doubt blunted the forceful critique of church and state,
transferring blame for the inferior status of women from the enduring institutional and social
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legacies of imperialism to women’s acquiescence. To be sure, men were called on within the
pages of leftist periodicals to update their presumptions about gender roles and women’s rights.
But this injunction, too, appeared in awkward efforts to eroticize black women—and thus to
value white and black feminine beauty equally—as well as within claims that men, while not
responsible for procuring birth control, should not stand in the way of a woman’s desire to use
contraceptives. Ambivalence on women’s roles in this unfolding revolution were perhaps best
evidenced by the sustained attention to reproductive issues and women’s rights, on the one hand,
the paucity of women’s voices on the other hand.
In what ways did reproductive and sexual politics impact the revolutionary events of
Trinta di mei? To what extent did Vitó’s Brown and other members of Frente Obrero
Liberashon (FOL)—the socialist party to which Brown belonged, and who assumed positions of
power after 1969—continue to champion reproductive issues once in power? Two years after
the revolution, in 1971, the Antillean executive formed a committee to study laws that upheld
sex-based discrimination, although it would take at least another decade to abolish many of these
discriminatory statutes. Although policies pertaining to women’s subordination would remain in
place until the 1980s, the aspirations of Vitó and FOL to change these policies and the social
attitudes underpinning them merits scholarly attention. While the majority of scholarship has
focused on the achievements and disappointments of Trinta di mei,58 it is striking that none have
commented upon the ways in which radical actors attempted to rally support for progressive
reproductive and sexual politics, while also retreating from the urgency of these goals once
58
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actors associated with Vitó entered the political mainstream.59 While this may tell us something
about protest leadership’s priorities, it also suggests that perhaps reproductive and sexual
freedoms—tethered to a range of assumptions about appropriate gender roles and fears of
overpopulation—may have indeed played a role in mobilizing support for the uprising in 1969
and for the entry of its leadership into politics that year.
While commitments to reproductive rights and gender equality conveniently disappeared
from the political agenda in 1969, Trinta di mei did impact subsequent leftist social movements
in notable ways. As the former revolutionaries of 1969 joined the political mainstream in the
decades following the revolt, leftist actors on both sides of the Atlantic continued to press for full
and immediate independence from the Netherlands. Student groups like Kontakto Antiano,
formed just prior to May 1969, continued to publish on global anti-capitalism and anticolonialism into the early 1980s, nearly a full decade after Vitó seized to exist. More still, the
uprising served as a turning point that inspired a later generation of leftist-feminists.60 On
Curaçao, a new group of radical feminist activists entered the fray, powerfully co-opting the
struggle for Antillean independence from a largely male-dominated discursive and political
space. In 1975, the first International Year of the Woman, the Antilles first feminist group,
Unity for Antillean Women (Union Muhé Antiano, hereafter UMA), formed on Curaçao.61
These actors combined women’s rights, demands for independence, and reproductive freedoms
with greater consistency. In contrast to an earlier generation of leftist activists, these feminists
focused much greater attention on how lingering colonial oppression and capitalist exploitation
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rendered women uniquely vulnerable. Because of this, they saw the struggle for women’s
emancipation as inseparable from the struggle for Antillean independence.
One editorial running in both Kontakto Antiano and re-printed in the conservative
mainstream newspaper Amigoe in 1971 and 1972 respectively called on women to “Use your
common sense!” Although the female author pointed out that women bore some responsibility
for rejecting their mistreatment by Antillean men, her primary contention was that women as
well as men needed to be educated not only on reproductive matters, but on the importance of
female pleasure. The author stated, “people must also tell [women] that they have just as much
right to sexuality as Antillean men and that sexuality is one of the few pleasures in life, for both
rich and poor, so long as they ensure that others do not become the dupes because of it.” She
argued that sex education should be available to children from a young age, lest a new generation
of Antillean women would become “sexual robots.” “It is high time,” the author argued, “that
the Antillean woman realize that the great struggle for INDEPENDENCE, mental and sexual,
will for an important part take place in the bedroom.” Although she touched on similar themes
as other leftists who supported birth control, including the urgent need to expand sex education,
legalize abortion, and broaden economic and educational opportunities for youngsters on
Curaçao, her editorial is unique among leftist publications for its frank discussion of sexual
pleasure both in and of itself, and as a critical step toward achieving the mental and material
liberation of Antillean women. She closed her article with an inspirational cry for women to
embrace sexual pleasure and reject oppression: “Sexuality, Yes! Slavery, No!”62
The transformation from reproductive rights as an issue of overpopulation to a factor in
women’s emancipation would further advance in 1975 with the creation of the Union di Muhé
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Antiano (UMA), or Unity for Antillean Women. UMA similarly viewed political independence
for the Antilles as constitutive of the struggle for women’s emancipation. The two goals were,
indeed, fundamentally linked and inseparable in UMA’s activism, which managed to secure male
support for emphasizing the struggle not against Antillean men but with them in pursuit of
common aspirations for total decolonization. UMA shared the conviction with early leftists
circles on the island that anti-capitalism and anti-colonialism must go hand-in-hand, and that
these systems explained the enduring oppression of women, not male attitudes.
UMA’s purpose was, “to stimulate the active participation of women in the struggle for a
Free Antilles.” As such, it was not an organization designed primarily to expand reproductive
rights for women—and in this way it differs significantly from some of the other ‘gender and
sexual revolutions’ taking place in the 1960s and arguably even today, where the defense of
women’s reproductive freedom is a primary motivating goal.63 Although UMA might not have
mobilized primarily around this goal, they did speak at length about reproductive issues.
Together with the Department of Public Health, they organized a major international seminar on
women’s health and sexuality in 1986. UMA frequently held information seminars in
neighborhoods through Curaçao, and routinely published on effective use of contraceptives in
their publication, Bosero. When UMA discussed birth control and family planning, they did so
without the kind of moralizing dictates that characterized earlier discussion of reproductive
issues.
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On the occasion of the International Year of the Woman in 1975, various women’s
groups on the island—the majority of them social, sometimes loosely based around religious
communities—joined together under the umbrella organization, the Steering Committee
Curaçao. UMA took on an important role in the Steering Committee, and successfully brought
together other groups to agitate for the repeal of laws that disenfranchised married women,
reducing them to “legal minors” in 1975 and to abolish laws forbidding married or partnered
women from working in the public sector in 1983.64 In their grassroots outreach activities, UMA
routinely discussed information on family planning and fought for the expansion not simply of
reproductive freedoms, but for the improvement of living conditions for single Antillean mothers
and their children, including access to affordable housing, day care and health care.65
While UMA’s activism reached far beyond struggles for reproductive freedoms for
women, a thread runs through these varied discussions on reproductive politics, even as the
“purpose” of reproductive rights changed over time and across groups. In the early 1960s and
even for some leftist thinkers, the primary goal of birth control was to stem overpopulation and
diminish stress on limited resources. By the 1970s, and with the entry of UMA into public
discourse, reproductive rights were still very much tied to issues of national import—but this
time indirectly. For UMA, reproductive health was but one goal within a broader project of
women’s emancipation, a goal that ultimately worked to support the ideal of a liberated Antillean
state. So, in short, with feminist activism in the 1970s, reproductive rights became women’s
rights, but women’s rights became fundamental to the project of Antillean independence.
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Aid and Anxiety: European Dutch Perspectives on Family Planning
As this chapter has demonstrated, reproductive politics on Curaçao factored into demands
for greater cooperation with and autonomy from the Netherlands. But this debate occurred not
only in the Antilles or among Antillean Dutch residing in the Netherlands. Moving now to the
European part of the Kingdom, I will briefly explore how European Dutch policy makers viewed
the promises and challenges of a commonwealth Kingdom through the lens of reproductive
politics. Dutch thought on reproductive politics also evolved in step with expectations for later
Antillean independence, but the evolution of the Netherlands’ approach was neither
straightforward nor linear.
Initially, prior to 1970, Famia Planea covered its operating costs through a range of
sources: the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) provided monetary and
practical assistance, while the Dutch government, under the auspices of the Long Term
Development Plan for the Netherlands Antilles, furnished the majority of the foundation’s
operating costs. In 1968, the Dutch government extended $197,000 NaF to support Famia
Planea’s efforts. Yet, in 1970, the Dutch government abruptly announced that they would taper
off funding for Famia Planea over the next four years. This dramatic and unexpected decision
imperiled the survival of the foundation, and mobilized a small army of its supporters to petition
the Dutch government to reconsider its decision. Dutch officials offered little explanation,
saying only that the Antillean government must invest more in Famia Planea if population
control were, in fact, an issue of such vital importance to the country’s future. But a look in the
archives reveals other considerations, too. One report circulating within the ministry responsible
for Antillean affairs is especially revelatory. The report stated, “'the rising tide of nationalism in
most developing countries makes external advice increasingly less welcome on all issues and
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especially so on such sensitive matters as population polices."66 The word “sensitive” was
underlined in thick, red marker. Despite the fact that Famia Planea sought closer bonds of
cooperation with the Dutch government, the Dutch government chose instead to distance itself
from such “sensitive” matters, their anxieties no doubt heightened after 1969. Indeed, funding
was cut at the start of the fiscal year immediately following.
This approach was highly paradoxical and ultimately shortsighted. Professor A.A.
Haspels, a European Dutch expert who was involved in the pioneering research on emergency
contraception, visited the Netherlands Antilles in 1970 at the request of the Dutch government.
In his report, Haspels called for the “energetic support” of Famia Planea by the Dutch
government and stated, “Based on the report of the Research Committee…that occurred on 30
May 1969 on Curaçao, I make the following recommendations: In the future, a well thought-out
population policy will be necessary for the Netherlands Antilles. Along with vital support for the
existing initiatives on the terrain of family planning, measures will need to be adopted for
planned emigration.”67 Curiously, the Dutch government made their support for Famia Planea
contingent upon the outcome of this report, and yet ultimately decided to ignore both of the
author’s recommendations. It is unlikely that the reasons for this were purely economic—the
government continued to invest large amounts of money in other development projects. The
retraction of funding for Famia Planea in 1970 signifies not that the Dutch government did not
care about these issues. Rather, it suggests in fact that they did. In their effort to wipe clean the
legacy of colonial rule, Dutch policy makers acted quickly to distance themselves from issues
related to reproduction and population policy. The urgency with which they abandoned projects
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to limit fertility suggests that these were important nodes upon which colonial rule operated, and
hence sites upon which the legacies of colonial rule must be dissolved.
Dutch aspirations for Antillean independence, however, did not come to pass in the way
many politicians and anti-colonial activists envisioned. The deterioration of the Antillean
economy throughout the 1970s-1980s spurred many Antilleans to seek a better life in the
Netherlands. The anxieties that animated family planning efforts on Curaçao in the 1960s—that
there would not be enough jobs or social services to provide for the population—shifted to the
Netherlands, which, in the 1970s, was in the throes of its own economic crisis. The drama that
unfolded in the realm of reproductive politics with increased immigration from the Antilles to the
Netherlands is the subject of the next chapter.

Conclusion
This chapter has examined how reproductive politics served as a proxy discussion for
national imaginaries in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. In the 1960s, as doctors and officials
expounded upon the threat of overpopulation, they marshaled the discourse of “responsibility” to
encourage family planning. This discourse of responsibility gained traction in the 1960s and
among groups as diverse as union leaders and Catholic clergy because it sought, in some ways,
to reverse the stigma of immaturity and sexual irresponsibility that had underpinned European
justifications for colonialism. Instead of rejecting these metrics of “responsibility” as the
illegitimate holdovers of corrupt colonial rule, Famia Planea pursued what we might call a
mission to “make the Antilles respectable.” As the scholars Harvey Neptune and M. Jacqui
Alexander have shown, many newly independent Caribbean nation-states also introduced

118

legislation and incentives to promote the nuclear family after decolonization.68 The nuclear
family gained critical purchase after decolonization not least because colonial-era stereotypes of
racial difference and wanton sexuality justified the unfreedom and dependence of AfroCaribbeans. Thus, claiming and asserting the nation’s respectability in the realm of the
household would demonstrate their preparedness to belong to the modern, postcolonial order.
Although the Antilles pursued autonomy rather than independence in the age of decolonization,
it is clear that similar concerns about respectability and responsibility, saturated as they were by
interlinked assumptions about race and sexuality, emerged in the pursuit of forging closer transAtlantic ties.
In the material from Famia Planea, we can see how colonial-era stereotypes possess long
and ambivalent afterlives: on the one hand, helping to facilitate perhaps admirable awareness of
birth control and family planning, on the other rendering “irresponsible” those families who
differed from the norm. The potency of colonialism emerges again in the leftist imaginaries of
the 1960s and 1970s. For the anti-colonial activists in the era of Trinta di Mei, reproductive
freedoms were at once a way to criticize governing and church authorities who, leftists argued,
kept the masses in blind servitude. It was also in part a way to envision a new Antillean
government. If the government could manage the island’s population question, then it would
also possess the same resources for caring for a more autonomous state, free from colonial and
capitalist oppression. According to both Famia Planea and leftists like the authors of Vitó,
women should limit their fertility in defense of public order. It was not until the 1970s, with a
new generation of feminist activists both inspired and disillusioned by the first-wave of
radicalism, who came to appropriate the discussion of reproductive rights as women’s rights.
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And in doing so, they also fundamentally changed the nature of the struggle for independence—
this struggle would be led alongside men, but it would also in large measure be led by and for
women. The abrupt and immediate retreat of Dutch development programs supporting family
planning efforts speaks as well to the profound imbrication of reproductive politics in the vectors
of power and exchange linking the Netherlands and the Caribbean.
In the postcolonial period, we are tempted to think that these explicit articulations of
“who can do what and with whom” are comfortably behind us. Feminist scholars in the
Caribbean, however, have shown us that such proscriptions are not a thing of the past. Colonial
powers left behind restrictive laws that have been re-worked in modern Caribbean nation-states.69
But these legacies of colonial rule, so visible in their continuity, fail to capture the complexity of
the postcolonial relationship, especially in areas that straddle the line between nation-state and
dependency. Many actors discussed in this chapter encountered similar difficulties in thinking
beyond the logic of the nation-state. For radical activists on Curaçao, independence required a
kind of disciplining of selves and the state—women and men were called on to “use their senses”
in the realm of birth control and the state would, in turn, provide for them. This dual
development would pave the way for independence and ensure the emancipation of Antilleans.
Yet one wonders whether national independence would have brought the kinds of
emancipation desired; is the nation-state really the only way to be free? The European Dutch
experience is instructive. As this chapter briefly explores and as the following chapter will
engage more in depth, the logic of national independence and sovereignty has more often than
not rationalized the jealous guarding of state resources, limiting development aid and social
welfare in the Kingdom’s Caribbean territories. It was thus Famia Planea who seemed most
69
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willing to think within the framework of a commonwealth state and to see reproductive issues as
ones that permeated the entire Kingdom. Yet, their aspirations were based on universalizing
assumptions about the nuclear family and intertwined with racialized understandings of decency
and responsibility. When Famia Planea reached out to their commonwealth partner for help,
they were met with both condescension and apprehension. The Dutch backed away from that
project both to obscure their own imperial image and to prove a point that the Antilles would
need to mature politically and sexually if they wanted a seat at the table of independent nations.
Thus, to borrow a phrase from gender historian Joan Scott, it would seem these actors had only
paradoxes to offer.70
As Didier and Éric Fassin have argued about contemporary France, the ambiguities of
racial and sexual questions are not “obfuscations of reality nor obstacles of our understanding of
them. Rather, that ambiguity faithfully registers the social reality with which people grapple and
in which they live.”71 In this way, attention to the messiness of reproductive politics in the
Kingdom offers one way for exploring the social experience of the Kingdom’s postcolonial
history. In this instance, reproductive politics formed a trans-Atlantic circuit of exchange with
material and social consequences on both side of the Atlantic. In the Antilles, reproductive
politics inspired varied political imaginaries, and Kingdom ties inflected not only the tenor of
activism but also subjects as intimate as sex education and medical care. As some actors
suggested in the 1970s, it was in that highly charged field of the bedroom that Antillean Dutch
contested and grappled with what it meant to live in the Kingdom of the Netherlands and to
overcome the legacies of colonialism. And so it is no accident that the denunciation of slavery
and the celebration of female sexuality came together as a rallying cry in the 1970s. “Sexuality,
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Yes! Slavery, No!” is not hyperbole or oversimplification: it is a perceptive statement about the
ways in which power and intimacy are profoundly linked in the Kingdom.
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Chapter Four
Social Science and Single Mothers: Decolonizing the Dutch Welfare State, 1970s-1990s

Early in the 1970s, Dutch civil servants began to examine the prevalence of single
motherhood among recently arrived Antillean migrants.1 For many actors in the Dutch welfare
state, the migration of poor, unmarried Antillean women and their children—a migration that
accelerated over the following decades—brought with it a unique and complex set of demands.
Antillean and Surinamese Dutch, another group that migrated en masse to the former metropole
in the 1970s, entered the Netherlands as full and undifferentiated Dutch citizens with unfettered
access to the Dutch welfare state. According to many civil servants, it was this right to welfare
that helped to explain the unprecedented migration from the 1970s on that followed deepening
economic crisis in the islands. Yet, for some, the problems faced by single mothers could not
simply be resolved by marshaling the resources of the welfare state. Bureaucrats felt they
needed enhanced knowledge of the lives of Antillean families, and called on academic
researchers to develop expertise on the Caribbean household. Antillean groups in the
Netherlands bristled at the government’s narrow focus on some of its most vulnerable members.
Leaders of these organizations also saw the struggles of single mothers as evidence of failure of
the Dutch welfare state to emancipate the Antillean community.
As this chapter will explore, migration from the Caribbean parts of the Kingdom tested the
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A note on terminology: in this chapter I use “Caribbean migrants” to refer to Dutch citizens of Surinamese and
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evolving structures of the Dutch welfare state in the 1970s-90s, a period that witnessed not only
unprecedented migration to the Netherlands but also uncertainty about the future of Kingdomties. Scholars have generally approached this period in Dutch history from two perspectives.
The first examines the nature of immigration policy in the Netherlands, and assesses whether or
not immigrant groups from postcolonial states and a growing number of contract laborers and
their families from Turkey and Morocco were encouraged to maintain separate group and ethnic
identities from those of European Dutch.2 One of the questions driving this group of scholars is
whether and to what extent immigrants to the Netherlands were encouraged to assimilate into
mainstream Dutch society. The second and related trend in the literature explores the oftenacrimonious debates on Dutch citizenship and belonging unleashed by this immigration, and
links the revival of nationalist discourses in the contemporary Netherlands to the reluctant
transformation of the country in the 1970s into an immigrant country. This literature focuses
overwhelmingly on how mainstream Dutch society came to embrace gay rights and women’s
rights as fundamental to its national identity, in contrast to the alleged conservatism of primarily
Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands.3 This chapter builds off of these trends in the
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scholarship by considering the consolidation of notions of difference among Antillean and
European Dutch in the era of mass migration, and focuses in particular on how difference
concretized along the axes of gender, sexuality and race. However, this chapter departs from the
existing literature by highlighting the social, political and intellectual processes by which
Antillean and European Dutch were rendered distinct in the 1970s-1990s—a process, I argue,
that required intensive investment that resonated above all in the Dutch welfare state and in the
remarkable interest in the alleged eccentricities of the Antillean household.4 The explosion of
research by European Dutch civil servants and academics linking Antillean household
composition to welfare reliance was at once of an intimate and interventionist order. Although
the tone of this research shifted in the period under study, first from a desire to integrate
Antillean mothers into European Dutch society and reduce welfare dependence in the 1970s to a
concern with preventing the migration of poor single mothers and their children from the mid1980s-90s, the focus on single motherhood and household composition remained constant.
Indeed, while the Netherlands Antilles had once stood at the periphery of public interest, by the
1970s the intimate behaviors of those living at the margins of the former Dutch empire became a
topic of sustained intellectual investment.
This investment had an ambivalent impact: on the one hand helping to produce
problematic stereotypes of “welfare moms” and solidifying notions of difference between
Politics, Orientalism and Multicultural Citizenship in the Netherlands," Sociology 44 (2010): 962-979, Conny
Roggeband and Mieke Verloo, "Dutch Women Are Liberated, Migrant Women Are a Problem: The Evolution of
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C. Quispel, Illegal Migration and Gender in a Global and Historical Perspective (Amsterdam: Amsterdam
University Press, 2008).
4
Jordanna Bailkin analyzes the parallel developments of decolonization and the creation of the postwar welfare state
in The Afterlife of Empire.

125

European and Antillean Dutch, and on the other hand opening paths to discuss what an
egalitarian Kingdom of the Netherlands would look like. In this chapter, I view welfare as a
contested material and discursive field, and analyze how a growing number of Antillean Dutch in
the Netherlands made claims for equality within and against the Dutch welfare state.
The efflorescence of knowledge production at empire’s end also reads against the grain of
histories of colonial knowledge. Historians and anthropologists of imperialism have long
maintained that the development of expertise and the accrual of knowledge of colonized cultures
helped to maintain and advance colonial rule.5 Comparatively less attention has been devoted,
however, to the ways in which the demands of decolonization and immigration—deeply
entwined phenomena in the case of the Kingdom of the Netherlands—made urgent new kinds of
knowledge production. As historian Jordanna Bailkin has written on postcolonial Britain, “the
metropole, too, functioned as a live site of knowledge production about imperial decline.”6
Following Bailkin’s challenge to think together the histories of decolonization and the
development of the welfare state, this chapter also demonstrates how the Dutch welfare state
responded to an emerging cadre of experts who linked welfare reliance among Antilleans to
household organization and conjugal norms. In the period under study, the provisions of the
welfare state fluctuated as a result of the recommendations made by social scientists and based
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on predictions about future Antillean sovereignty. Although the 1970s witnessed the flourishing
of social welfare, by the 1990s and with the realization that the Antilles would not become
independent, the social safety net shrunk in light of research highlighting its “abuse” by
Antillean immigrants.
This chapter moves thematically and chronologically across discussions of welfare from
three perspectives. After a brief survey of the history of Caribbean migration to the Netherlands,
I consider how municipal and later state authorities addressed the influx of Caribbean migration
in Dutch municipalities, and the areas of policy deemed particularly urgent for accommodating
Surinamese and Antilleans in the Netherlands. Next I consider how topics deemed important for
policy—family size, single parenthood, and methods of birth control—later became the subject
of numerous government-funded scientific studies. These studies, which were intended to
inform welfare policy and providers, variously justified both increased intervention in Antillean
family life and, by the 1990s, significant reductions in social benefits for all Dutch citizens.
Lastly, I look at how Antillean welfare organizations in the Netherlands—which proliferated in
the 1970s-80s as a result of active municipal and federal support—participated in discussions
about welfare, paying special attention to how their priorities both coincided with and diverged
from Dutch policy makers. In particular, I examine how certain organizations attempted to
fashion welfare work as an essential tool in the struggle against enduring colonial oppression and
racism—a tool with the potential to radically transform the Kingdom of the Netherlands. As I
will argue throughout, the ambivalent nature of this investment, at once concerned and coercive,
evinces a process of growing entanglement between the European Netherlands and its Antillean
partners in the postcolonial period. It was not only the experience of migration that established
stronger vectors of exchange between the Netherlands and the Caribbean. It was likewise in the
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realm of welfare that claims for assimilation, separation, and emancipation were made on both
sides of the Kingdom.

Making the “Seventh Island”: Antillean Immigration to the Netherlands
A number of factors changed the character of Antillean immigration to the Netherlands
throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, prior to which only a small number of students
immigrated to the Netherlands each year. First, widespread mechanization in the Shell and Esso
oil refineries on Curaçao and Aruba led to increased unemployment and created an available
labor force that could be partially absorbed by the Netherlands, which faced a severe shortage in
skilled manual labor in the decades immediately following the war. This initial wave of
Antillean immigration in the early 1960s was thus encouraged by Dutch companies and
hospitals, who recruited male laborers and female nurses and healthcare workers respectively. It
was not until the early 1970s, however, that immigration from the Antilles increased
significantly and the socio-economic profile of Antillean immigration changed. Ever worsening
economic conditions in the Antilles, where the onset of the global economic crisis exacerbated
already high levels of unemployment, led to yet a second wave of immigration to the
Netherlands in the 1970s.
This time, however, the Netherlands neither encouraged nor expected increased migration
from the Netherlands Antilles. Deindustrialization and the effects of the oil crisis gripped
Europe, too, and immigration from the Netherlands Antilles, other parts of Europe, Turkey and
Morocco was now perceived by many within Dutch government as a burden on a narrowing
social safety net and shrinking economy.7 It was also in this time period that the character of
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Antillean immigration changed substantially: whereas the male and female immigrants in the
1960s tended to be skilled and educated laborers, the 1970s saw the rise in migration of families
from the lowest classes of Antillean society. The increase in the migration of families brought
with it a concomitant increase in female migrants, who, after 1973, outnumbered their male
counterparts.8
While this chapter focuses largely on discussions around and activism among Antillean
immigrants, it is important to note that immigration from the Antilles was not the only significant
development of the 1970s. Indeed, yet another cause of increased Caribbean migration, albeit
more difficult to quantify, was the uncertain future over the political status of the Caribbean
territories within the Kingdom. When the independence of Suriname was announced in 1973,
roughly one-half of that country’s population left to claim citizenship in the Netherlands before
the final transfer of sovereignty occurred on 25 November 1975. Out of anxiety for an uncertain
future in their own country, many Antilleans followed suit. In a curious reversal of behavior for
a former colonial power who, at least in Indonesia, clung desperately and unsuccessfully to
imperial rule, the Dutch cabinet under progressive Prime Minister Joop den Uyl sought to rouse
rather than suppress the zeitgeist of independence in the Caribbean parts of the Kingdom. Thus,
it was not so much the homegrown demand for independence that prompted first Surinamese and
later Antilleans to leave en masse for the Netherlands in the 1970s.9 Rather, in the Netherlands
Antilles, it was out of a sense of anxiety that other factors might lead the six-island state toward
an uncertain political future—fears that grew as the post-independence situation in Suriname
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Anke van Dijke, Hans van Hulst, and Linda Terpstra, Mama Soltera: De Positie Van "Alleenstaande" Curaçaose
En Arubaanse Moeders in Nederland (The Hague: Warray, 1990), 3.
9
As evidenced by the veritable exodus from Suriname to the Netherlands in the 1970s, the issue of independence
was never put to a popular referendum and was rather spearheaded by the Nationale Partij Suriname (NPS) in
concert with the Dutch government, see Hoefte and Meel, Twentieth-Century Suriname and Meel, Tussen
Autonomie en Onafhankelijkheid.
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deteriorated, by 1980, into military dictatorship.
Although the postcolonial trajectories of Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles differed in
large measure—to say nothing of the extraordinary differences within and amongst these two
Caribbean societies prior to decolonization—municipal and federal authorities in the Netherlands
perceived the cultures of and challenges faced by Antilleans and Surinamese as similar enough to
warrant coordinated policy and research. At least throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, nearly
all policy and research concerned Surinamese and Antilleans alike. Although the sudden and
unexpected arrival of over 120,000 Surinamese Dutch in the Netherlands captivated public
interest more than the comparatively smaller migration of 25,000 Antilleans to the Netherlands
in the 1970s, Antillean immigration was not simply ignored—rather, it was collapsed into
discussion of Surinamese immigration. Indeed, as the following section shows, civil servants
scrambling to address the exigencies of increased migration often regarded Antilleans and
Surinamese as part of a common and undifferentiated people, eliding the differences both
between and within these two extremely heterogeneous groups.

Large Families, Single Mothers: Municipal Welfare Policy in the 1970s
The vast majority of immigrants arriving from the Dutch Caribbean in the 1970s settled in
the four major urban centers of the Netherlands: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and
Utrecht.10 As Dutch citizens, Surinamese and Antilleans could settle freely in the Netherlands,
although upon arrival they often encountered difficulties with housing, employment or locating
educational opportunities—difficulties compounded by the economic crisis in the Netherlands
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Amsterdam drew the largest number of immigrants from the Netherlands Antilles and Suriname. For an
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Slavery: An Ethnography of Diaspora, Affect, and Cultural Heritage in Amsterdam" (Ph.D. diss., Vrije Universiteit,
2014).
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and exacerbated by racist discrimination in the housing and job market.11 Although the national
government tried to coordinate the settlement of Surinamese and Antilleans after 1974,12 the
practicalities of finding suitable housing ultimately fell on the shoulders of municipal
governments,13 which also assumed responsibility for providing welfare services and social
assistance to qualifying residents.14
In Amsterdam, the city with the largest population of Kingdom partners (Rijksgenoten), the
aging urban center and virtual monopoly of private corporations in the housing market rendered
the housing crisis uniquely acute. Many migrants languished in overcrowded hotels intended for
temporary residence. Right away, city residents and civil servants identified the sizes and
composition of migrant families as problematic. The owner of one hotel stated, “Due to the large
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On discrimination uncovered in Amsterdam and Rotterdam’s public housing sector, including the refusal to settle
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the welfare of immigrants from Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles, 1977-1983.
12
In June of 1974, the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work (Cultuur, Recreatie en Maatschappelijk
Werk, CRM) established the Inter-ministerial Committee for Policy Coordination with Respect to Citizens of
Migrants from Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles (ICBM). Their task was to coordinate ministerial activities in
the identification and resolution of problems in housing, employment and social affairs. An additional task of the
ICBM was also to submit proposals concerning the remigration of citizens of the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
thereby promoting the development of Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles. See Wetenschappelijke Raad voor
het Regeringsbeleid and Penninx, Ethnic Minorities, 64-65.
13
Penninx, Wie Betaalt, Bepaalt?: De Ontwikkeling En Programmering Van Onderzoek Naar Migranten, Etnische
Minderheden En Woonwagenbewoners, 1955-1985, Met Speciale Aandacht Voor De Rol Van De Overheid
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reports, the vast majority of welfare clients of Caribbean origin received social assistance through the A.B.W.
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number of children on the property in question, whose parents are apparently not aware of the
habits in Dutch and Western European society, the Miereveldstraat is becoming a 24-hour
playground and place for mischievous behavior.” It was no wonder the children were so
disorderly, she claimed, since, “one seldom sees their fathers.”15
Popular concerns about cultural differences inflected the policy of settlement. The first
major priority of local governments was to re-settle Surinamese and Antillean immigrants
according to a policy of “dispersed settlement.” Dispersal of thousands of immigrants seeking
housing, however, required national cooperation. In June of 1974, the Ministry CRM established
the Inter-ministerial Committee for Policy Coordination with Respect to Citizens of Migrants
from Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles (ICBM).16 Their task was to coordinate ministerial
activities in the identification and resolution of problems in housing, employment and social
affairs. An additional task of the ICBM was also to submit proposals concerning the remigration
of citizens of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, thereby promoting the development of Suriname
and the Netherlands Antilles.17 Even under new inter-ministerial supervision, problems in
providing for and coordinating the settlement of Surinamese and Antilleans in the Netherlands
abounded. The policy of “degrouped concentration” or “dispersed settlement,” as civil servants
variously titled it, was designed to relieve pressure on the major cities in the western
Netherlands. No policy of enforcement, however, attended these ambitions. Even after the socalled “5% regulation” went into effect, which mandated that five percent of all housing
constructed with government subsidies must be reserved for citizens from the Kingdom
territories, private housing corporations in both Amsterdam and Rotterdam—with the implicit
15
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knowledge of local governments—denied Surinamese and Antilleans housing in certain
neighborhoods.18
As a result of this initially lethargic coordination, at times blatantly racist discrimination in
the housing market, and legitimate housing shortages in the major cities—where immigrants
nevertheless predominantly settled—the majority of Surinamese and Antilleans settled in
dangerously outdated buildings in urban centers or else in isolated suburbs lacking infrastructure,
of which the Bijlmermeer in Amsterdam South-East is the most notable example.19 Many others
awaited offers of private subsidized housing from fire-hazardous boarding houses (pensions).20
By 1975, the major arm of the ICBM that coordinated settlement policy had little to boast about:
three times more immigrants had applied for subsidized housing than anticipated. Only 2,000
had been settled so far while 13,5000 more awaited an offer of permanent housing. Ninety-four
reception centers accommodated some 7,500 people and 15,000 applications awaited
consideration. In their policy objectives for 1976, the ICBM urged, “the host society should
acquire insight into the immigrants’ lifestyle and background. Municipal bodies and local
organizations coming into contact with what is for them an unfamiliar group need to be informed
on the subject.”21
In fact, at the start of the 1970s civil servants had begun to elaborate on the ways in which
“very large families” and single mothers stressed some of the most important provisions of the
18

Gemeente Stadsarchief Amsterdam (hereafter GAS), Archief van de Sociale Dienst 30047 invr. nr. 845 “Oproep:
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welfare state.22 Records from the archive of Amsterdam’s Department of Social Services reveal
two recurring preoccupations for municipal welfare providers: the prevalence of “single
mothers” (alleenstaande moeders) and the number of Surinamese and Antillean families with
four or more children, which civil servants categorized as “very large families” (“zeer grote
gezinnen”). According to welfare providers, these seemingly commonplace patterns of family
life among Caribbean immigrants stressed the housing market, already overcrowded and illequipped to accommodate families needing more than two bedrooms, and funds for social
assistance, traditionally viewed as a means of temporary subsistence. Also among the immediate
problems confronting municipal administrations, however, was the lack of concrete statistics
about immigrants and their living situations given that they entered the Dutch welfare system no
differently than other European Dutch citizens.
An early confidential report issued by Amsterdam’s department of social services in 1972
established these and other topics as areas of urgent concern. Issued in February of that year, the
report “Rijksgenoten (Kingdom partners) on social assistance and unemployment (WWV) in
Amsterdam” sought to fill a critical gap in administrative knowledge about immigrants relying
on social assistance. So urgent was this information for other municipalities and the national
government (in particular the Ministry of Culture, Recreation, and Social Work or Ministerie van
Cultuur, Recreatie en Maatschappelijke Werk, hereafter CRM, who would later spearhead an
effort to coordinate the settlement of immigrants from the Kingdom on a national level)23 that the
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city of Amsterdam prematurely issued its most important findings ahead of schedule, and before
Rotterdam’s Social Services department—also set to collaborate in the report—delivered its
conclusions. Connecting family life to social care, the report unequivocally asserted, “Why do
these roughly six hundred parties require assistance? In order to understand this, we must
consider two things: the family situation and those who are not registered with the
unemployment agency, whereby we can address the reasons why registering was not necessary
or possible.”24 In this report and for similar internal documents that would emerge in the
following decade, the family situation of Surinamese and Antillean clients became the most
fundamental correlate from which all other data would be understood. In this instance, “female
heads of household,” accounted for 304 of the 620 Surinamese/Antillean welfare recipients in
Amsterdam, and constituted by far the largest majority of those not registered with the
unemployment agency—a requirement of which was, in return for modest unemployment
assistance, proof of active solicitation of work.25 The report further concluded that female heads
of household, in general, stayed on welfare longer than their male counterparts, classifying single
mothers as “structural welfare clients.”26
By the end of the 1970s, the municipality of Amsterdam had undertaken several research
projects to assess the living situation of citizens from the Kingdom. During a 1977 discussion
with the major municipal housing authorities, the Municipal Bureau of Statistics ordered further
Welfare and Sport in 1994. Each of these ministries played a special role in formulating immigration and
“minorities policy” (minderhedenbeleid) on a national level.
24
GAS, Archief van de Sociale Dienst 30047 invr. nr. 3676, Report “Rijksgenoten in de bijstand en de WWV te
Amsterdam” Feb. 1972. Of the Surinamese and Antillean clients researched in this report, which categorized
welfare recipients by location of birth—a measure that required special research through all client files given that
Antilleans and Surinamese entered the welfare system no differently than European Dutch citizens—92% of clients
were Surinamese and 8% were Antillean; a figure that corresponds roughly with the ratio of Surinamese and
Antilleans living in Amsterdam in 1972.
25
258 women out of 396 people not registered with the GAB—thus over one half—were female heads of household.
Single women without dependents constituted the second largest group of 98 people.
26
GAS, Archief van de Sociale Dienst 30047 invr. nr. 3676, Report “Rijksgenoten in de bijstand en de WWV te
Amsterdam” Feb. 1972.
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investigation of the housing demand among Kingdom citizens and, in particular, adequate
housing for “extremely large families.”27 Within two years, municipal authorities established a
special “working group for extremely large families” to address the need for larger and more
affordable housing in Amsterdam. In the spring and summer of 1979, this working group sought
to make an inventory of Surinamese and Antillean families with four or more children and to
assess available options for their housing. Alongside a dearth of suitable accommodations, a
further challenge that municipal housing authorities confronted was whether a distinction could
be made—and priority given—to Surinamese and Antillean families above European Dutch
families. At the first meeting of the working group on 25 May, one representative from the
Municipal Relocation Services department (GDH) contended that he considered it “nearly
impossible” to provide information on those families urgently in need of housing since no
distinction could be made among Dutch citizens, yet, “there are 344 urgent cases (urgenten)
registered for dwellings of six or more rooms, from which it can be assumed that these people
belong to an ethnic minority.”28 For many civil servants, assumptions about race, family norms,
and welfare became interwoven. This manifested in an ambivalent dynamic. On the one hand,
municipal and national governments appeared perhaps more invested in understanding and
accommodating a plurality of family norms.29 Yet, while the rights of Dutch citizenship for
Surinamese and Antilleans were honored in the realm of welfare, it was also in this realm that the
differences of Surinamese and Antilleans from “other Dutch” were painstakingly pointed out,
studied and typified.
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In this way, the Caribbean household emerged as both a curiosity and a concern to welfare
providers.30 Troubling, too, was the fact that these migrants entered the welfare system like any
other European Dutch citizen. As one civil servant explained, “because Rijksgenoten are Dutch,
they are not in any way individually distinguished in our records.”31 In other words, it would take
additional legwork to quantify, distinguish and prove the existence of these perceived differences
between Caribbean and European Dutch households. What occurred then in this initial phase of
Kingdom migration was the problematization of single motherhood in connection with welfare
reliance.32 The problem, according to civil servants, was that lower-class Surinamese and
Antillean “creoles” frequently did not marry, had more female householders and children to
support and fewer means of doing so, thus requiring greater assistance from the state. This
“problem” was attached to concerns ranging from the retraction of the social safety net, and,
perhaps more popularly, to anxieties about the erosion of proper morality, intertwined as it was
with racial stereotypes of wanton Caribbean sexuality and unruly children. The fact that these
concerns peaked at a moment when traditional gender roles were radically contested within
mainstream Dutch society is intriguing. Throughout the 1970s and 80s, with the rise of the
feminist movement and in the aftermath of the sexual revolution, growing numbers of European
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Dutch women increasingly uncoupled marriage and reproduction. It was precisely at the time
when European and Caribbean households began to resemble each other in some surprising ways
that a remarkable amount of intellectual energy went into solidifying their differences.

The Pursuit of “Post”-Colonial Knowledge
Social scientific research on Surinamese and Antillean single mothers sought above all to
illuminate how these households interacted with the European welfare state. In the 1970s-1980s,
researchers got their assignments, and sometimes generous funding, from both local and national
governments.33 And, indeed, while the Dutch state invested broadly in academic research on all
migrant groups, the enduring political bonds between the Antilles and the Netherlands
distinguished research on Antillean Dutch in surprising ways.
Municipal governments carried out the first wave of research on Antillean families. In
perhaps an unusual act of bureaucratic creativity, city authorities hired anthropologists and
sociologists to investigate household composition and patterns of welfare reliance. Researchers
commented anxiously on the changing profile of migrant groups: “It is no longer the better
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situated and middle classes, but increasingly the socially fragile groups such as the skilled and
unskilled manual laborers, unemployed, school dropouts and families without a breadwinner
(kostwinner). In general, in the past years more women than men have arrived in the
Netherlands."34 Race also played a determining role in this research. If Surinamese and
Antilleans were ultimately studied apart from European Dutch, they were in the 1970s not
considered apart from each other. Municipal reports almost always considered Surinamese and
Antilleans of African descent together as one undifferentiated group, while other groups—such
as Hindustani Surinamese, for example—received separate attention. Forty pages into one 1977
study by the city of Amsterdam, the author mentions almost as an aside that while single
motherhood was prevalent among Surinamese creoles, it was less common among Antilleans.35
Yet, this important qualification is buried forty pages into a report that otherwise made little
distinction between Surinamese and Antillean Dutch. While statistical research shows that the
number of Antillean single mothers did increase in the 1980s, what is interesting here is the fact
that the problematization of single motherhood was prepared ahead of their arrival—in this
sense, the problematization preceded the problem itself. What emerged from this portrayal was
the racialization and feminization of poverty and welfare use.36
In one 1975 report on Surinamese and Antillean female householders, municipal researcher
Ineke Gooskens—a sociologist by training—prefaced her analysis of welfare use with a detailed
academic discussion of the matrifocal household. Quite remarkable in these reports is the
34
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combination of traditional anthropological obsessions with frankly dry statistics on the
consumption of social services. According to her definition, borrowed from other seminal
works, this was a family where the mother and her female kin took on a central role in providing
for the family, owing to either the permanent absence or peripheral position of the father.
Gooskens claimed in addition that where the matrifocal household proliferated, so, too, did a
range of non-marital relationships—something that likewise earned the attention of other
researchers. While marriage may be an aspiration for some Caribbean women, owed to its cost it
was often an impractical goal. Such traditions, Gooskens claimed, were foreign to the
Netherlands, where "It is…sooner an exception than a rule that a woman is the householder.
Among Kingdom partners (Rijksgenoten), the single mother with one or more children, while not
a rule, is also surely not an exception.”37
Virtually all research on single mothers referenced debates on the origins of matrifocal
household, drawing on decades-old studies on the conjugal norms of the African diaspora.38
While researchers echoed Gooskens’ definition of matrifocality, they often debated its historical
origins. On the one hand, cultural-historicists argued that the matrifocal family found its origins
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in West Africa or else in the slavery past. 39 Atlantic slavery not only brought West African
family practices to the Caribbean, it also reinforced the strong bond between mother and child
given the routine separation of couples and attempts to prohibit and/or regulate romantic
relationships among enslaved men and women. On the other hand, “functionalists” insisted that
matrifocality emerged above all as a practical response to a bad economic position.40 Based on
sociological research carried out in impoverished and predominantly African-American and
Afro-Caribbean neighborhoods, this camp argued that the father’s role in black working class
families was marginal primarily because of his low economic status.
This reprisal of old academic debates may seem out of place amid reports on welfare use in
the 1970s-1980s. Yet, researchers insisted that these studies had consequences for their present
moment. If, as some scholars suggested, the matrifocal family were cultural, then single
parenthood, teen pregnancy, and a variety of non-marital relationships would be likely to
continue and proliferate among the Antillean population in the Netherlands.41 Alternatively, if
single parenthood, higher rates of teen pregnancy and non-marital reproductive relationships
were economically determined, then the increased access to social assistance, improved
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educational and job opportunities in the Netherlands would likely lead to an increase in formal
marriages among Antilleans in the Netherlands.42 If matrifocality was a cultural tradition
stemming from the slavery past or else West African conjugal practices, as some “culturalists”
contended, then single motherhood would likely keep apace with immigration.43 However, if
“functionalists” or “culture of poverty” theorists were correct in stating that matrifocality was a
response to economic hardship, then improved socio-economic position in the Netherlands might
result in increased marital rates. As immigration continued into the 1980s, demographers
tracked the marriage rates and fertility levels among Rijksgenoten, and in their analyses separated
these populations from other European Dutch.44
Dutch civil servants were not alone in their embrace of old sociological studies on the
Caribbean household. As Kristen Stromberg Childers’ study of the postcolonial French Antilles
reveals, French civil servants turned to the very studies employed by Dutch bureaucrats and
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social scientists through the course of Antillean departmentalization in the 1940s-50s.45
Although Childers argues that French civil servants and researchers were unmotivated to produce
new research on French Antilleans and instead relied upon and reproduced studies of African
descended people in disparate times and places, her study nevertheless underscores how
sociological literature on the postemancipation Caribbean circulated in an Atlantic space and
further highlights the lengthy afterlife that such research enjoyed, owing undoubtedly to dubious
ideas of black essentialism.46 Indeed, French, British and American researchers studying their
countries’ black populations in the latter half of the twentieth century relied upon the very texts
that populated in Dutch social scientific studies of the Antillean family.47
In addition to matrifocality, Dutch researchers also sought to create a typology of conjugal
relationships found among lower-class Afro-Caribbeans. Like matrifocality, nearly every
academic study on single motherhood, and, later on, studies on the use of birth control, sought to
portray single mothers within a constellation of complex and varied social and romantic
relations. Three types of relationships garnered scholarly attention: marriage—according to
Keller, an “unattainable luxury” for working class couples because of the financial stability
needed to enter into it48—concubinage and the bibà, or visiting relationship. Concubinage, a
term that evokes the sexual license of European colonists, was employed here to mean a short or
long-term relationship where couples lived together under one roof but did not marry. The
“visiting relationship,” or, in Papiamentu, bibà, was typically a short-term and, for the man, nonmonogamous sexual relationship wherein the couple did not cohabit. Alongside this variety of
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relationships, researchers also sought to illuminate the differing ideas around motherhood that
prevailed in the Dutch Caribbean. In particular, researchers highlighted the lack of stigma of
single motherhood in Antillean society and the central position of motherhood within
expectations of appropriate femininity. But perhaps the most astonishing finding for emerging
experts of Caribbean family formation was, at least among a large number of Antillean
respondents, the preference for single motherhood as a form of freedom from patriarchy.49
Paradoxically, then, as a growing literature on the Antillean family sought to typify and
understand its differences from and consequences for European norms and resources, a number
of researchers also pointed out how, in some ways, middle-class European Dutch women
increasingly resembled their lower-class Antillean counterparts in the statistically small but
increasing preference for raising children out of wedlock.50
As other scholars have pointed out, the coterminous developments of increased
immigration and the mainstreaming of the sexual revolution contributed in the 1970s-80s to a
growing accommodation for a plurality of sexual norms.51 Academic commentators at the time
pointed out how the “crisis of family and marriage” in the Netherlands, dating back to the
immediate postwar period and peaking in the sexual revolution, ushered in growing acceptance
for a range of non-marital, non-reproductive romantic relations that social welfare services
needed to catch up with. Some scholars predicted that changes in mainstream Dutch society
would help to increase acceptance and support for immigrants.52 Why, then, were Antilleans
often singled out as uniquely reliant on the welfare state in a time when norms in mainstream
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Dutch society were changing, too? As other scholars have identified, the mainstreaming of
gender equality and sexual progressivism occurred within a political and social landscape
saturated by racism. Marlou Schrover has argued that European Dutch women’s rights activists
often assumed female immigrants were victims of violent, patriarchical regimes and household
relations—and thus aimed to advance women’s rights while simultaneously promoting ideas
about the backwardness of immigrant populations.53 While women’s emancipation was a
generally stated goal of the Dutch government after 1977, the emancipation of minority women
assumed a special role in minority policy, which authorities and scientific researchers alike
believed central to the successful integration of immigrant communities.54
While early literature on the topic focused almost exclusively on the ways in which
Antilleans confronted the welfare state in the Netherlands, a later cluster of research reaching
publication in the late 1980s and early 1990s focused instead on the forms of social assistance,
family planning, and sex education that existed in the Antilles themselves.55 As the Dutch state
invested ever more resources in gaining knowledge of its Kingdom partner and their increasingly
inter-meshed populations, extraordinarily intimate domains were deemed useful and relevant to
public knowledge. In one Ministry WVC-funded project, researchers compared uses of
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contraceptive methods among Antillean women to statistics on the European Dutch population.
Using interviews and surveys of Caribbean women resident in the Netherlands, the researchers
solicited not only personal histories of their experiences with sex education and the methods of
birth control they employed, but also details on the age of their first sexual experience and
whether they had ever had an abortion.56 Indeed, youthful sexuality and “high recidivism” of
abortion had become controversial topics in the Netherlands, which had long boasted a low rate
of teen pregnancy and abortion. Some alleged that Caribbean migrants had accounted for the
spike in these figures in the 1980s-90s. The aim here was to provide background context to
policy makers, welfare providers and social workers in the Netherlands, and authors often
recommended vigorous campaigns to educate immigrant’s expectations before coming to the
Netherlands. The focus on birth control and sexual hygiene in later studies is interesting, too, as
it shows how the problematization of Antillean sexuality had evolved since the 1970s, focusing
not only on single motherhood, but now also on a web of corollary problems like high rates of
abortion and teen pregnancy.57 The possibility for intervention in the Antillean context was
made possible by the unique, enduring relationship between the Antillean islands and the
Netherlands.
This shift in the location of academic research in the 1990s is likely owed to several
developments. First, by this point the national government in the Netherlands no longer held fast
to the expectation of return migration.58 Secondly, it was also in the 1990s that the Dutch
government finally stepped away from its program of “enforced liberation” in the Caribbean
parts of the Kingdom. With the disappointing results of Surinamese independence and Aruba’s
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successful transition to an autonomous country within the Kingdom, Dutch politicians at last
understood that the eventual independence of the Netherlands Antilles was unlikely to occur and
was furthermore unpopular in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, which separated from the
Antillean state but remained within the Kingdom in 1986. Lastly, in the 1990s, critics of socalled “multiculturalism” launched attacks on the alleged costs of categorical work—the term
used to describe social welfare organizations advocating for a particular “category” of
immigrants based on their country of origin—to the Dutch state. Assimilation, rather than return
migration, thus became the primary goal within policy circles.
Understanding and improving social assistance in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba
could help to stem the tide of immigration and ease its alleged pressures on the welfare state.
Again, an investment in welfare and knowledge—this time on the other side of the Kingdom—
served a dual purpose: improving the living conditions of Antilleans in the Antilles to dissuade
Antilleans from immigrating to the Netherlands. Closer and some might say more interventionist
ties thus transformed yet again by the 1990s, with increased funding being channeled from the
Netherlands to NGOs working with single mothers in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.59 The
renewed Dutch interest in directly funding such projects, which waned after anti-colonial revolt
shook the Kingdom in 1969, coincides with patterns of increased migration from the Antilles and
with the recognition that the Antilles may maintain a perpetual link with the Netherlands that
included, not least, freedom of movement to Europe. In this time period of flux and uncertainty
within the Kingdom, the decolonizing state solicited new kinds of information on the ways in
which girls and young women learned about sex, their ideas about motherhood, and practices
around childrearing. This information was deemed essential to shaping welfare and immigration
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policy, and also to informing the personal interactions between European social workers and
Antillean single mothers.
Within colonial studies, there has been a tendency to view the production of knowledge
as an extremely insidious process that was instrumental to maintaining colonial rule.60 I ask
whether the energy spent on developing expertise had more of an ambivalent than a coercive
impact. While the production of social scientific knowledge no doubt helped to solidify notions
of difference between European and Antillean Dutch, the interest generated by this excessive
focus on single mothers likewise opened some avenues for Antillean welfare activists in the
Netherlands to make claims against the Dutch state. Significantly, it was also on the terrain of
social science that Antillean activists in the Netherlands sought to change the terms of debate on
women and welfare. It is to this subject that I now turn.

Welfare as Activism
If welfare became a subject of academic inquiry and the focus of immigration policy, it
also became a site of activism. Under the rubric of categorical work, Antillean Dutch
established numerous social welfare organizations throughout the 1970s-80s to help Antilleans
upon first arrival in the Netherlands.61 These nationally and locally established groups helped to,
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among other things, connect Antillean Dutch to educational and job opportunities and
appropriate social service providers, and to facilitate social interactions through the creation of
youth and community centers. Examining the records from some of these organizations found in
the municipal archives of Amsterdam and the national archive in The Hague, as well as in the
rich collection of organizational ephemera found in the KITLV collection in Leiden, highlights
the contested field of welfare and social science.
For some leaders of Antillean welfare organizations, broadening the access of Antillean
Dutch to the welfare state served as a critical struggle within an anti-imperial project, offering a
path toward achieving a radical kind of equality within a unified Kingdom. While citing
revolutionary anti-colonialist thinkers such as Frantz Fanon and Marcus Garvey, the spokesmen
for the radical Antillean welfare organization, Welzijnswerkers Vereniging Surinaamse en
Antilliaanse (VSAW), promoted a model of anti-colonial overcoming that did not rely on
separation from the Netherlands, but the enhanced and equal presence of Antilleans in
mainstream Dutch society.62 While greater scholarly attention has been given to more dramatic
eruptions of radicalism in the Netherlands Antilles, such as in the Trinta di mei revolt, the
tradition of black radicalism among social welfare activists merits attention for the ways in
which its interlocutors viewed strengthening ties between former colony and metropole as the
ultimate path for advancing decolonization. Notably, at a point when the national government
shunned any mention of race in its “ethnic and cultural minorities” policy, welfare activists
sought to rally others around the principle of racial solidarity. They fiercely criticized the
preponderance of white European Dutch within both academic research on immigrant
communities and social work. These activists also paid sustained attention to the ways in which
62
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women of color faced unique discrimination at the intersection of race and gender.
Prominent organizations like Plataforma di Organisashonan Antiano i Arubano (POA) and
Kibra Hacha63 tried to change the tenor of conversations regarding women and welfare on
several fronts. First, they commissioned their own research on single mothers and often received
government funding to do so. Mama Soltera was one such product of this partnership between
academic researchers and categorical organizations, and their main intervention was to jettison
stereotypes of Caribbean women as the “dupes” of a macho culture. These authors insisted that
lower-class Antillean mothers were not victims of absentee fathers but, in fact, women who had
in many ways preferred single motherhood as a form of economic and social independence from
men. According to subjects interviewed, having children was central to their definition of
appropriate femininity.64 Using women’s testimony as evidence, in contrast to simply pulling
welfare client files,65 they also made policy recommendations to improve circumstances for
single mothers. In this way, experts and activists worked together.
Another way in which Antillean welfare organizations tried to change the terms of debate
was to situate the struggles of single mothers within a broader context of Antillean emancipation.
For these commentators, empowering single mothers was not simply a matter of getting them to
marry or form double-income households, it was about giving them social and economic
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confidence more broadly. Activists tried to make this connection clear via informational
sessions and instructional materials sent to welfare providers and social workers. This pamphlet
reminded its readers, “The position of Antillean women in the Netherlands cannot be seen apart
from the neo-colonial history of the Netherlands and the Antilles… We view the struggle of
women together with the emancipation of the whole Antillean population.”66
Other groups echoed the complex meaning of Antillean women’s liberation at a moment of
uncertainty in the Kingdom. Aruba’s status aparte in 1986, when it left the Antillean state but
remained in the Kingdom, renewed discussions on the possibility of Antillean independence.
This led some Antilleans to question whether their rights as Dutch citizens would continue to be
recognized if ties were amended.67 One commentator argued that maintaining this life line was,
indeed, the postcolonial duty of the Netherlands, whose welfare state owed its abundance to
painful histories of colonization and exploitation. In this way, categorical organizations insisted
that welfare would be critical to overcoming the inequalities that colonialism produced.
While the voices of single mothers themselves do appear in activist materials, it does seem
that this group was more frequently spoken for or about. Antillean organizations often expressed
difficulty in reaching these women who were, quite simply, too busy to attend organizational
meetings. In this way, the chatter around single mothers seems to have been at times more about
other issues beyond these women themselves. As this chapter has shown, discussion about
single mothers was often a way of discussing the contours of belonging in the postcolonial
Netherlands, and the allocation of resources and welfare tethered to notions of citizenship—
issues very much linked to the postcolonial order of things. Within Antillean organizations,
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single mothers became a kind of cause for strengthening the welfare apparatus. As the central
government reduced funding for categorical organizations through the 1980s, focus on the plight
of single mothers proved to be one effective way of getting the government to listen and offered
a discursive space in which these organizations could continue to assert their vision of a more
egalitarian Kingdom.
Despite this activism, important welfare provisions would be reduced rather than expanded
in the decades following mass Antillean migration. This is especially true of the National
Assistance Act, which was established in 1965 to provide economic self-sufficiency for
individuals, especially single parents who could not work because they were responsible for
raising children.68 By 1996, this changed: single parents with children over age five were
required to work (previously they did not have to until their children were teenagers), and
payments became smaller in order to incentivize labor participation. Of course, without
adequate childcare, educational background, and language comprehension, this was particularly
devastating for many newcomers to the Netherlands, not just Antilleans. But Dutch policy
makers singled out Antillean women as unique among other migrants—and they based this
contention on a corpus of state-funded research undertaken between the 1970s-1990s that
explored the connection between single motherhood and welfare reliance. This information
served to legitimize and solidify understandings of Antillean immigrants as singularly
problematic among other immigrant groups, and it did so, again, on the terrain of reproductive
politics.
In the early 1990s, as welfare resources came under fire by Dutch parliamentarians, the
ministry responsible for social affairs commissioned research that examined not only the kinds of
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social services that immigrants relied upon in the Netherlands, but also the ends to which they
used financial assistance from the state. In one 1992 report, the authors stated, “according to our
informants, Antilleans form the migrant group with the most problems.” These authors
maintained that Antillean problems in Dutch society stemmed from “the purchase of luxury
goods, debt, lack of knowledge about social services, great dependence on institutions, and so
forth.”69 According to this report, these issues escalated with the changing demographic profile
of Antillean migrants after 1985—in particular with the immigration of poor single mothers and
their children. With impending changes to the National Assistance Act, authors studying welfare
reliance recommended reducing financial assistance and enhancing childcare services and
education on pregnancy prevention for Antillean women.

Conclusion
This chapter has explored how the perceived demands of Antillean immigration
resonated in the Dutch welfare state and manifested in the remarkable interest in the alleged
eccentricities of the Antillean household. At the same time, the preoccupation with single
mothers also inflected Antillean claims for equality within the Dutch welfare state. Despite the
ultimate retrenchment of social welfare and welfare activism by the 1990s, the period between
the onset of Antillean migration in the 1970s until the scaling back of the social safety net by the
1990s nevertheless witnessed the unprecedented level of interest—intellectual and material—in
Antillean Dutch, an interest that centered predominantly on the realm of the household.
Even if the “gains” of this investment were short-lived, the history of these decades is
nevertheless consequential for scholars of colonialism and decolonization. Against the grain of
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traditional narratives of decolonization, this chapter has argued that European interest in the
cultures, lifestyles and habits of Antilleans emerged only at empire’s end. The creation of
expertise helped to consolidate notions of European and Antillean difference at a moment when
mobility across the Kingdom increased. Within colonial studies, there has been a tendency to
view the production of knowledge as an extremely insidious process that was instrumental to
maintaining colonial rule. As Nicholas Dirks has argued, “Colonial knowledge both enabled
conquest and was produced by it. In certain important ways, knowledge was what colonialism
was all about.”70 Colonial knowledge production disseminated expertise on environments,
peoples and things that could aid in their control and subjugation. It could also in a more
abstract sense consolidate notions of difference that ideologically paved the way for European
domination, as Edward Said so importantly argued.71 Was the redoubling of investment in
postcolonial social science then simply a continuation of its colonial predecessor? To be sure,
the production of knowledge on Antillean households consolidated notions of difference between
Antillean and European Dutch and provided an arsenal of statistics about what Antillean mothers
cost the welfare state. In this way, postcolonial knowledge produced and concretized difference
among ostensibly equal Dutch citizens.
Yet, it might be worth questioning whether knowledge production was a uniquely
colonial phenomenon. Striking in the history of the Kingdom of the Netherlands is that such
investment in knowing Antillean Dutch appears at a very late date. In fact, government
subsidized research on the Antilles appears only at empire’s end, in the 1940s-50s, when the
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democratization of Kingdom ties made urgent familiarity with the islands.72 If colonialism in
this part of the world was characterized by disinterest and neglect, then it was in the era of
decolonization that the Kingdom at last assumed the distinctive traits of familiar colonial powers:
including, not least, an invasive and interventionist will to know. Such a view offers us not
simply a postcolonial rehashing of the imperial project. Instead, it suggests that in some places,
characteristics of modern imperial power might not have mattered to the metropole until empire
ended.
More still, focus on expertise shows us that the creation of closer trans-Atlantic ties was
forged in surprising venues. Concerns among social workers, researchers and others about single
motherhood merited unparalleled investment—above all in gaining knowledge of the intimate
behaviors of those living at the margins of the former Dutch empire, places that once stood at the
periphery of public interest. In the 1970s, despite Dutch attempts to move the Antilles toward
independence, these two Kingdom partners became increasingly inter-twined through the
experience of immigration and its demands. By the late 1980s, one out of every six people born
on the Antillean islands lived in the Netherlands, leading some commentators to dub the
Netherlands as the “seventh island.”73 Placing this particular chapter in the “seventh island”
reminds us that these intensifying bonds were consequential to many European and Antillean
Dutch in the former metropole, too. The Kingdom is, after all, not something that only islanders
are compelled to live with. Housing authorities, civil servants, social workers, scientific
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researchers and activists in the Netherlands in the 1970s-80s all saw their work drastically
transformed by evolving Kingdom ties. And it was in no small part because of these evolving
ties that the nature of the Dutch welfare state itself changed, expanding in the 1970s and
ultimately retracting in the 1990s. In this instance, concern with single mothers brought together
a chorus of voices in sometimes cacophonous and in other times harmonious ways.
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Chapter Five
Intimacy and Integration: The Ambivalent Achievement of Gay Rights in the Dutch
Caribbean, 2000-2012

On the morning of July 10, 2008, over six hundred people crowded into a gymnasium on
Bonaire to discuss mounting concerns over the island’s integration into the Netherlands.
Leading the informational session, Dutch Secretary of Interior and Kingdom Relations, Ank
Bijleveld, hoped to clarify the changes that awaited the island’s population and two others, Saba
and St. Eustatius, when it would assume its status as a public administrative entity of the
Netherlands in two years. The meeting, however, quickly grew tense when Pastor Ramiro
Richards requested a definitive answer about whether same-sex couples would be allowed to
marry on the island after 2010. Bijleveld responded cautiously: “It is not our plan to take away
your culture, but in time, if you are going to implement Dutch law, then [gay marriage]1 is part of
the package.”2 The following day on the radio, Richards railed against his island’s political
leaders for selling the rights of Bonairean people to the Dutch government for no more than “a
plate of beans.” Before it was too late for the island’s 16,000 inhabitants, Richards urged, “let us
fight against the sin and evil that await us.”3
While the international media framed this event and the struggle over the legalization of
same-sex marriage in the Antilles as a culture clash between the presumably liberal Netherlands
and its conservative Caribbean territory, few commentators questioned how evolving transAtlantic ties inflected this controversy. With the debate over the legalization of same-sex
1

I use the terms “gay rights,” (homorechten) “gay marriage,” (homohuwelijk) and “gay emancipation”
(homoemancipatie ) to reflect the language of parliamentary sources.
2
Quoted in Jaus Müller, “Het Homohuwelijk Hoort bij de Wet, Ook op de Antillen,” NRC Handelsblad, 23 July
2008. http://vorige.nrc.nl/nieuwsthema/antillen/article1935199.ece
3
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http://www.rnw.nl/caribiana/article/column-uit-bonaire-wie-betaalt-de-dominee.

157

marriage as my point of focus, I argue that conflicts over sexual politics played a pivotal role in
refashioning the Dutch state in a brief but critical period of transition from 2007 when the
expansion of sexual freedoms became a top priority for Dutch parliamentarians overseeing the
restructuring of Antillean governance, until 2012, the year that the first same-sex marriage
occurred in a Caribbean jurisdiction on the Dutch island of Saba. Changes in the legal status of
marriage equality factored into the broader process of Antillean restructuring, the outcome of
decades of Antillean discontent over the modes and methods of governance in the five-island
state. On the symbolically chosen date of October 10, 2010, and after five years of negotiation
among Dutch and Antillean leaders, the state of the Netherlands Antilles ceased to exist. The
islands comprising the former state willfully dissolved political ties among themselves, and
instead forged a range of intensive bilateral ties with the Netherlands. Far from rupturing
traditional bonds of solidarity, the dissolution of the Netherlands Antilles synthesized the trends
that characterize the Kingdom’s postcolonial history and which this dissertation has sought to
illuminate: the forging of closer and steadily strengthening trans-Atlantic ties at empire’s end, as
well as the growing fragility of bonds among the islands themselves.
Although transitioning the island governments of Curaçao and St. Maarten toward
autonomous country status within the Kingdom demanded the majority of diplomatic efforts, it
was on the islands of Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba, the so-called BES islands, where daily life
changed most drastically. Unprecedented in the history of the Kingdom, the decision to forge
“direct constitutional ties” between these islands and the Netherlands opened a heated debate on
whether Dutch law on abortion, same-sex marriage, and euthanasia should apply in the BES
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islands.4 This chapter considers the role that sexual politics and ethical questions played in the
uneven incorporation of the BES islands into the Netherlands. On the one hand, Dutch
politicians erroneously insisted that the islands had “chosen to become Dutch,” and thus insisted
on expanding sexual rights even as they problematically circumvented others—notably, the
extension of equal social welfare spending on pensions, health care, and schools. Additionally,
because of the unilateral way in which the Dutch determined ethical policy, it became difficult,
indeed untenable, to be at once anti-imperial and sexually progressive on the BES islands,
marginalizing Antillean activists who had nurtured a strong, homegrown gay rights movement.
The decision in the BES islands to forge “closer ties” with the European Netherlands thus
evoked considerable concerns about the intimate consequences of reformed political relations.
The willful incorporation of the BES islands into the metropolitan Netherlands, and the
controversy that ensued over the eventual implementation of so-called “ethical laws” on gay
marriage, abortion and euthanasia, makes urgent a reevaluation of the politics of intimacy as an
enduring legacy and tension of imperial aftermaths.
This chapter thus seeks to understand how ongoing debates over Antillean autonomy
manifest in transatlantic discussions of sexual politics. Reflecting on conversations in Dutch
parliament and the international press, I chart how the debate over sexual freedoms evolved as a
Kingdom-wide discussion from the run-up to Antillean dissolution in 2007 to the first same-sex
marriage on Saba in 2012. In a political climate where defending certain sexual freedoms
defines Dutch citizenship, many members of Dutch parliament stressed the importance of
enforcing Dutch law on same-sex marriage, abortion, and euthanasia as a requisite for Antillean
integration. Crucially, the coalition of left and right parties supporting the immediate
4

Oostindie and Klinkers mention this debate very briefly in their study of Antillean dissolution, which is otherwise
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230-232.
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implementation of “ethical laws” avoided addressing the historical relationship of inequality
between The Hague and the Antilles. These parties excluded the BES islands from their
deliberations and, with tremendous latitude, improvised policies for ambivalently incorporating
Caribbean territories into a Dutch legal regime. In the Netherlands, and however paradoxically,
the unilateral implementation of marriage law in the Caribbean drew the sharpest criticism from
far right Christian parties who disagreed with sexual liberalization and the resurgence of neocolonial attitudes among Dutch parliamentarians. For some on the BES islands, Dutch efforts to
codify sexual rights evoked specters of a colonial regime seeking to restrain cultural and political
autonomy. Yet for others, Antillean dissolution opened new paths for advancing sexual rights.
Antillean activists’ alliances with Dutch politicians and gay rights organizations, however,
widened the seeming separation between the causes of sexual progressivism and anti-colonial
resistance.

The Last Act of Decolonization?
Despite the endurance of political relationships throughout the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, Gert Oostindie attributes their longevity less to contentment with the postwar
settlement than to the rigidity of the constitution that binds them.5 Though never intended to
serve as an “eternal edict,” revising the Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands—the
constitutional document organizing relations within the Kingdom—requires the unanimous
agreement of all partners although problematically offers no method for resolving gridlock
amongst the Kingdom’s partners. In the former Netherlands Antilles, dissatisfaction with
governing arrangements ran deeper. Centrally administered from Curaçao, the remaining islands
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of the Netherlands Antilles expressed discontent with Curaçao’s privileged position.6
Alternatively, the wealthier islands of Curaçao and Sint Maarten resented the financial and
political obligation to their smaller partners.
Despite decades of discontent among the islands, a pattern explored in previous chapters,
it was not until the opening of the twenty-first century that The Hague committed to reforming
the Netherlands Antilles. The process began in 2000 when Sint Maarten issued a referendum on
their future political status within the Kingdom. With a long tradition of separatist aspirations,
sixty-nine percent of voters indicated their preference to become an autonomously governed
country within the Kingdom.7 Although Dutch government officials initially balked at the
decentralization of the Antillean state, popular enthusiasm for a wholesale reevaluation of the
Antillean state throughout the Dutch Caribbean eventually compelled the attention and support
of the Netherlands over the next several years.
Referenda issued across the Netherlands Antilles in 2004 and 2005 confirmed the
widespread desire for change. The referenda offered a choice between four political statuses,
asking voters:
A. Do you want to remain in the Antillean constellation?
B. Do you want direct ties with the Netherlands?
C. Do you want autonomous status within the Kingdom?
6

Since Dutch colonization began in the seventeenth century, the colonial state experimented with different
administrative groupings of the Antillean islands. From the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the colony
of “Curaçao and Dependencies” joined Aruba, Bonaire, St. Eustatius, St. Maarten and Saba under an administrative
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It is also worth noting that the islands of the Netherlands Antilles are located many miles apart, divided amongst the
Leeward islands of Aruba, Bonaire and Curaçao, and the Windward Islands of Saba, St. Maarten and St. Eustatius.
On Saba and St. Eustatius, which at various points in history came under British rule, the recognized regional
language is English. In the Leeward islands, Papiamentu is the recognized regional language.
7
Oostindie and Paul Verton’s survey study of Antillean popular opinion on political relationships between the
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government in Curaçao and confidence in the sound governance of their own local government. Oostindie and
Verton, “Ki Sort Reino?/What Kind of Kingdom? Antillean and Aruban Views and Expectations of the Kingdom of
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D. Do you want independent status?8
A majority of voters on Sint Maarten and Curaçao chose option C, desiring to remain within the
Kingdom of the Netherlands while assuming legislative and governing responsibility within their
own island jurisdictions. On Bonaire and Saba, over fifty percent of voters chose to develop
direct ties with the Netherlands.9 St. Eustatius, the only island voting to preserve the Netherlands
Antilles, approved in a reissued referendum the development of direct ties with the Netherlands.
When island governments initially issued status referenda in 2004 and 2005, it was
unclear what precisely “direct ties” with the Netherlands might look like beyond simply the
transfer of some governing responsibilities from Curaçao, former seat of the government of the
Netherlands Antilles, to the Netherlands. On 2 November 2006, Dutch and Antillean officials
finalized the decision to dissolve the Netherlands Antilles per the referenda results. Together
with Dutch officials, elected representatives from the BES islands decided to forge “direct ties”
with the Netherlands based on Article 134 of the Dutch Constitution.10 The BES islands would
thus be integrated as “public entities” of the Netherlands, a status that made the BES islands
administrative divisions of the Dutch state but did not group them into a province. At an as yet
unspecified date, and after each of the islands met requirements for autonomous statehood and
constitutional integration, the Netherlands Antilles would cease to exist, marking a new phase in
nearly four centuries of transatlantic relations.
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Political Climate and Divisions in The Hague
Despite the consensus achieved on Antillean reorganization in 2006, in the Netherlands
the process of constitutional restructuring occurred against the backdrop of acrimonious debates
on immigration and citizenship. Anxieties surrounding identity and belonging in the Dutch state
emerged in parliamentary discussions over the integration of the BES islands and reflected the
primacy of sexual rights in defining Dutch citizenship.
Since the Netherlands became the first country in the world to legalize gay marriage in
2001, the country is widely recognized for its acceptance of sexual minorities. Yet a mainstream
antihomophobia politics in the Netherlands has only begun to develop recently.11 Since the
1990s, rightist parties like by Pim Fortuyn’s List Pim Fortuyn (LFP) and later Geert Wilder’s
Party for Freedom (PVV) have, with stunning electoral success, promoted a pro-gay marriage,
anti-immigrant political platform. The argument runs that the acceptance of gay rights and
women’s rights, celebrated markers of Dutch identity, clash with the ostensibly homophobic and
sexist views of the Netherland’s large Muslim immigrant population. Within recent years, the
arrival of Antilleans in the Netherlands has also drawn increased scrutiny from Dutch parliament,
where alleged criminality, poor education and the high rate of unemployment amongst Antilleanborn immigrants have met with controversial efforts to restrict the free movement of people
within the Kingdom.12 For parties like the PVV, only the total desertion of the Antilles promises
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to halt immigration to the Netherlands and protect spending on social welfare services. One
PVVer even controversially proposed auctioning off the Antillean islands on marktplaats.nl, the
Dutch variant of eBay.13
Dutch support for Antillean independence has increased in step with the belief that the
Antillean islands cannot adequately handle issues of good governance, economics, crime and
civil rights, and therefore demands intensified Dutch intervention. The expansion of sexual
freedoms in the Caribbean territories of the Kingdom has thus occurred against this backdrop,
initially moving to the forefront of Dutch-Antillean relations in 2007. That year, a Supreme
Court case on same-sex marriage in Aruba threw light on the limits of Antillean autonomy and
galvanized members of parliament to make “gay emancipation”14 a goal of constitutional
restructuring. The catalyst was a lawsuit filed by Dutch and Aruban couple Charlene and Esther
Oduber-Lamers on Aruba in 2004.15 The couple wed legally in the Netherlands in 2001, shortly
after same-sex unions became legal. After the public registry in Aruba refused to recognize the
couples’ marriage, the Oduber-Lamers’ filed a lawsuit for discrimination. In episodes
dramatically recounted in the press, the couple fled back to the Netherlands after the case incited
negative public attention and even violence against the Oduber-Lamers on Aruba. Although
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their efforts would eventually succeed, the strong emotions resulting from the couple’s legal
struggle, “underlined a deep cultural rift between liberal Holland and its conservative former
colony.”16 Aruban officials, stating that gay marriage struck at “the very heart of Aruban life,”
were dubious about the ruling’s implications. One Aruban official asked, “If we accept gay
marriage, would we next have to accept Holland’s marijuana bars and euthanasia? They have
their culture, we have ours.”17
Strikingly, the international press glossed over the ambiguous colonial relationship
between Aruba and the Netherlands and emphasized instead the clash in sexual mores between
the “liberal” Netherlands and Aruba, the conservative perpetrator of homophobic discrimination.
Scholar Natasha Omise’eke Tinsley argues that the misplaced emphasis in the international press
on a “culture clash” overlooked, “what part of public reaction was fueled by homophobia and
what part by anticolonial sentiment – by resentment that Aruba was bound to recognize the
Netherlands’ laws despite its autonomous status, and that Dutch travelers and Dutch legislature
dictate the day-to-day realities of this place, right down to its intimate relationship.”18
Troublingly, the international press would continue to disavow the legacy of imperialism
immanent within contemporary Kingdom relations when discussions began over the integration
of the BES islands.
A month before the Supreme Court was set to rule on the Oduber-Lamers case, and
amidst ongoing discussion over the legal assimilation of the BES islands, a representative of
Democrats66 (D66)—a progressive social liberal party who had publicly supported the Oduber16
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Lamers—requested that the Minister of Justice clarify the future of Dutch marriage law on the
island of Bonaire. The year before, Bonaire finalized plans to develop “direct ties” with the
Netherlands although the precise designs for assimilation, as yet an unprecedented event in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands, remained unclear. Boris van der Ham, member of D66 implored,
“If Bonaire becomes a new municipality of the Netherlands, I assume that Dutch same-sex
marriage laws will also be in force…In the coming time surely there will be a lot of
compromises made with Bonaire. We request that the government not compromise over the
equal treatment of people.”19 Early on in political negotiations, then, extending same-sex
marriage to the integrated Dutch Caribbean became a key goal for progressive politicians.
As Antillean dissolution loomed throughout the following years, parliamentary response
to Van der Ham’s initial behest laid bare the major divisions in Dutch government that would
remain in place in the run-up to Antillean dismantlement. Support for the legalization of samesex marriage in the BES islands unified a broad coalition of parties, including D66 and
GreenLeft on the left and PVV of the populist right, and liberal-centrists like the People’s Party
for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). On the Christian right, however, parties like the Reformed
Political Party (SGP), Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) and Christian Union (CU) resisted
the introduction of “ethical laws” into the BES islands. Meanwhile, the government leaders with
the greatest responsibility for Antillean affairs, including the Minister of Justice and the
Secretary of Interior and Kingdom Relations, defended a moderate and gradual implementation
of Dutch law together with intensive input from the islands. These key figures, however, relied
on the legislative authority of the parliament to define how precisely the “public entities” would
join the Dutch state, and, likewise, how the Dutch state would expand to include the Caribbean.
19
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The Minister of Justice’s reply to van der Ham illuminates one of the curious tensions in
these discussions. Hirsch Ballin, then Minister of Justice and a major figure in Antillean affairs
since the 1990s, argued that van der Ham’s reductive statement that Bonaire would become a
new municipality of the Netherlands overlooked a much more complicated juridical process that
would take many years to define. While the ultimate goal would be to achieve the closest
possible harmonization between the laws of Bonaire and the Netherlands, the Minister reasoned
that, at that time, “the question will arise whether there must be greater consensus over civil law
throughout the Kingdom, but we are bound to address this in consultation [with the islands].”20
For Ballin, the question over gay marriage was primarily a juridical issue, the major stakes of
which centered on the democratic inclusion of the islands in legislative decision-making. This
notion of democracy, however, clashed with some amongst the left who emphasized the
protection of equal individual rights over popular democracy. These two notions of
democracy—space for collective and popular decision making, on the one hand, and the
injunction to defend equal rights for all individuals—would crosscut each other throughout
parliamentary discussion.

“Gay Emancipation” and the Incoherence of Equal Individual Rights
As the Minister of Justice pointed out, because the BES islands would integrate into the
Netherlands as “public entities,” the juridical relationship of the BES islands to the Netherlands
required separate provisions and processes. Parliamentarians grew increasingly restless over the
ambiguity of this status. MPs agitated to move beyond the discussion of the Antilles’ economic
relation to the Netherlands and on to social issues of broad import. Two MPs in particular
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became the most vocal and insistent proponents of extending Dutch marriage legislation in the
Caribbean. In the heated run-up to Antillean dismantlement between 2009-2010, VVD
representative Johan Remkes and member of GreenLeft Ineke van Gent issued a series of
amendments to secure Dutch marriage law in the Caribbean. 21 Their arguments and the support
they garnered in the House of Representatives show the difficulty of embracing programs at once
sexually progressive and democratically inclusive.
At the close of the parliamentary year in December of 2009, Van Gent and Remkes
issued the first in a series of amendments designed to place gay marriage at the top of
parliament’s agenda during the next congressional year. This jointly-sponsored amendment
recommended:
The prospective changing political relations must seek to ensure equal treatment for all
citizens and must exclude discrimination on any grounds…the chamber requests the
government to ensure no later than 10/10/2010 that people of the same sex can legally
marry anywhere within the Kingdom per the new political relations.22
Strikingly, this amendment proposed to legalize gay marriage even within autonomously
governed parts of the Kingdom. Although the 2007 Supreme Court decision in the OduberLamers case ensured the recognition of same-sex marriages throughout the Kingdom, this
amendment proposed a drastic curtailing of autonomy in the interest of defending “equal
treatment” of and eradicating discrimination amongst citizens. As parliamentary discussion
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unfolded throughout the following months, commitment to dissolving “discrimination on any
grounds” within the Kingdom took ambivalent and often contradictory forms.
To widespread approval, parliament approved the Van Gent and Remkes amendment
when the representatives convened early in 2010 to discuss legislation in the BES islands. In a
move some mocked as “political opportunism,” a number of parties rushed to support the
“emancipation” of Antillean homosexuals just several months before parliamentary elections.23
A member of the Socialist Party (SP) reflected on whether the BES islands would need to adopt
Dutch marriage law and stated, “The SP-faction respects that until today the islands have had
their own responsibilities, but now that they want to become part of the Netherlands, the SP no
longer regards this difference as justified.”24 Citing the Netherland’s own historic decision to
legalize same-sex marriage, Remkes argued that no one at the time entertained pardoning more
conservative municipalities from implementing the law. To excuse the BES islands from
national marriage law would now be comparably absurd. And although the PVV supported
political independence for the Antilles, in this instance the controversial PVV-er Hero Brinkman
(who proposed selling the Antilles on marktplaats.nl) echoed the majority of parliamentarians,
opining, “If the BES islands indicate that they would like to be part of the Netherlands, then
some things go with this. In negotiations it should then be very simple and one-dimensional: if
you want that, that is fine, but then you must also accept gay marriage.”25
Two salient points emerge through these discussions. The first is the parliamentarians’
unproblematic acceptance that the BES islands, in choosing to develop direct ties with the
Netherlands, wished to integrate fully into the Dutch state and to accept all Dutch law. Indeed,

23

“Politiek Opportunisme,” Antilliaans Dagblad, 25 May 2010. http://www.antilliaansdagblad.com/lezers/1254politiek-opportunisme.
24
Tweede Kamer, 20 January 2010, 37.
25
Ibid., 35.

169

parliamentary insistence that the islands must assimilate fully into the Netherlands gained
increased traction only after 2009 as plans for Antillean dissolution concretized. The timing
suggests that, at the outset, full integration in the Netherlands was neither the plan nor the
intention. As I will later explore, the equation of “direct ties” with total legal assimilation
became a major point of contention between some politicians from the BES islands and their
constituents, on the one hand, and the Dutch parliament on the other. Secondly, however, is the
pervasive assumption amongst Dutch parliamentarians that in exercising popular selfsovereignty in the 2004-2005 referenda, the islands henceforth forfeited rights to collective and
popular negotiation during the transition process.
Van Gent’s comments demonstrate parliament’s restrained interpretation of Antillean
sovereignty as justified by the defense of sexual freedoms. In an emotional appeal to the
parliament she argued, “Let one thing be clear: when it comes to the equal treatment of citizens
within the Kingdom, when it comes to gay marriage, the position of the woman, abortion and
euthanasia, then the onus is on us not to compromise (marchanderen).”26 If, as Van Gent argues,
the Netherlands must work to secure these rights throughout even the autonomously governing
parts of the Kingdom, then by what logic could the Antilles resist Dutch intervention? Members
of parliament thus implicitly suggested that only total independence could protect selfsovereignty in the legislative process.
Such arguments illustrate the extent to which the logic of territorial sovereignty looms in
the minds of many Dutch people and policy-makers. Although unrepresentative in its vitriol,
Brinkman’s (PVV) comments to a mixed audience of Dutch parliamentarians and Antillean
leaders are significant: “Self-determination is not only for colonial peoples, but also for the
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Netherlands. Self-determination is not just an instrument of decolonization. The Dutch people
want out of the Charter. The PVV provides that.”27 The third largest political party in the
Netherlands and a key member of the coalition government in 2010, Brinkman’s sentiments
surely resonated with many Dutch people. Yet even among the comments of more moderate
parliamentarians one can detect that Dutch and Caribbean aspirations for independence have
been hard to reconcile with the reality that this might never occur. Speaking on behalf of the
Dutch Labor party, Antillean-born John Leerdam stated resignedly, “The Labor Party is not
concerned with false solutions, not with ways to remove the Antilles and Aruba from the
Kingdom against the will of their people…We all know that this is impossible within the Charter
of the Kingdom and under international law. And that the inhabitants of the islands are free to
decide their own future. So be it.”28 Leerdam followed this momentary reflection on the
impossibility of independence with a passionate appeal to reinvigorate political cooperation
throughout the Kingdom. The pep talk, however, contained little by way of creating a
representative body of all constituent countries, in the absence of which Dutch law and Dutch
institutions operate as the de facto legislatures of the Kingdom writ large. Failure to take
seriously the Kingdom as a political unit—not the Netherlands as a state unit leading the
Kingdom—enabled the endurance of the Kingdom’s “democratic deficit.”29
In situating defenses of gay marriage in a discourse of civil liberties and human rights,
parties such as the VVD and GreenLeft downplayed the importance of negotiation with the BES
27
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islands as a form of liberty and rights. The broad coalition of parties supporting the extension of
Dutch marriage law in the Caribbean implicitly argued that the island’s decision to integrate into
the Netherlands invalidated the need for collaborative decision-making. Although I will later
discuss the different interpretations of integration on the Antillean side, my interest here lies in
questioning how Dutch parliamentarians employed an outmoded logic of national decolonization
and the language of sexual progressivism to justify Antillean exclusion in the process of defining
public entity status. The rhetoric of “choice”—of choosing to become Dutch—enabled
parliamentarians to both avoid questions of historical and structural inequality and to unilaterally
define public entity status in the BES islands. Sexual politics in this case afforded an extreme
expansion of Dutch responsibilities in the wider Antilles, challenging traditions of cultural and
political autonomy.
The belief that sexual rights in the Antilles must be won and fought for by the Dutch
raises problematic questions about the historical relationships between Europe and the
Caribbean. In jettisoning a historical framework from their discussions, the majority of
parliamentarians overlooked the disturbing irony that the former colonial authority was now, in
the name of sexual progressivism, proposing to educate former colonies about protecting human
rights and civic freedoms. Writing on British aid conditionality and LGBT rights in Africa,
political scientist Rahul Rao warns that such, “a contemporary rerun of the civilising mission: the
spectre of the erstwhile imperial power and its white dominions berating the black and brown
Commonwealth for its backwardness is not one that is likely to engender the sort of change that
its proponents wish for.”30 Strikingly, these historical blinders enabled parliamentarians to
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refashion “public entity” status as, on the one hand, undifferentiatingly Dutch vis-à-vis sexual
rights and, on the other hand, unequally entitled access to the coffers of the Dutch welfare state.
Members of the Christian right attempted to draw attention to the incoherencies of this logic in
an effort to obstruct the legalization of same-sex marriage, abortion and euthanasia in the
Caribbean.

Questioning the Past, Contesting Sexual Rights: The Dutch Christian Right
If the parties supporting the legalization of gay marriage in the BES islands marginalized
the history of imperialism in their efforts to expand sexual rights and freedoms, the same cannot
be said of the minority of Dutch parties in opposition to so-called “ethical laws.” From the
inception of the gay marriage question in 2007 to its ultimate legalization in the BES islands in
2012, the parties of the Christian right31 criticized the neoimperial chauvinism latent in
arguments to introduce gay marriage, abortion, and euthanasia in the Caribbean. Cleverly
obviating a critique of the “ethical laws” rooted in Christian morality—an unwise political move
in a largely secular parliament—the Christian right instead called attention to the echoes of
imperialism in the parliament’s unilateral decision-making process. Although typically the
intellectual preserve of the left, the Christian right appropriated the language of anti-colonial

powers. See Luis Abolafia Anguila, “Aid Conditionality and Respect for LGBT People Rights,” Sexuality Policy
Watch, http://www.sxpolitics.org/?p=7369. See also the report on the colonial origins of anti-sodomy laws and their
contemporary repercussions in India, Malaysia and Uganda produced by Human Rights Watch, This Alien Legacy:
The Origins of “Sodomy” Laws in British Colonialism (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2008). I cannot find any
reference to anti-sodomy laws in the early modern Dutch Caribbean, although it is reasonable to assume that such
provisions existed given that anti-sodomy laws were on the law books in certain Dutch cities until the adoption of
the Napoleonic Code in 1811.
31
The orthodox Calvinist Reformed Political Party (SGP) is perhaps the most sexually conservative Dutch party.
The oldest political party in the Netherlands, the SGP is known as a “testimonial party” given its primary interest in
emphasizing Christian principles versus participating in the coalition government. Even the SGP’s website goes
offline on Sundays in observance of the Sabbath. Although a minor faction holding just two seats in the House of
Representatives, members of the SGP typically vote in alliance with the ChristianUnion (CU), another Protestant
party. Together with the more mainstream Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), these Christian parties tend to vote
alike on issues relating to sex and sexuality.

173

critique in parliament and again in 2012 when the BES islands’ voted in their first Dutch national
election. Their arguments bring to the fore the troubling estrangement between sexual
progressivism and anti-colonial resistance.
Early discussions in 2007 reveal the peculiar affinity between homophobic and antiimperial politics. When D66 insisted that the Minister of Justice legalize gay marriage on
Bonaire, the SGP immediately indicted the left’s condescension, “The SGP has an understanding
of Bonaire’s objections to gay marriage, and stronger yet: we share these objections. My faction
takes issue with the spirit of neocolonial patronizing from the left, who, with a raised finger think
they can help the whole world achieve gay marriage.”32 The CU also repudiated the left’s
neocolonial “civilizing mission” and argued that the rhetoric of equal rights for all citizens
throughout the Kingdom concealed their opponent’s hypocrisy. Especially in the final year of
deliberations over BES island legislation between 2009-2010, mention of gay marriage in
parliament often derailed debates over pension, health insurance and social relief spending.
During one such contentious debate in January 2010, Curaçao-born CU representative Cynthia
Ortega-Martijn called attention to discrepancies in the VVD’s campaign for “equal” treatment
throughout the Kingdom, arguing, “On the other hand we have just debated social security and
insurance. In that instance Remkes was a supporter of structurally unequal treatment. I just
don’t understand that.”33 Although Remkes retorted that the cost of living in the BES islands
was cheaper than in the Netherlands, he did not discuss how widespread changes after 10/10/10
might raise the price of commodities to unprecedented levels.
The ultimate creation of separate social security laws, standards for schools and hospitals,
even the introduction of a separate currency (USD) in the BES islands lay bare the
32
33

Ibid.
Tweede Kamer, 20 January 2010, 39.

174

improvisational and selective process of Caribbean integration.34 As Minister of Justice Hirsch
Ballin cautioned early on, “Of course we can say here from a Dutch perspective that it is
desirable to eliminate the differences between ‘public entities’ and Dutch municipalities. [The
BES islands] will not be Dutch municipalities with hearth and home; they have their own input.
We must follow this procedure.”35 And yet the effort to legally guarantee sexual freedoms in the
BES islands highlights perhaps more than any other issue just how far many members of
parliament were willing to stray from the injunction to include the islands during the transition
process. While less damning in their critique than the SGP, the more moderate CDA remained
dubious over the outcome of swift and unequivocal assimilation. Prominent CDA representative
Bas Jan van Bochove argued:
The Final Declaration of 2006 states that a significant part of Dutch-Antillean legislation
will remain in force in the three islands, and that Dutch legislation will be introduced
gradually…The argument to handle things in this manner received the support of the
CDA. The immediate and full implementation of Dutch legislation works to disrupt
many things of the islands. This applies to the immediate—I would say almost
decreed—introduction of gay marriage…The CDA will not cooperate on direct
implementation as a condition for supporting the process of political change.36
Members of the left rushed to point out how the lives of same-sex desiring men and women in
the Antilles were “disrupted” by social discrimination and demanded an immediate clarification
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of van Bochove’s personal support for gay marriage, all the while ignoring the process agreed
upon in the 2006 Final Declaration, which resolved to dismantle the Netherlands Antilles.
Despite the Christian right’s appeals for the left to be historically mindful and politically
consistent, the parliament resolved the “homosexual question” against the advice of leading
government officials and the minority of Christian right opposition both in the House of
Representatives and the Senate.37 After Van Gent and Remkes introduced yet another
amendment to hasten the introduction of same-sex unions from 2015 to 2012, the Senate
approved these and other plans for legally assimilating the BES islands on May 12, 2010.
Among a diverse package of laws, the ethical laws drew the greatest opposition both in their
content and form. One senator from the CDA claimed:
It is incomprehensible that a majority of the House took the view that they need to
regulate these highly sensitive subjects for the residents of the three islands—and without
any form of consultation with the island councils and their leaders. The CDA respects
why residents of the BES islands have expressed misunderstanding on this point.38
Facing tremendous time constraints just several months before the Netherlands Antilles would
cease to exist, the Senate was forced to swallow their misgivings and approve of the legislation.
The controversy, however, did not end with the Senate’s approval. Two years after the
historic dismantlement of the Netherlands Antilles occurred on October 10, 2010, the SGP
capitalized on the enduring chasm between sexual progressivism and anti-colonial resistance.
Just a month shy of the planned date for legalizing same-sex marriage, the SGP launched an
aggressive campaign in the Caribbean as residents of the BES islands prepared to vote in their
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first Dutch national elections. In published party statements circulating in the Antilles, the SGP
promised:
Much has transpired within the Kingdom in the recent past… The SGP finds it
undesirable that the BES islands, which are part of the Netherlands, have ethically
reprehensible things imposed upon them…Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba must have the
flexibility to reject abortion, euthanasia, gay marriage and prostitution. They must not be
coerced into accepting such matters.39
Full-page ads running in Antillean newspapers and posters appearing throughout the BES islands
stated, “The SGP is a Christian party. That’s our bottom line…That’s why the SGP supports
classic marriage. We are against gay marriage. Many people on the islands think the same way.
Good. Stay that way.”40 After running these campaigns in the 2012 elections, the SGP, long the
holder of two seats in the House of Representatives, increased their representation to three seats.
The election had been the most successful to date, drawing a record 196,834 votes for the party.
In reflecting on the breadth of parliamentary discussion in the run-up to Antillean
dissolution, this chapter has sought to illuminate a process of discursive and political foreclosure:
for government leaders and, as will later be shown, for some residents of the Antilles, supporting
the advancement of sexual rights while simultaneously resisting the unilateral and expansive
intervention of the Dutch was an untenable and impossible position. While GreenLeft and the
VVD undoubtedly spearheaded the parliamentary struggle for “gay emancipation,” broad
support for their measures enabled the parliament to abandon initial plans for collaboration with
and inclusion of the BES islands. Insisting that the choice to “become Dutch” meant the
wholesale adoption of Dutch law, however, proved more expedient to advancing ethical
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legislation. In matters of social welfare spending, parliamentarians held fast to the distinctions
between public entities and municipalities. Thus it fell to the Christian right, the only political
group who could risk unambiguity in their position on sexual freedoms, to question the
incoherencies and inequality latent within their opponents’ rationale. This process of foreclosure
carried over into the Antilles, where political and religious leaders and gay rights activists
grappled with the dangers and promises of closer metropolitan ties.

The Sexual Politics of Integration in the BES Islands
Many people on the BES islands opposed parliament’s decision to accelerate the
enforcement of ethical laws. Emphasizing the undemocratic and zero-sum process by which the
islands would “become Dutch,” and highlighting the religious and cultural differences between
the European Netherlands and their overseas entities, political and religious leaders on Bonaire
and St. Eustatius attempted to halt the legalization of gay marriage and even threatened to
abandon integration efforts entirely. Despite initial resistance on Saba, the island’s leaders
supported the advancement of gay rights and promoted same-sex marriage tourism by the time
same-sex marriage became legal in 2012. While the international press and mainland Dutch
politicians frequently cast Antillean opposition as an extension of conservative Catholic social
mores in the Caribbean, surfacing in Antillean discussions are anxieties over the loss of local
autonomy and attempts to reconfigure the meaning of sovereignty in an integrated state. Given
the parliament’s insistence that the islands must become legally Dutch, leaders and activists in
the BES islands operated within a narrowed discursive space wherein support for same-sex
marriage could be understood as encouraging Dutch hegemony in the process of legal
assimilation.
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As Antillean dissolution drew nearer, island representatives from Bonaire and St.
Eustatius challenged parliament’s interpretation of public entity status. For leaders from Bonaire
and St. Eustatius, the question of same-sex marriage became a focal point of disappointment and
frustration regarding the future of political relations between the Netherlands and BES islands.
Tensions ran high when Antillean and Dutch politicians met in The Hague in 2009 to discuss
how to amend the Charter. That year, Bonaire’s ruling party lost its majority and in its place
ascended the Partido Demokrátiko Boneriano (DPB). Bonaire’s new government was outspoken
in their criticism of The Hague and attempted to reverse integration, calling instead for
autonomous statehood within the Kingdom. With this change in 2009 and with intensified
parliamentary discussions that year, representatives from both Bonaire and St. Eustatius
increasingly denounced actions in The Hague, in particular the hastened introduction of what
some Antilleans deemed the “anti-social laws.”41
Representatives from Bonaire and St. Eustatius drew attention to the ways in which the
transition process by 2009 strayed from the political imaginaries of the 2005 referenda.
Although discussion over same-sex marriage was not on the parliament’s agenda when Antillean
and Dutch representatives met to negotiate the Charter, Ramoncito Booi, leader of the second
largest political party in Bonaire, the Union Patriotico Bonairano (UPB), wasted no time in
raising the issue, “I find it unethical that suddenly [the implementation of the law] has been
shortened from five to two years and that we need to swallow that. I do not think this is the right
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form.”42 Grounding opposition to the legalization of same-sex marriage in a moral discourse of
democratic rights, and not a moral discourse of appropriate sexuality, Antillean politicians hoped
to expose how The Hague had disavowed the terms established during the 2006 Final
Declaration. Statian representative Reginald Zaandam stated warily that the people of St.
Eustatius were “sitting in a constitutional train racing towards an endpoint they did not choose,”
and opined: “I am able to ascertain from the literature that for self-determination to cease to exist
for an area, that area with free will and without any coercion must make the decision to be
integrated. My island is not freely integrated! Therefore I say that it is important—for me it is
sacred—to examine how the right [to self-determination] has been maintained after 10-10-10 in
the island territory of St. Eustatius.”43 For these politicians, parliament’s decision to legalize
same-sex marriage without consulting the islands confirmed that The Hague had not bargained in
good faith, usurping Antillean autonomy and unilaterally imposing the terms of integration.
The Antillean and Dutch presses followed the debate on gay marriage closely. With the
press as mouthpiece, Statian politicians continued the campaign at home to prevent the
legalization of gay marriage. Although ultimately unsuccessful, the island council of St.
Eustatius unanimously accepted an amendment to halt the introduction of same-sex marriage,
abortion, and euthanasia on the island and threatened to invoke the United Nations if the Dutch
did not comply with their request. One official argued, “During the process, the Netherlands
indicated that they would take into account the fundamental human rights of the residents of the
islands. Gay marriage, euthanasia, and abortion are here morally rejected and are diametrically
opposed to our community and culture.”44 While Dutch politicians as well as sympathetic
Antillean leaders and gay rights activists framed gay rights as human rights, Statian politicians
42
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defended their opposition to gay marriage in the language of human rights centered on principles
of self-determination and democratic inclusion. However, it was precisely because St. Eustatius
sought the right to self-determination within an integrated Kingdom that some Dutch observers
dismissed the amendment as a “losing struggle.” A Dutch constitutional scholar said, “I would
not know what they would be able to ask the UN. The discussion always concerns the question
of when you can become an independent country, not about what kind of legislation applies
internally within countries.”45 Such conflicts reveal the limited means for discussing and
arbitrating conflicts in political spaces that are neither fully independent nor wholly integrated.
For others on Bonaire it was not simply infractions against autonomy that threatened
island rights. Indeed, as the transition date loomed, a flurry of Dutch officials arrived to
reorganize health and social welfare services, economic bureaus, and even to rebuild prisons.
One Bonairean pastor lamented, “The arrival of large numbers of European Dutch has led to
moral decay amongst the island’s populace.”46 Referencing the general public opinion across the
Antilles, one resident claimed, “The Netherlands wants to bring their pernicious values here in
exchange for debt forgiveness.”47 Closer ties with the Netherlands thus promised to restrict
Antillean claims to autonomy while also threatening morality and culture on the islands. Yet
politicians, religious leaders and commentators in the press who emphasized the “big cultural
and emotional shocks” that awaited the BES islands in the aftermath of integration found the
issue of cultural autonomy inseparable from concerns over democratic debate and inclusion. A
resident of St. Eustatius summed up the affinity between these issues: “These are issues that
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affect our culture, customs and religious sensibilities. You cannot just one day change the rules.
This requires first a public debate.”48
In discussions over same-sex marriage, Antillean “culture” emerges as a major roadblock
on the path of sexual progressivism. At least for the Dutch politicians who framed Antillean
resistance as a matter of cultural difference, it is unclear what precisely is meant by “culture.” In
its abstracted form, notions of cultural difference worked to secure an image of Europeans as the
bearer of progressive, liberal rights and residents of the Antilles—in particularly those who are
gay-identifying—as victims of a conservative, intolerant culture. The region’s Christian
religiosity plays a central role in imagining the cultural estrangement between the Netherlands
and the Caribbean. Although many scholars of the Caribbean have rejected the idea that
Christian respectability alone informs sexual mores in the region, they have nevertheless taken
seriously sexual conservatism as a response to the history of European-labeling of the region as
hypersexual.49 Writing on European stereotypes of the Caribbean, sociologist Kamala
Kempadoo writes, “Polygamy, tribadery, sodomy, rape, adultery, prostitution, incest, bestiality,
pederasty and sexual profligacy as well as a perceived lack of modesty were taken as prime
indicators of inferiority.”50 Throughout the colonial period, notions of hyper-sexuality
functioned to justify European coercion based on racial difference. In a curious reversal, today it
is the region’s perceived conservatism that rationalizes Dutch interference in the Antilles. The
question remains to what extent the opposition to “ethical laws” in the Antilles stems from fear
over the loss of political and cultural autonomy or from moral conservatism. One answer might
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be that incorporating attention to Antillean comments on “culture” can expose the false binary
between anti-colonial resistance and moral opposition.
Antillean politicians and residents thus looked to the future of political relations between
the two regions and the disappointed aspirations for forging more equitable forms of political
association in the Kingdom. For many in the Dutch Caribbean, the issue of sexual politics
portended a future of political marginalization and exclusion. One columnist in Bonaire stated,
“The amendment to introduce gay marriage, abortion and euthanasia – done without consulting
the islands – has shown to many people at once how the relationship will be after 2010.”51 Like
the Dutch Christian right, some politicians pointed out the ambivalent interpretation of full
European integration. A Saban deputy asked, “In other areas, such as the level of salaries and
benefits, there are differences between the Netherlands and the BES islands. Why not also on
ethical grounds?”52
Even on Saba, where political and popular support for Dutch legislation emerges as the
outlier amongst the BES islands, enthusiasm for Dutch law eroded neither political imaginaries
for intensified forms of democratic inclusion nor the possibility for eventual separation. Chris
Johnson, a leading deputy from the island, stated in the Dutch press: “In our Island Council we
have a member who is openly gay. There are other same-sex couples on the island, too. But this
does not take away from the fact that the people would like to have a say in the way we shape
legislation.”53 During a later debate, Johnson quoted Multatuli, a nineteenth-century Dutch
author whose writings denounced the abuses of Dutch colonialism in the East Indies, stating,
“Multatuli wondered if people in the future would say about Indonesia: once there were Dutch
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people in this land. We cannot see the future, but through [the Charter] the Netherlands offers
Saba the security that Saba does not need to depend in perpetuity on anyone, if ever the Dutch
leave the West.”54 Significantly for Saban politicians, the choice to cooperate with Dutch law—
whether on same-sex marriage in particular or during the transition process in general—was seen
as an exercise in sovereignty, not as overwhelming evidence of its curtailment.
On October 10, 2012, two years after the Netherlands received “thousands of nonWestern ethnic minorities living in municipalities overseas,” gay marriage became legal on
Bonaire, Saba and St. Eustatius. Shortly after the first gay couple wed on Saba in December
2012, numerous articles appeared in the international gay press with headlines such as,
“Legalization of Gay Marriage Sends Saba’s Popularity Soaring,” and “Tiny Island Becomes
Same-Sex Marriage Refuge.”55 Saba’s Minister of Tourism, himself an openly gay man,
announced that he would use gay marriage in promotional materials for the island’s tourism and
reported that inquiries had poured in from around the Caribbean after an Aruban and Venezuelan
wed last year.56
Curiously, two groups claimed responsibility for Saba’s historic legalization of gay
marriage, the first island in the Caribbean to allow same-sex couples to legally marry. The
Saban press stressed that the legalization of gay marriage was a homegrown effort, an “initiative
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that came entirely from Saba itself,”57 and attributed the achievement to Carl Bruncamper, a gayidentifying Island Councilman who won support for same-sex marriage by defending it as a
human rights issue.58 Meanwhile, the president of COC Netherlands, the largest gay rights
organization in the Netherlands, congratulated the COC’s dedication in bringing marriage law to
the Dutch Caribbean.59
As these varied interpretations suggest, the advocacy of Dutch gay rights organizations in
the Antilles has had an ambivalent impact. A small group of activists working together across
the Antilles actively supported the legalization of gay marriage in the islands and crusaded for
the social acceptance of gay rights more broadly. These activists, however, appealed their
arguments to the Dutch parliament and aligned with Dutch gay rights organizations to advance
their cause, further compounding the estrangement between sexual progressivism and antiimperialism. In 2008, FOKO Curaçao, the largest Antillean gay rights organization, wrote a
letter appealing to the Dutch House of Representatives urging them not to allow any of the BES
islands to integrate without first agreeing to uphold Dutch legislation on same-sex marriage.
Moreover, they asserted, “The excuse that Antillean politicians offer, that…gay marriage would
not fit with Antillean culture is incorrect, and besides, if it were true, then it would nevertheless
be unacceptable that Antillean leaders’ misguided vision of their own culture takes precedence
over the civil rights and international treaties arising from legal principles of equality.”60 In
opposition to the majority of Antillean politicians, FOKO publicly endorsed the Dutch parties
such as GreenLeft. And when the legalization of gay marriage appeared imminent, FOKO
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received significant financial support from the COC in order begin educational outreach in the
BES islands.61
While activists on Saba and Bonaire joined in founding the Pink-Orange Alliance, a
Dutch and Caribbean gay rights and activist network, St. Eustatius, probably the most outspoken
in their disagreement with Dutch legislation, rejected invitations to participate.62 Meanwhile, the
leader of the newly erected Diversity Bonaire, a sister organization of FOKO and member of the
Pink-Orange Alliance, expressed hope for the future of gay rights on the BES islands precisely
because the islands would become part of the Netherlands. He stated: “In the Netherlands there
are rights to protect everyone regardless of sexual orientation—that’s what I want in Bonaire.”63
In other words, sexual progressivism in the Caribbean could be achieved because of Dutch
leadership and example.
FOKO leader Mario Kleinmoedig, however, found the reliance on Dutch leadership to be
a frustrating legacy of unequal relations between the Dutch and the Caribbean. Perceptively,
Kleinmoedig argued that this legacy obscured the difference between “autonomy and one’s own
culture on the one hand and voluntary discrimination of minorities on the other.”64 Although he
dismissed critics stating that the implementation of ethical laws was “neocolonial,” Kleinmoedig
nevertheless felt that the history of colonial relations forced Antillean reliance on Dutch
leadership in the struggle to win sexual rights:
First, it is a big scandal that the Antillean states, in the fifteen years that the Antillean gay
rights movement has existed, never addressed our calls for a homegrown Antillean gay
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emancipation movement, and that the [Dutch] parties have never invited us into
discussion. Secondly, as an autonomous but non-independent country, we have little
access to international arbitrators, which leaves nothing left for us to do than follow along
with the Kingdom government and the Kingdom parliament.65
Kleinmoedig’s comments illustrate how the legacy of colonialism and the configuration of nonsovereignty have foreclosed avenues for advancing sexual freedoms and forced reliance on
Dutch leadership. The issues of constrained sovereignty, foreclosed options, and the narrow
imagination of an international order unable to contend with alternate forms of statehood
resonate throughout the Dutch Caribbean and the non-self-governing world. Yet Kleinmoedig
also seized upon the historic moment of integration to advance sexual freedoms in the Antilles, a
struggle he defended as Antillean in origin and yet compatible with—indeed made in some ways
possible by—closer ties with the Netherlands. In this instance, the condition of non-sovereignty
provided for the radical extension of certain freedoms at the same time that it foreclosed others.

Conclusion
As this chapter has attempted to show, the controversy over same-sex marriage in the
Dutch Caribbean played a formative role in shaping the political relationship between the
Netherlands and the BES islands from 2007 to 2012. I have argued that the integration of the
BES islands as public entities followed an improvised course, and that the implementation of
Dutch legislation on gay marriage, abortion and euthanasia did not originate in a carefully
planned policy of total legal assimilation. Rather, the accelerated enforcement of these laws
deviated from plans to preserve a degree of legislative autonomy in the BES islands and, more
importantly, to include soon-to-be public entities in negotiations concerning their political
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futures. Throughout I have examined the ways in which the history of Dutch colonialism in the
Caribbean has entered into discussions on sexual freedoms, and how interpretations of this
history by Dutch and Antillean politicians has rendered incommensurable the goals of sexual
progressivism and anti-imperialism. In exploring how sexual rights are denounced and defended
in the Dutch Caribbean we can understand more fully how lingering colonial relationships
continue to inform notions of rights, citizenship, and state-building.
Through the negotiation of sexual rights, Dutch and Antillean politicians have
simultaneously struggled over the boundaries and nature of Antillean autonomy. Frequently,
Dutch politicians countered the frustrations expressed in the BES islands by arguing that the
islands “chose” to become Dutch. On the other hand, Antillean opponents of same-sex marriage
grounded their resistance to sexual freedoms in the interest of defending cultural mores and
autonomy. These rhetorical moves in Europe and the Caribbean raise three questions. First, how
and in what ways have the “choices” of the BES islands regarding their political status within the
Kingdom been determined or constrained by a legacy of dependence? Secondly, how might the
controversy over same-sex marriage currently experienced in the BES islands have originated in
former colonial policies?66 Indeed, the presence of the Catholic Church and the sexual
conservatism on Bonaire, now deemed problematic by many Dutch officials, had traditionally
served as the keeper of Dutch culture in the late-colonial era.67 While religious attitudes in the
Netherlands have changed considerably in the postwar period, at least in the present discussion
on sexual rights, Dutch ability to unilaterally define and measure notions of “progress” appears
as a troubling holdover of the colonial past.
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Lastly, in what way does the rhetoric of “choice”–and, in particular, of “choosing to
become Dutch”–continue to assume a normative model of decolonization resulting in national
sovereignty and self-determination? Many Dutch people and politicians hold fast to the hope
that one day their former Caribbean dependencies will move toward total independence.68
Unlike former colonial attachment to Indonesia, which stimulated popular Dutch national
imagination and pride in the nineteenth century, the Caribbean then as now remains for many
Dutch people a distant region possessing little in common beyond a shared ruling family. With
the logic of national self-determination as the dominant paradigm for framing and claiming
rights, Dutch politicians have been empowered to dismiss both Antillean resistance to
asymmetrical relationships of power as well as possibilities for meaningful exchange in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands, taunting Antillean Dutch to “leave” the Kingdom if they are
displeased with it.
Antillean insistence to remain within the Kingdom in spite of these grievances and Dutch
ambivalence regarding their continued presence in the Caribbean reads against received
narratives of colonial struggles for liberation and European’s desperate attempts to curtail them.
If, as Todd Shepard suggests, metropolitan contemporaries reluctantly embraced a mythos of
decolonization as the inevitable fulfillment of their republican ideals, then those colonies that
disavowed independence would be seen as failures of the modernist project.69 As anthropologist
Vanessa Agard-Jones observes in the French départment d’outre-mer (DOM) of Martinique:
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Martinicans continue to be understood as products of a kind of modernist failure, having
not followed the standard postcolonial teleology to independence as did the majority of
other territories of the global South. Locally, same-sex desiring and gender-transgressing
people become subject to a culturalist agenda that rationalizes homophobia as an
expression of cultural sovereignty and as a way to defend Martinican ‘local values’
against those of the French state.70
Indeed, similar defenses of cultural sovereignty have emerged throughout this study on the nonsovereign Dutch Caribbean.
Within this constellation of factors, Antillean Dutch face two equally undesirable options:
refusing enduring ties with the Netherlands and, by extension, embracing the unwanted outcome
of independence, or acquiescing to Dutch policies that continue to betray the Kingdom’s alleged
commitment to equality by differentiating among Dutch citizens. In either scenario, the interests
of European Dutch are privileged over those of Antilleans in the Kingdom. Thus, the impossible
and inescapable binds that for Frantz Fanon characterized the “tragedy of the colonial situation”71
are again rehearsed in the postcolonial multinational state. And it is precisely these constraints
that from 2007-2012 drove a wedge between the standpoints of sexual progressivism and antiimperialism.
One wonders, however, whether the seeming incommensurability between sexual
progressivism and cultural sovereignty in the non-self-governing world might be overcome by
challenging interpretations of non-sovereignty as reactionary and anti-modern. Scholars of
political relations within the Kingdom of the Netherlands such as Lammert de Jong and Gert
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Oostindie have similarly argued that The Hague must invest in new notions of citizenship and
forms of political integration in order to meet the exigencies of a multinational state. These
scholars argue, in other words, that non-sovereignty should be recognized and dignified as a
form of statehood both in formal constitutional relationships across the Kingdom and informally
in order to engage in more enlightened popular and political debates.72
New questions thus emerge when we take seriously the multinational state as a unit of
analysis—a polity whose history is no doubt shaped by colonialism but whose future, if such
states are to succeed in meeting demands for freedom and equality, must not be overdetermined
by its colonial inheritances. If we are to incorporate analyses of non-sovereignty into theories of
empire and postcoloniality, the challenge will be to resist the temptation to view non-sovereign
territories as legacies—or perhaps even extensions—of imperialism and to view them instead as
potentially innovative political formations that disrupt conventional understandings of statehood
and citizenship. Such an analysis must take into account the extremely uneven power relations
evident within multinational or non-sovereign states like the Kingdom while also striving to
theorize freedom and justice through a commitment to non-national configurations. Looking to
Aimé Césaire on Martinique, Gary Wilder has argued that actors pursuing integration into the
French nation-state did not view their struggle as simply a means of bringing the benefits of
citizenship to the colonies. Instead, incorporation might carry with it the radical potential to
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transform the meaning of freedom and belonging in France, its former colonies, and throughout
the postwar world.73
From the standpoint of the present, such a broad re-thinking of citizenship and belonging
seems in many ways more urgent and yet simultaneously unreachable than ever before. The
debate over same-sex marriage in the Dutch Caribbean offers a small but meaningful window
into the seemingly intractable issue of equality in a context where histories of colonialism and
revitalized (European) demands for national sovereignty have rendered incommensurable the
goals of sexual progressivism and resistance to enduring forms of cultural domination. My
interest here lies not in arguing that non-sovereignty is necessarily coercive or insidious with
regards to matters of intimacy. Rather, I wish to argue that by situating sex and gender at the
center of studies of non-sovereignty we can more fully understand how the boundaries of
autonomy and integration are drawn, and how past and contemporary political relationships are
negotiated. It is this combined impulse towards autonomy and integration—as Curaçaon activist
Mario Kleinmoedig’s insightful comments remind us—that both forecloses and radically opens
paths for winning and redefining rights in a transnational Kingdom.

73

Wilder, Freedom Time, 7-9.	
  

192

Conclusion
Sex and Sovereignty after Empire

Within the explanatory notes of the 1954 Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands lies
a curious statement. It reads: “the Charter is not an eternal edict.”1 Indeed, assertions about the
ephemeral nature of laws and constitutions are rarely found in such historically significant
documents. Still more surprising is that the Charter, despite its invitation to revise the transAtlantic ties binding the Kingdom, has proven more resilient and enduring than it has fragile or
fleeting. As the chapters assembled here have explored, the bonds linking the European
Netherlands to the Kingdom’s Caribbean territories have steadfastly strengthened from the
announcement of imperial reform to the present day. Yet, as I have also argued, the process of
forging steadily strengthening ties has not been without its share of conflict. Throughout the
Kingdom’s postcolonial history, debates on topics ranging from household composition to family
planning and sex work to same-sex marriage have invoked broader questions about the nature of
trans-Atlantic ties. If sexual politics have served as a public venue for debating the Kingdom,
they have also helped to shape important policies in the Netherlands and the Antilles that have
drawn these Kingdom territories in ever-closer relation. In this way, the trajectory of
decolonization in the Kingdom cannot be understood apart from often-tense discussions on
gender, family and sexual politics.
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Looking to the ways in which Kingdom ties touch the ground in the daily lives and
intimate experiences of its residents on both sides of the Atlantic offers numerous insights for
students of colonialism and decolonization. Foremost among them, the strengthening rather than
severance of bonds between the Netherlands and the Antilles challenges the assumed trajectory
of decolonization. Addressing David Scott’s provocation to “give up constructing an image of
colonialism that demands from us an attitude of anticolonial longing,”2 this dissertation has
shown how some European and Antillean Dutch alike pursued closer collaboration with their
Kingdom counterparts throughout the postcolonial period. The willingness to seek equality
within the Kingdom rather than without, however, should not be read as an enduring
accommodation of colonialism, nor should we interpret the maintenance of Kingdom ties as the
outcome of a mild or benevolent form of colonialism. Those who have labored to transform the
substance and meaning of abiding trans-Atlantic relations have grappled with the durability of
racism and the tenacity of inequality. In the 1970s as in the last decade, Antillean Dutch activists
have openly condemned the effects of colonialism while still imagining a future of multinational
statehood wherein the even expansion of rights and privileges in the Kingdom could transform,
in ways more thoroughgoing and sincere, social and economic relations across the Atlantic.
Negotiations on the precise meaning of equality in a multinational state have not only
taken place in the halls of Parliament and in conversations among political elites and their radical
opponents. At various points, these trans-Atlantic attachments have been embraced and
challenged in protests against regulated prostitution, funding for family planning initiatives, and
in academic studies of single mothers. While familiar characters such as politicians and
revolutionaries have no doubt helped to shape the postcolonial Kingdom, “Closer Ties” has also
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shown how other popular actors both nurtured and contested trans-Atlantic ties by entering the
discursive terrain of gender, sexual and family politics. Oil companies, Catholic women’s
groups, family planning experts, welfare providers and academic researchers, and feminists and
LGBTQ rights groups have variously sought greater collaboration, intervention, or autonomy in
the Kingdom. Their actions have critically helped to mobilize opinion for and against this
commonwealth state. Focus on these dynamic processes of contestation and negotiation broaden
scholarly view of the subjects and actors that decolonization is presumed to concern.
Considering alternative sites of struggle, including especially those over sexual freedoms,
“Closer Ties” illuminates the varied locations and meaning of anti-imperial struggle itself.
Although independence movements have emerged sporadically in the Antillean islands over the
past seventy years, it is paradoxically in the European Netherlands and among European Dutch
that the aspiration for independence enjoys a high degree of popular and political support.
Recently, anti-immigrant populist parties have sought to extricate the Netherlands from the two
supranational states to which it belongs: the European Union and the Kingdom of the
Netherlands. But already in the 1970s, the progressive Labor government of Joop den Uyl
struggled to conceive of progress beyond the nation-state model, and attempted to thrust
independence on the Kingdom’s Caribbean territories. Dutch efforts to rouse rather than
suppress the zeitgeist ideal of territorial sovereignty amongst its Caribbean partners have, to
metropolitan chagrin, compelled only one exodus from the Kingdom in 1975, when Suriname
accepted total independence.3
Yet, in the Kingdom, “independence” has not always been synonymous with the
severance of ties between former metropole and colony. As this dissertation has shown, much of
3
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the drama in the Kingdom’s history lies in the islands’ relationships to each other. The popular
maxim on Aruba in the 1940s, “Never under Willemstad, better a thousand times under The
Hague,”4 captures the sense of frustration with Curaçao’s dominant political role in the Antillean
constellation. Aruba’s appeal to separate from Curaçao finally succeeded in 1986 when Dutch
politicians conceded to the decentralization of the Netherlands Antilles, stipulating that Aruba
must accept total independence ten years later. In 1993, Aruban politicians amazingly managed
to rescind this condition—and, with it, Dutch ambitions to shake off its imperial remnants in the
Caribbean.
In the past fifteen years, inter-island antagonism intensified as the remaining Antillean
islands complained of continued domination by Curaçao, which likewise resented its duty to look
after the smaller islands. On the symbolically chosen date of 10 October 2010, the Netherlands
Antilles ceased to exit, dissolving a state long accused of having only existed in the minds of
Dutch bureaucrats.5 With the absorption of the BES islands into the Dutch state that year, the
boundaries of the European Netherlands dramatically expanded. While I have argued that the
physical boundaries of the Kingdom owe their shape to the mobilizing power of sexual politics, I
have also argued that sexual politics have played a symbolic but no less profound role in
demarcating the boundaries of social, cultural, and material belonging. With the unprecedented
migration of growing numbers of Antillean Dutch to the Netherlands from the 1970s on, new
schemes have arisen to solidify notions of difference among ostensibly equal Dutch citizens.
The retrenchment of social welfare services in the Netherlands throughout the 1980s-1990s, and
the differential allocation of welfare in the contemporary Dutch Caribbean municipalities,
highlights the imbrication of the welfare state in broader postcolonial developments. This
4
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version of empire’s dénouement places the drama of imperial dissolution in Europe itself, and
bridges the only ostensible divide between the postwar and postcolonial period.
Recently, Ann Stoler has invited scholars of colonialism and its aftermaths to look
beyond the static ruins of empire to active processes of “decimation, displacement, and
reclamation” in order to better understand how the remains of imperial projects continue to exert
force in our present, engendering and revitalizing disparities.6 Engaging the temporal ingenuity
of Derek Walcott’s poetry, which slips between a past tense of bygone colonialism to its present
areas of abandonment, Stoler asks, what is the “rot that remains” when the men are gone?7 In
ways both predictable and obvious, the colonial past looms large in the non-sovereign world,
places that are often ambiguously integrated into former metropolitan states. In the Dutch
Caribbean, the unbroken attachments of empire allow for an easy and immediate recognition of a
colonial past, found in the recent gentrification of colonial neighborhoods or the aging colonialera oil refineries that blight the landscapes of both Aruba and Curaçao. Likewise, evidence of
this continued relationship saturates the institutions that govern the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
Unlike other regimes, however, the architects of these systems concede that this negotiation
between autonomy and integration is a permanent and foundational aspect of political life and
social realities.
At various points throughout this study, European Dutch politicians and their supporters
have abruptly retreated from the mandate to treat all Kingdom territories equally. Whether in the
sudden withdrawal of Dutch funding for family planning campaigns after the Trinta di Mei revolt
in 1969, or in the repeal of the National Assistance Act and social services for single mothers in
the 1990s, European Dutch politicians have repeatedly leveraged the nationalization of welfare
6
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and aid as punishment for daring to imagine futures beyond the nation-state. This dismissive
posturing enables European Dutch to counter Antillean grievances by claiming that Antillean
Dutch need not remain in a Kingdom that treats them unfairly, obviating a serious engagement
with the meaning of multinational citizenship.
What, then, is the rot that remains where the men never leave? In Dutch debates, the past
that overdetermines this question is not so much a colonial one. Rather, it is the recursive
assumption about decolonization – about how empires were alleged to have ended – that expands
and invests in certain notions of rights as it legitimizes the circumvention of others. In other
words, if we understand decolonization culminating in territorial sovereignty not as an
unfinished project in the non-sovereign world but as a historical sensibility that limits freedoms
to and frames political rights around the nation-state and national community, we can gain new
insights into the elusiveness of equality in a commonwealth Kingdom. The unfulfilled goal of
equality, however, should not be grounds for dissolving the Kingdom. Rather, it should compel
European and Antillean Dutch to take the Kingdom—and the unique path to decolonization
pursued within its borders—ever more seriously.
Making a contribution toward this effort, “Closer Ties” has considered debates on sexual
politics as sites where the Kingdom is lived, experienced, and contested. While sexual politics
mobilize publics beyond the former colonial world, I argue that these debates recur in the
Kingdom not simply because issues of morality are personal and sensitive. Rather, if we accept
that colonialism was so saturated by concerns about sexuality, then we must also consider how
sexuality would stand at the center of its undoing. In the Kingdom as in other post-slavery
societies, the stereotypes of black sexual irresponsibility that once underpinned justifications for
colonialism and slavery have had a long and pernicious afterlife. In the Kingdom, these
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stereotypes rationalized renewed intervention in the intimate lives of Antilleans at the moment of
decolonization and resurfaced in debates over family planning, immigration and welfare in
subsequent decades. Yet, it is also important to remember that sexual politics have not only
served as a technology for domination in the Kingdom. Arguments for enhanced sexual
freedoms have likewise entered the political programs and demands of Antilleans pursuing
emancipation within the Kingdom, just as these struggles have brought together some European
and Antillean Dutch in closer contact and collaboration. That the conflicts of the postcolonial
period have been profoundly saturated by anxieties around appropriate gender roles, conjugal
norms, and household organization reconceives the very substance of imperial dissolution, and
draws attention to the overlapping personal and political experiences of decolonization. The
Kingdom, with its lingering trans-Atlantic attachments, offers us a way to appraise the aftermath
of empire’s intimate entanglements.
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